Part 1: Consciousness and Qualia [410] ================================ Contents -------- 1.1 Subjectivity (Nagel) [34] 1.2 The Knowledge Argument (Jackson) [22] 1.3 Functionalism and Qualia [41] 1.3a Introspection and Absent Qualia (Shoemaker) [9] 1.3b Absent Qualia, General (Block, etc) [14] 1.3c Miscellaneous [18] 1.4 The Inverted Spectrum [22] 1.5 Qualia, General [38] 1.6 Functional Approaches to Consciousness [65] 1.6a Neurobiological Approaches [15] 1.6b Cognitive Approaches [15] 1.6c Dennett on Consciousness [20] 1.6d Functional Approaches, Misc [9] 1.6e The Function of Consciousness [6] 1.7 Consciousness [76] 1.7a General [22] 1.7b Conceptual Analysis [9] 1.7c Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought (Rosenthal, etc) [12] 1.7d Consciousness and Physicalism [15] 1.7e Eliminativist Perspectives [10] 1.7f Consciousness and Intentionality [9] 1.8 Mind-Body Problem [28] 1.9 The Identity Theory (Smart, etc) [54] 1.10 Essentialism and the Identity Theory (Kripke) [30] 1.11 Machine Consciousness (Searle, etc) -- see 4.3, 4.4 1.1 Subjectivity (Nagel) [34] ------------------------ Nagel, T. 1974. What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 4:435-50. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Physicalist explanations leave out consciousness, i.e. what it is like to be an organism. Objective accounts omit points of view (could there be an objective phenomenology?). Physicalism may be true, but we can't see how. Nagel, T. 1979. Subjective and objective. In _Mortal Questions_. Cambridge University Press. Subjective and objective views clash e.g. on meaning of life, free will, personal identity, mind-body problem, ethics. How to reconcile: reduction, elimination, annexation? Maybe just let multiple viewpoints coexist. Nagel, T. 1986. _The View From Nowhere_. Oxford University Press. Seeing philosophy as a clash between the subjective and objective views of various phenomena (mental states, self, knowledge, freedom, value, ethics). Eliminating the subjective is impossible. Akins, K. 1993. What is it like to be boring and myopic? In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and his Critics_. Blackwell. Gives a detailed account of perceptual processing in bats, and suggests that we can know what bat-experience is like: it's like nerd experience. But then is there an unexplained residue? Akins, K. 1993. A bat without qualities? In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays_. Blackwell. On what science tells us about the experience of bats, birds, and others. Why a movie of bat-experience isn't good enough -- because of the inseparability of intentionality and experience. Science can do OK. Biro, J. 1993. Consciousness and objectivity. In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays_. Blackwell. Davis, L. 1982. What is it like to be an agent? Erkenntnis 18:195-213. On what is required for consciousness of agency (rather than qualia): belief, intention, and most importantly desire, enabling a capacity to care. A robot could have all this, and it would be like something to be it. Flanagan, O.J. 1985. Consciousness, naturalism and Nagel. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6:373-90. Naturalism can do autophenomenology just fine. Foss, J. 1989. On the logic of what it is like to be a conscious subject. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67:305-320. A Super Neuroscientist will know how we describe and think about experience, so will know as much as a Super Sympathist. One doesn't have to imagine to know what it's like. With remarks on bat experience. Haksar, V. 1981. Nagel on subjective and objective. Inquiry 24:105-21. The objective and subjective don't conflict, but complement each other. Hanna, P. 1990. Must thinking bats be conscious? Philosophical Investigations 13:350-55. Hiley, D.R. 1978. Materialism and the inner life. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16:61-70. Nagel conflates questions about sensory qualities with those about a unique point of view. The truth of physicalism is irrelevant to uniqueness. Hill, C.S. 1977. Of bats, brains, and minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38:100-106. Kekes, J. 1977. Physicalism and subjectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37:533-6. The subjective/objective distinction is ill-drawn. Objective descriptions aren't species-independent, but in terms of the space-time causal network. Science can explain the experience this way, but not provide the experience. Lewis, D. 1983. Postscript to "Mad pain and Martian pain". In _Philosophical Papers_, Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press. Knowing what it's like consists in an ability, not possession of information. Lycan, W.G. 1987. "Subjectivity". In _Consciousness_. MIT Press. Various anti-Nagel points. Lycan, W.G. 1990. What is the "subjectivity" of the mental? Philosophical Perspectives. The subjectivity of the mental is no more special than usual propositional subjectivity. It can be handled by a self-scanner model of introspection. Malcolm, N. 1988. Subjectivity. Philosophy 63:147-60. A critique of Nagel's idea of a "point of view" that is occupied by a "subject". There aren't any peculiar facts about given viewpoints. Maloney, J.C. 1986. About being a bat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:26-49. McClamrock, R. 1992. Irreducibility and subjectivity. Philosophical Studies. Phenomenological properties cannot be picked out in physical or computational terms; argues against Lycan's criticism of Nagel. But all this is compatible with materialism. With comments on the phenomenological tradition. McCulloch, G. 1988. What it is like. Philosophical Quarterly 38:1-19. Criticizes absent/inverted qualia arguments for a special "what it is like", but argues that the possibility of "what it is like" differences relative to semantic states shows that something's not conveyed by functional accounts. McMullen, C. 1985. `Knowing what it's like' and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48:211-33. The Nagel/Jackson argument is analogous to the Perry indexical argument, and can be treated the same way. Muscari, P. 1987. The status of humans in Nagel's phenomenology. Philosophical Forum 19:23-33. Nagel's dilemma: separating feeling from process. Moral consequences? Nelkin, N. 1987. What is it like to be a person? Mind and Language 2:220-41. Nagel-consciousness exists, but isn't so important. It's essential for sensations, but not for thoughts. Beings without it could still be persons. Nemirow, L. 1980. Review of Nagel's _Mortal Questions_. Philosophical Review 89:473-7. Understanding does not consist only in facts; we can understand via sympathy. Nemirow, L. 1990. Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance. In (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_. Blackwell. Knowing what it's like = knowing how to imagine. Reduce Nagel's question to a question about possession of a certain ability. Pugmire, D. 1989. Bat or batman. Philosophy 64:207-17. Subjectivity is not something we have knowledge of, as we lack comparisons. Rorty, R. 1993. Holism, intrinsicality, and the ambition of transcendence. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and His Critics_. Blackwell. On the Nagel/Dennett debate: Nagel holds out for unexplained intrinsic properties once the relational is all accounted for; Dennett can renounce the transcendental ambition. Remarks on realism, holism, and metaphilosophy. Russow, L. 1982. It's not like that to be a bat. Behaviorism 10:55-63. Divides Nagel's problem: qualitative differences, special access, mineness. Taliaferro, C. 1988. Nagel's vista or taking subjectivity seriously. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26:393-401. Nagel's `View from Nowhere' doesn't take subjectivity seriously enough. Teller, P. 1992. Subjectivity and knowing what it's like. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Tilghman, B.R. 1991. What is it like to be an aardvark? Philosophy 66:325-38. A Wittgensteinian critique of Nagel. Nagel's question is confused: "what it's like" is a matter of behavior, sociality, etc, not inner experience. van Gulick, R. 1985. Physicalism and the subjectivity of the mental. Philosophical Topics 13:51-70. Reducing doesn't imply understanding. Two different kinds of reduction. Wider, K. 1989. Overtones of solipsism in Nagel's `What is it like to be a bat?' and `The view from nowhere'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49:481-99. Nagel is an epistemological solipsist, whether he likes it or not. 1.2 The Knowledge Argument (Jackson) [22] ------------------------------------ Jackson, F. 1982. Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32:127-136. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_ (Blackwell, 1990). Knowing a completed neuroscience does not imply knowing about qualia. Mary, the colorblind neuroscientist, gains color vision and learns about red. Jackson, F. 1986. What Mary didn't know. Journal of Philosophy 83:291-5. Reply to Churchland 1985: Mary *learns*, Churchland misstates the argument. Bachrach, J.E. 1990. Qualia and theory reduction: A criticism of Paul Churchland. Iyyun 281-94. Argues that Churchland's neuroscientific descriptions must leave at least some qualia behind: they might account for what we know (e.g. brain states) in qualia-knowledge, but can't handle distinctions in how we know. Bigelow, J. and Pargetter, R. 1990. Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria. Mary gains knowledge of old facts, in a new way: she gains a new mode of acquaintance with those facts. Analogies with indexical knowledge: her new knowledge eliminates no possible worlds. Churchland, P.M. 1985. Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82:8-28. Reprinted in _A Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989). Qualia can undergo a normal reduction to the neurophysiological. Jackson commits an intensional fallacy; in any case, perhaps Mary can understand red. When we apprehend qualia, we are directly introspecting our brain state. Churchland, P.M. 1989. Knowing qualia: a reply to Jackson. In _A Neurocomputational Perspective_. MIT Press. Rejoinder to Jackson 1986. The key lies in knowing-how vs. knowing-that. Conee, E. 1985. Physicalism and phenomenal properties. Philosophical Quarterly 35:296-302. Contra Lewis, Nemirow, and Horgan on the knowledge argument. But qualia may still be physical (though outside vocab of science) due to their causal role. Cummins, R. 1984. The mind of the matter: Comments on Paul Churchland. Philosophy of Science Association 2:791-8. Speculation on how consciousness might be left out by a physical account. Dennett, D.C. 1991. "Epiphenomenal" qualia? In _Consciousness Explained_, pp. 398-406. Little-Brown. Argues that we most people don't really imagine Mary's situation. In fact, Mary would be able to identify blue objects from the way they make her react. Furash, G. 1989. Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against materialism. Dialogue 32:1-6. Defends Jackson's argument against criticisms by Nemirow, Smith & Jones, Warner, Horgan, & Conee. The argument forces physicalism into a quandary: either deny qualia, or make the confused claim that qualia are physical. Horgan, T. 1984. Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34:147-83. Mary didn't know all the physical facts: she knew all the explicitly physical information, but not all the ontologically physical information. Levin, J. 1986. Could love be like a heatwave?: Physicalism and the subjective character of experience. Philosophical Studies 49:245-61. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_ (Blackwell, 1990). Contra Nagel/Jackson: Understand qualia through relational properties, and separate the mental concept from the recognitional capacity. Lewis, D. 1990. What experience teaches. In (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_. Blackwell. Against the hypothesis that phenomenology carries information. If it does, and if parapsychology isn't true, qualia are epiphenomenal. Better to analyze the "new information" as acquiring an ability instead. Entertaining. Newton, N. 1986. Churchland on direct introspection of brain states. Analysis 46:97-102. Contra Churchland 1985: we couldn't introspect sensations as brain states, although we could interpret them as such. Papineau, D. 1993. Physicalism, consciousness, and the antipathetic fallacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71:169-83. Mary goes from a third-person concept of experience to a first-person concept, but they co-refer; we can refer to an experience without having the experience. Physical and phenomenal properties are brutely identical. Robinson, D. 1993. Epiphenomenalism, laws, and properties. Philosophical Studies 69:1-34. A thorough discussion of Lewis 1990. Phenomenal information implies epiphenomenalism, even at the intra-psychic level. Remarks on ineffability, and on whether properties should be individuated by nomic role or by essence. Robinson, H. 1993. Dennett on the knowledge argument. Analysis 53:174-7. Contra Dennett, Mary can't tell an object's color unless she already knows about experience. The knowledge argument bears on thought, not just qualia. Shoemaker, S. 1984. Churchland on reduction, qualia, and introspection. Philosophy of Science Association 2:799-809. Introspection reveals functional properties, not physical, so qualia should be reduced to the functional, not to the physical. Stemmer, N. 1989. Physicalism and the argument from knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67:84-91. Physicalism explains all the relevant evidence, hence all facts, and needn't admit mental entities; belief in mental entities is based on physical facts. Thompson, E, 1992. Novel colours. Philosophical Studies 68:321-49. Interesting remarks on what it would be for someone to see colors that we cannot, combining philosophical considerations with empirical findings about color space. Argues that science could tell us what such colors are like. Warner, R. 1986. A challenge to physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:249-65. A Jackson-like argument that physical knowledge can't give you the knowledge of what pain feels like. With detailed consideration of objections and replies. Argues from limited incorrigibility to factualism about pains. Watkins, M. 1989. The knowledge argument against the knowledge argument. Analysis, 49:158-60. Epiphenomenalism => qualia don't cause beliefs => we don't know about qualia. 1.3 Functionalism and Qualia [41] --------------------------------- 1.3a Introspection and Absent Qualia (Shoemaker) [9] ------------------------------------------------ Shoemaker, S. 1975. Functionalism and qualia. Philosophical Studies 27:291-315. Reprinted in _Identity, Cause, and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1984). Absent qualia possible => qualia make no causal difference => no knowledge of qualia, therefore absent qualia are impossible. If qualia are introspectively accessible, they must be functional. An important argument. Shoemaker, S. 1981. Absent qualia are impossible -- A reply to Block. Philosophical Review 90:581-99. Reprinted in _Identity, Cause, and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1984). Reply to Block 1980. Distinguishes two AQ theses, and argues that if AQ are possible, then the problem for functionalism isn't due solely to qualia. Averill, E.W. 1990. Functionalism, the absent qualia objection, and eliminativism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28:449-67. Defending Shoemaker's argument against Conee: immediate awareness and qualitative beliefs are the same. But maybe people *can't* tell whether they're having genuine or ersatz pain. Eliminativism is the best option. Block, N. 1980. Are absent qualia impossible? Philosophical Review 89:257-74. Reply to Shoemaker 1975. The possibility of absent qualia is compatible with a functional role for qualia, as qualia can make a causal difference that is independent of a given functional account. Conee, E. 1985. The possibility of absent qualia. Philosophical Review 94:345-66. Contra Shoemaker: qualia cause qualitative beliefs, which are affected by the absence of qualia, so we know about qualia even if AQ are possible. Davis, L. 1982. Functionalism and absent qualia. Philosophical Studies 41:231-49. Elucidating Shoemaker's argument: if absent qualia are possible, then the difference between real and ersatz pain makes no difference to belief, so qualia aren't introspectively accessible. A nice analysis. Doore, G. 1981. Functionalism and absent qualia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59:387-402. Qualia and qualitative beliefs are the same, so Shoemaker's argument fails. A numbness/pain inversion argument shows that pain isn't a functional state; it yields an introspectible difference without a functional difference. Hill, C.S. 1991. Introspection and the skeptic. In _Sensations: A Defence of Type Materialism_. Cambridge University Press. Argues that the possibility of absent qualia is compatible with introspective knowledge. The fact that we have evidence of qualia isn't altered by the fact that we'd still think we had that evidence if we didn't have qualia. White, N. 1985. Professor Shoemaker and the so-called `qualia' of experience. Philosophical Studies 47:369-383. Shoemaker's account leaves out experience, experienced similarity, etc. 1.3b Absent Qualia (Block, etc) [14] ------------------------------- Block, N. & Fodor, J.A. 1972. What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review 81:159-81. As a criticism of functionalism. raises the possibility that realizations of any given functional account of mental states may lack qualia. Block, N. 1980. Troubles with functionalism. In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol 1. Harvard University Press. All kinds of absent qualia cases: homunculi-headed robots, the population of China, and so on. There is a prima facie doubt that such cases lack qualia, so there is a prima facie case against functionalism. Bogen, J. 1981. Agony in the schools. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:1-21. It's OK for bizarre realizations to lack pain, as functionalism requires teleology as well as organization. With remarks on the relation between pain and "introspectible noxiousness". Carleton, L. 1983. The population of China as one mind. Philosophy Research Archives 9:665-74. Taking the personal stance, we should regard the Chinese nation as having qualia. A lack of qualia would make a functional difference. Chalmers, D.J. 1995. Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia. In _Toward a Theory of Consciousness_. MIT Press. Argues that absent qualia and inverted qualia are empirically impossible (though logically possible), using neural-replacement thought-experiments. So functional organization fully determines conscious experience. Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. 1981. Functionalism, qualia and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12:121-32. Reprinted in _A Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989). Absent qualia are impossible. Also, qualia aren't essential to mental state, functional role is. Cuda, T. 1985. Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies 48:111-27. Replace neurons one by one with homunculi: what happens? Beliefs don't change, does consciousness fade? Very nice. Elugardo, R. 1983. Functionalism, homunculi-heads and absent qualia. Dialogue 22:47-56. If absent qualia are possible, then either qualia are inexplicable or species chauvinism is true. Homunculi-heads could make similar arguments about us. Elugardo, R. 1983. Functionalism and the absent qualia argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13:161-80. Jacoby, H. 1990. Empirical functionalism and conceivability arguments. Philosophical Psychology 2:271-82. Conceivability arguments are only a problem for empirical functionalism insofar as they are a problem for materialism in general. Very true. Levin, J. 1985. Functionalism and the argument from conceivability. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 11:85-104. Argues that metaphysical conclusions can be drawn from conceivability arguments, but that absent qualia cases have not been clearly and distinctly conceived. The functionalist is better off than the identity theorist here. Levine, J. 1988. Absent and inverted qualia revisited. Mind and Language 3:271-87. IQ are no more plausible than AQ (by analysis of thought experiments and skepticism). So there's no reason to choose physicalist-functionalism over pure functionalism, as Shoemaker does. Nice. Sayan, E. 1988. A closer look at the Chinese Nation argument. Philosophy Research Archives 13:129-36. The Chinese Nation would require less people than Churchland & Churchland 1981 suggest, as we'd only need to handle a subset of all possible inputs. Tye, M. 1993. Blindsight, the absent qualia hypothesis, and the mystery of consciousness. In (C. Hookway, ed) _Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences_. Cambridge University Press. Gives a thorough neurophysiological analysis of blindsight and related pathologies, and argues that these cannot be used to support the possibility of absent qualia. With remarks on the mystery of consciousness. 1.3c Functionalism and Qualia, Miscellaneous [18] -------------------------------------------- Brown, M. 1983. Functionalism and sensations. Auslegung 10:218-28. Various comments on functionalism's troubles with qualia, including absent and inverted qualia. Analogis with biology and information theory. Cole, D.J. 1990. Functionalism and inverted spectra. Synthese 82:207-22. Acquired spectrum inversion doesn't refute functionalism, if qualia revert after behavioral adaptation. With empirical evidence. Dumpleton, S. 1988. Sensation and function. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:376-89. Eshelman, L.J. 1977. Functionalism, sensations, and materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7:255-74. Graham, G. & Stephens, G. 1985. Are qualia a pain in the neck for functionalists? American Philosophical Quarterly 22:73-80. Pain-qualia are in the body, not the mind, and so aren't part of psychology. Graham, G. & Stephens, G. 1987. Minding your P's and Q's: Pain and sensible qualities. Nous 21:395-405. Hill, C.S. 1991. The failings of functionalism. In _Sensations: A Defence of Type Materialism_. Cambridge University Press. Gives a number of arguments against both analytic functionalism and psychofunctionalism: arguments from absent qualia, absent functional role, epistemology, semantics, and heterogeneity of functional roles. Horgan, T. 1984. Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44:453-69. Argues that non-phenomenal mental events are functional, while qualia are low-level physiological. Lycan, W.G. 1981. Form, function and feel. Journal of Philosophy 78:24-50. Accuses Block of a perspective error. Functionalism can handle a lot, if it's multi-levelled. Lycan, W.G. 1987. _Consciousness_. MIT Press. (esp. `Homunctionalism and Qualia') Various stuff, mostly against absent qualia arguments. Marcel, A. 1988. Phenomenal experience and functionalism. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_. Oxford University Press. Moor, J.H. 1988. Testing robots for qualia. In (H. Otto & J. Tuedio, eds) _Perspectives on Mind_. Kluwer. Behavioral evidence for qualia is always indirect. And you can't check by replacing own neurons by chips, as you'll still believe you have qualia if you're functionally identical. Posit robot qualia as explanatory construct? Nemirow, L. 1979. Functionalism and the subjective quality of experience. Dissertation, Stanford University. Seager, W.E. 1983. Functionalism, qualia and causation. Mind 92:174-88. Functionalism can't explain the causal role of qualia by identifying them with functional states (circularity) or physical realizations (chauvinism). Which leaves property dualism, epiphenomenalism, or eliminativism for qualia. van Gulick, R. 1988. Qualia, functional equivalence and computation. In (H. Otto & J. Tuedio, eds) _Perspectives on Mind_. Kluwer. Commentary on Moor 1988. Systems that differ in qualitative properties will likely differ in functional organization. White, S. 1986. Curse of the qualia. Synthese 68:333-68. Criticism of "physicalist-functionalism", where functional organization doesn't completely determine qualia (e.g. Shoemaker/Block). The only tenable options are pure functionalism or transcendental dualism. Nice. White, S. 1989. Transcendentalism and its discontents. Philosophical Topics 17:231-61. Taking transcendental dualism seriously. Privileged access provides strong arguments against objective theories, but it turns out that transcendentalism can't explain it any better, so maybe embrace objective theories after all. 1.4 The Inverted Spectrum [22] ------------------------- Block, N. 1990. Inverted earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79. Uses Inverted Earth case, colors and lenses inverted, to argue vs Harman that qualitative states aren't intentional states. Also, less convincingly, to argue that qualitative states aren't functional states. Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. 1981. Functionalism, qualia and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12:121-32. Reprinted in _A Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989). Functional role counts more than qualitative content in determining what e.g. "redness" is. Clark, A. 1985. Spectrum inversion and the color solid. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23:431-43. Argues that there could be inverted spectra even without a symmetrical color space. Qualia must be distinguished from their place in color space. Cole, D.J. 1990. Functionalism and inverted spectra. Synthese 82:207-22. Acquired spectrum inversions do not refute functionalism, if qualia revert after behavioral adaptation (as they do with inverting lenses). Gert, B. 1965. Imagination and verifiability. Philosophical Studies 16:44-47. Inverted spectra with constant behavior is a meaningful hypothesis even under verificationism. Switching nerve endings, tinting contact lenses, etc. Hardin, C.L. 1987. Qualia and materialism: Closing the explanatory gap. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:281-98. On the physiological bases of phenomenal states, particularly color. Inverted spectrum isn't really coherent, as coolness/warmth would have to be inverted too. So the contingency of qualia is diminished. Hardin, C.L. 1988. _Color for Philosophers_. Hackett. Distinguishes various functionally distinct inverted spectrum cases. Hardin, C.L. 1991. Reply to Levine. Philosophical Psychology 4:41-50. Reply to Levine 1991. "Green residue" and "red residue" may be identical. Physiology might put more constraints on qualia, eventually ruling out all other possibilities. But there may still be absent/alien qualia problems. Harrison, B. 1967. On describing colors. Inquiry 10:38-52. Harrison, B. 1973. _Form and Content_. Blackwell. The inverted spectrum is impossible, due to asymmetries in color space. Harvey, J. 198x. Systematic transposition of colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 211-19. The inverted spectrum can be detected, if a single person experiences both. Johnsen, B. 1986. The inverted spectrum. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:471-6. Against Shoemaker: physical realizations do not give empirical conditions for qualia inversion. Nice. Kirk, R. 1982. Goodbye to transposed qualia. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82:33-44. The possibility of an inverted spectrum w.r.t. dispositions implies the falsity of physicalism. But this rests on an implausible "slide-viewer" model of seeing, and is incoherent otherwise. Levine, J. 1988. Absent and inverted qualia revisited. Mind and Language 3:271-87. Inverted qualia, with respect to a functional account, are no more plausible than absent qualia (by analysis of thought experiments). Both lead to first-person skepticism about qualia. Levine, J. 1991. Cool red. Philosophical Psychology 4:27-40. Contra Hardin 1988: there's a "green residue" after coolness is subtracted, so inverted spectrum could still be possible. In any case, the impossibility of IS doesn't affect the explanatory gap for qualia, which is epistemic. Lycan, W.G. 1973. Inverted spectrum. Ratio 15:315-9. Inverted spectrum holding behavior constant is at least a coherent idea. Hook up brain in different ways, etc. Lycan, W.G. 1993. Functionalism and recent spectrum inversions. Manuscript. Argues that qualia are intentional properties, and that inverted spectra, though conceivable, are metaphysically impossible, due to considerations about society and normality. Argues against Block's "inverted earth". Rey, G. 1992. Sensational sentences reversed. Philosophical Studies 68:289-319. Argues for a computational/sentential theory under which qualia are fixed by functional organization. Argues against Block's 1990 inversion: qualia might slowly change back as associations fade. Memory isn't 100% reliable. Shoemaker, S. 1975. Phenomenal similarity. Critica 7:3-37. Reprinted in _Identity, Cause, and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1984). Maybe IS is ongoing, with memory changes. What is the logic of "appears"? Shoemaker, S. 1982. The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy 79:357-381. Reprinted in _Identity, Cause, and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1984). All about the coherence and otherwise thereof. Uses switch in state for IS IS wrt behavior. Also claims that IS wrt function is possible as qualia are fixed by realizing state, not functional state. Bad assumption. Taylor, D. 1966. The incommunicability of content. Mind 75:527-41. Inverted spectra thought-experiments show that experiential content is incommunicable. Accounts for the fact that attempts to describe such cases lead to contradiction (I'm seeing green & not seeing green). Tye, M. 1993. Qualia, content, and the inverted spectrum. Nous. Argues that qualia are intentional properties, along the lines of "looks F to P". Handles inverted earth and related cases by taking the narrow intentional content. With remarks on the semantics of color terms. 1.5 Qualia, General [38] ------------------- Berger, G. 1987. On the structure of visual sentience. Synthese 71:355-70. Blumenfeld, J-B. 1979. Phenomenal properties and the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:485-93. Argues that phenomenal properties aren't needed to identify sensations with brain-states, and nor are topic-neutral analyses. Clark, A. 1985. A physicalist theory of qualia. Monist 68:491-506. A Goodman-like theory of qualia discrimination. Clark, A. 1985. Qualia and the psychophysical explanation of color perception. Synthese 65:377-405. One can give an information-theoretic explanation of color perception, which leaves nothing out. Rebuts various qualia objections, e.g. from the possibility of inversion. Qualia are codes for external properties. Clark, A. 1992. _Sensory Qualities_. Clarendon. Argues that psychology is in the business of explaining sensory qualities, and does a perfectly good job using discriminability as a basis. With detailed argument and many interesting examples. Dennett, D.C. 1978. Why you can't make a computer that feels pain. Synthese 38. Reprinted in _Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). Discussion of the concept of pain, flowcharts, reportability, etc. Dennett, D.C. 1988. Quining qualia. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_. Oxford University Press. Argues against the existence of ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly accessible properties. With lots of meaty-thought experiments, and arguments that there is no fact of the matter about inversion cases. Double, R. 1985. Phenomenal properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:383-92. A somewhat vague defense of materialism against objections from phenomenal properties. The only problems are epistemological. Flohr, H. 1992. Qualia and brain processes. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Fox, I. 1989. On the nature and cognitive function of phenomenal content -- Part one. Philosophical Topics 17:81-103. Searching for a theory of qualia: rejects epiphenomenalism, separation of the form and quality of experience, and immediate perception of phenomenal objects. Experience consists in represented (inexistent) objects of thought. Gilbert, P. 1992. Immediate experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:233-250. Against an account of phenomenal content as given by inner discrimination. Argues that the character of experience consists in its reason-giving role. Hardin, C.L. 1992. Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinona's true colors. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Harding, G. 1991. Color and the mind-body problem. Review of Metaphysics 45:289-307. On the unique nature of color expanses, which are laid bare to perception as they are in themselves. These are incompatible with functionalist accounts of mind, but might still be physical, on a broader conception thereof. Harman, G. 1990. The quality of experience. Philosophical Perspectives. There are no real qualia problems, just Intentional confusions. Holborow, L.C. 1973. Materialism and phenomenal qualities. Aristotelian Society Supplement 47:107-19. Horgan, T. 1987. Supervenient qualia. Philosophical Review 96:491-520. Arguing from the causal efficacy of qualia and the closedness of physical causation to the conclusion that qualia conceptually supervene on the physical. A very thorough paper. Kitcher, P.S. 1979. Phenomenal qualities. American Philosophical Quarterly 16:123-9. Qualia problems stem from assuming direct awareness of perceptual states. Instead, we should acknowledge only an ability to detect and label these states. Also argues for the possibility of unconscious and illusory pains. Leeds, S. 1993. Qualia, awareness, Sellars. Nous 27:303-330. A discussion of in what sense we are aware of qualia, and how we can have beliefs about them, with reference to Sellars. Ends up reducing qualia to phenomenal beliefs in a language of thought. A rich and subtle paper. Levin, J. 1991. Analytic functionalism and the reduction of phenomenal states. Philosophical Studies 61:211-38. Contra Kripkean arguments, a good enough functional theory may help close the conceivability/explanatory gap between the physical and qualia. Contra Nagel/Jackson, such a theory could provide us with recognitional abilities. Levin, M. 1981. Phenomenal properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42:42-58. There are no irreducible phenomenal properties. Materialism can handle our direct awareness of inner states by the right sort of causal connection. Gives a materialism account of discrimination and learning mental concepts. Levine, J. 1983. Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:354-61. How do we explain the apparent contingency of the qualia-matter reduction? Even if it's not metaphysically contingent, it's conceptually contingent, so there's a gap in any physical explanation of qualia. Excellent. Levine, J. 1993. On leaving out what it's like. In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays_. Blackwell. Physical accounts leave out qualia epistemologically but not metaphysically. So physicalism holds, but there is an explanatory gap. Discusses Kripke's and Jackson's arguments in detail; also explanation and content. Loar, B. 1990. Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108. Phenomenal and functional concepts are distinct, but the relevant properties may be identical. We directly refer to phenomenal properties by recognition. Remarks on other minds, transparency, incorrigibility & more. A meaty paper. Lycan, W.G. 1988. Phenomenal objects: A backhanded defense. Philosophical Perspectives 3:513-26. Argues that qualia, if viewed as simple properties of phenomenal individuals, are problematic for materialism. Considers the case for phenomenal individuals, and argues that they are intentional inexistents. Nelkin, N. 1987. How sensations get their names. Philosophical Studies 51:325-39. Sensations are an inessential element of experiences. Experiences are typed by their cognitive component, and the naming of sensations is derivative on this. With examples and empirical evidence about pain, color, perception. McCulloch, G. 1993. The very idea of the phenomenological. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:39-57. The phenomenological can be reduced to the intentional. Intentional states have a what-it-is-like, and there is no special phenomenal object of introspection. Mellor, D.H. 1973. Materialism and phenomenal qualities II. Aristotelian Society Supplement 47:107-19. Perkins, M. 1970. Matter, sensation, and understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly 8:1-12. On the possibility of an Insentient Perceiver, who perceives the world without sensation. Sensation is inessential to perception and understanding, except understanding in the "whatlike" manner. Putnam, H. 1981. Mind and body. In _Reason, Truth and History_. Cambridge University Press. Considers qualia, inverted and absent, and various other stuff. Wishy-washy. Rey, G. 1993. Sensational sentences. In (M. Davies & G. Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays_. Blackwell. Explicating sensory experience in terms of an appropriate computational relation to a sentence in the language of thought. Argues that this handles many features of qualia (privacy, ineffability, grainlessness, unity, etc). Schick, T.W. 1992. The epistemic role of qualitative content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:383-93. Contra Sellars, Rorty, and Churchland: knowledge of qualitative content is an important aspect of our understanding of mental concepts, although it is not everything. Seager, W. 1993. The elimination of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:345-65. Dennett's 1988 argument against ineffability, etc., doesn't nearly make the case against qualia, and largely relies on verificationist assumptions. Shoemaker, S. 1975. Phenomenal similarity. Critica 7:3-37. Reprinted in _Identity, Cause, and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1984). Where does similarity come from? From belief therein? Similarity of experience = experience of similarity. Also relation to projectibility. Shoemaker, S. 1990. Qualities and qualia: What's in the mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Supplement 50:109-131. Qualia can't be reduced to standard intentional properties (due to certain IS cases). Projectivist and sense-reference accounts don't work either. Perhaps qualia are necessarily-illusory intentional properties. Shoemaker, S. 1991. Qualia and consciousness. Mind 100:507-24. On the relationship between phenomenal and intentional aspects of qualia, and in particular on the accessibility of qualia to conscious awareness. Phenomenal & intentional similarity are connected but must be distinguished. Shoemaker, S. 1994. Phenomenal character. Nous 28:21-38. Phenomenal character is bestowed by representation of certain relational properties, defined by relation to experience. With a discussion of possible candidates, and argument against other views such as projectivism. Tye, M. 1986. The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95:1-17. Absent/inverted qualia aren't really imaginable. The Knowledge Argument fails, as discovering new experiences doesn't imply learning new facts, but only coming to know old facts in a new way. van Gulick, R. 1993. Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos? In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays_. Blackwell. Qualia pose no insurmountable problems for materialism: knowledge argument can be answered, explanatory gap can be closed, and absent qualia arguments beg the question. With speculations on their functional role. 1.6 Functional Approaches to Consciousness [65] ------------------------------------------ 1.6a Neurobiological Approaches [15] ------------------------------- Calvin, W. 1990. _The Cerebral Symphony: Seashore Reflections on the Structure of Consciousness_. Bantam. Churchland, P.S. 1981. On the alleged backward referral of experience and its relevance to the mind-body problem. Philosophy of Science 48:165-81. Argues against Libet on subjective re-ordering of experiences. His experimental methodology is suspect, and in any case the data are compatible with a physicalist hypothesis wherein experiences are delayed. Churchland, P.S. 1988. Reduction and the neurobiological basis of consciousness. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_. Oxford University Press. Remarks on reduction, and on the different notions underlying consciousness. Outlines some counter-intuitive cases, and gives a detailed presentation of neurobiological results concerning the sleep-dream-wake cycle. Churchland, P.S. 1994. Can neurobiology teach us anything about consciousness? Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67:23-40. Argues against objections to a neurobiological approach to consciousness, and presents two hypotheses about neural mechanisms due to Crick and Llinas. Crick, F. and Koch, C. 1990. Toward a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:263-275. Advocates a neurobiological approach, and suggests that 40-70 hertz oscillations in the cortex may be the neural basis of consciousness, due to their role in facilitating the binding of information contents. Crick, F. 1994. _The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul_. Scribners. Largely an account of the neurobiology of the processes underlying visual awareness, with some remarks on consciousness. Edelman, G. 1989. _The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness_. Basic Books. Uses the theory of re-entrant neural circuits developed in _Neural Darwinism_ to provide an account of perceptual awareness and its relation to memory and language. Flohr, H. 1990. Brain processes and phenomenal consciousness: A new and specific hypothesis. Bielefeld Report. Consciousness comes from rapid assembly-formation in the brain. Gazzaniga, M. 1993. Brain mechanisms and conscious experience. In _Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness_ (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). Wiley. Gillett, G. 1988. Consciousness and brain function. Philosophical Psychology 1:325-39. Lahav, R. 1993. What neuropsychology tells us about consciousness. Philosophy of Science 60:67-85. Argues from neuroscientific data that consciousness is a unitary kind: a junction of information allowing global, integrated and flexible behavior. Discusses explicit vs implicit knowledge in blindsight, neglect, etc. Libet, B. 1978. Neuronal vs. subjective timing for a conscious sensory experience. In (P. Buser & A. Rougeul-Buser, eds) _Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience_. Elsevier. On experiments that showing that the subjective timing of experiences differs from neural timing, suggesting the "backward referral" of experience in time. Libet, B. 1985. Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:529-66. On experimental evidence that the onset of conscious events is preceded by unconscious neural processes. The role of the conscious will may be only to act as a veto. Libet, B. 1993. The neural time factor in conscious and unconscious events. In _Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness_ (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). Wiley. On a neural "time-on" theory suggesting that about 350 milleseconds is required for an unconscious neural event to become conscious, accounting for delays in experience of intention. Newton, N. 1991. Consciousness, qualia, and re-entrant signaling. Behavior and Philosophy 19:21. So far, reductive accounts explain what red is like but not what it is like to experience red. Uses theories of re-entrant neural signals to address this: experience is like seeing our own seeing. 1.6b Cognitive Approaches [15] ------------------------- Baars, B.J. 1988. _A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness_. Cambridge University Press. Advocates a "global workspace" theory of consciousness, on which conscious contents are contained within a central workspace for the communication of information between multiple specialized unconscious processes. Burks, A.W. 1986. An architectural theory of functional consciousness. In (N. Rescher, ed) _Current Issues in Teleology_. University Press of America. Cam, P. 1989. Notes toward a faculty theory of cognitive consciousness. In (P. Slezak, ed) _Computers, Brains and Minds_. Kluwer. Consciousness mediates interaction between faculties, with the contents of consciousness corresponding to the outputs of faculties. With remarks on mental imagery and confabulation. Farrell, B.A. 1970. The design of a conscious device. Mind 79:321-46. An outline of the design requirements for a conscious machine: reactivity, negative feedback, categorization, associative learning. Compares this machine's abilities to those of a child. Harnad, S. 1982. Consciousness: An afterthought. Cognition and Brain Theory 5:29-47. Consciousness comes from "pseudoconation" and auto-referentiality. Johnson-Laird, P. 1983. A computational analysis of consciousness. Cognition and Brain Theory 6:499-508. Consciousness divides into awareness, control, self-awareness, and intentionality. Achieved computationally through parallelism, recursively embedded models, and a high-level internal model of the system. Mandler, G. 1975. Consciousness: respectable, useful, and probably necessary. In (R. Solso, ed) _Information-processing and Cognition_. Erlbaum. Natsoulas, T. 1974. The subjective, experiential element in perception. Psychological Bulletin 81:611-31. Natsoulas, T. 1981. Basic problems of consciousness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Natsoulas, T. 1983. A selective review of conceptions of consciousness with special reference to behavioristic contributions. Cognition and Brain Theory 6:417-47. Ideas about consciousness from Locke, Brentano, Hebb, Dennett, Skinner, Sellars, Aristotle, Gibson. Theories: inner eye vs. verbal vs. outer eye. Oatley, K. 1988. On changing one's mind: A possible function of consciousness. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_. Oxford University Press. Distinguishes Helmholtzian, Woolfian, Vygotskyan, and Meadean consciousness (related to conclusions, imagery, inner speech, model of self). The function may be to draw conclusions from a socially-constructed model of self. Schacter, D.L., McAndrews, M.P., and Moscovitch, M. 1986. Access to consciousness: dissociations between implicit and explicit knowledge in neuropsychological syndromes. In (L. Weiskrantz, ed) _Thought Without Language_. Oxford University Press. Surveys evidence for implicit without explicit knowledge: amnesia, aphasia, blindsight, prosopagnosia, dyslexia, hemineglect. Discusses hypotheses and proposes a disconnection between specific modules and conscious mechanism. Shallice, T. 1972. Dual functions of consciousness. Psychological Review 79:383-93. Toward an information-processing account of phenomenological consciousness in terms of selector input to the dominant action system. Shallice, T. 1988. Information-processing models of consciousness: possibilities and problems. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_. Oxford University Press. Wilks, Y. 1984. Machines and consciousness. In (C. Hookway, ed) _Minds, Machines and Evolution_. Cambridge University Press. 1.6c Dennett on Consciousness [20] ----------------------------- Dennett, D.C. 1978. Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9. Reprinted in _Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). Conscious contents are contents of a buffer memory to which a public report module has access. We only have conscious access to propositional judgments, not to underlying processes. With a cute functional diagram. Dennett, D.C. 1979. On the absence of phenomenology. In (D. Gustafson & B. Tapscott, eds) _Body, Mind, and Method_. Kluwer. There is no real phenomenology. There are only *judgments* about phenomenology, and nothing more is going on. We don't have privileged access to anything, except perhaps certain propositional episodes. Dennett, D.C. 1978. Reply to Arbib and Gunderson. In _Brainstorms_. MIT Press. On various notions of awareness: contents of the speech center, contents directing behavior, and contents of attention. We have privileged access to one sort, but it is a different sort that plays the main role in control. Dennett, D.C. 1982. How to study human consciousness empirically, or, nothing comes to mind. Synthese 53:159-80. We can study consciousness by the method of heterophenomenology: studying the things we say about conscious states, which we can interpret as we interpret texts. Autophenomenology gives nothing extra. With comments by Rorty. Dennett, D.C. 1988. The evolution of consciousness. Manuscript. Consciousness is a virtual machine which evolved. Dennett, D.C. 1991. _Consciousness Explained_. Little-Brown. Argues against the "Cartesian Theatre", advocating a "multiple drafts" model of consciousness. Presents a detailed model of processes underlying verbal report, and argues that there is nothing else (e.g. qualia) to explain. Dennett, D.C. & Kinsbourne, M. 1992. Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Using temporal anomalies in consciousness to support a "Multiple Drafts" theory of consciousness rather than a "Cartesian Theater". Contents of consciousness are wholly determined by effects on action/memory. Dennett, D.C. 1993. Is perception the "leading edge" of memory. In (A. Spafadora, ed) _Memory and Oblivion_. There is no "leading edge" of consciousness, separating perception and memory. With an analysis of metacontrast cases, etc. Dennett, D.C. 1993. Precis of _Consciousness Explained_. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:889-931. A discussion of _Consciousness Explained_, with comments by Tye, Jackson, Shoemaker, and Rosenthal, and a reply by Dennett. Bricke, J. 1984. Dennett's eliminative arguments. Philosophical Studies 45:413-29. Criticizing Dennett's accounts of pains, dreams, and images: in no case do his arguments earn their eliminative conclusions. Bricke, J. 1985. Consciousness and Dennett's intentionalist net. Philosophical Studies 48:249-56. Reportability is no good for capturing consciousness: it completely leaves out the qualitative content of conscious states. Churchland, P.S. and Ramachandran, V.S. 1993. Filling in: Why Dennett is wrong. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and His Critics_. Blackwell. Argues that Dennett's account of the blindspot and scotomas are wrong. Neurophysiological data suggests that blind areas are represented explicitly; psychological data shows that it's not just "more of the same". Dretske, F. 1993. Differences that make no difference. Manuscript. Criticizes Dennett's first-person operationalism as Cartesian. There can be awareness without judgment -- e.g. non-epistemic perception. This comes from information or "micro-judgments", and is not conceptual. Kirk, R. 1993. "The best set of tools"? Dennett's metaphors and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Quarterly 43:335-43. Joycean machines and multiple drafts turn out to shed no light on the question of what features make a conscious system conscious. Lockwood, M. 1993. Dennett's mind. Inquiry. Argues for a suitably sophisticated Cartesian Theatre, and against the identification of phenomenology with judgments. Mangan, B. 1993. Dennett, consciousness, and the sorrows of functionalism. Consciousness and Cognition 2:1-17. McCauley, R.N. 1993. Why the blind can't lead the blind: Dennett on the blind spot, blindsight, and sensory qualia. Consciousness and Cognition 2:155-64. Brings empirical evidence to bear against Dennett's "filling-in" account of the blindspot, and argues that blindsight and the blindspot aren't analogous. Seager, W. 1993. Verification, skepticism, and consciousness. Inquiry. An elucidation of Dennett's fundamental eliminativism about phenomenology, resting on verificationist arguments. Like many sceptical arguments, it ends up too powerful to be convincing. Siewert, J. 1993. What Dennett can't imagine and why. Inquiry. Argues that zombies are conceivable, via partial zombiehood in blindsight patients who respond unprompted. Dennett's arguments rely on a question-begging third-person absolutism. Toribio, J. 1993. Why there still has to be a theory of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 2:28-47. Criticizes behavioral, localist, and "intransitive" approaches to consciousness, and recommends a "transitive" metacognitive approach. But criticizes Dennett for not explaining subjective experience. 1.6d Functional Accounts, Misc [9] ------------------------------ Cam, P. 1985. Phenomenology and speech dispositions. Philosophical Studies 47:357-68. Reportability is not phenomenology, as blindsight has reportability but no phenomenology. Dennett, D.C. 1986. Julian Jaynes' software archaeology. Canadian Psychology 27:149-54. Casting Jaynes as a heroic explorer of fossil traces left by the mind. Gennaro, R. 1992. Consciousness, self-consciousness, and episodic memory. Philosophical Psychology 5:333-47. Argues that consciousness entails having episodic memory, which entails self-consciousness. So consciousness entails self-consciousness. Goswami, A. 1990. Consciousness in quantum physics and the mind-body problem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 11:75-96. Argues for a view on which consciousness collapses brain function, yielding a "tangled hierarchy" of mechanisms, and self-referential awareness. Humphrey, N. 1992. _A History of the Mind_. Simon and Schuster. On sensation as the central problem of consciousness, and an account of indexicality and ownership in terms of sensory short-circuits. An entertaining book with some interesting discussion. Jaynes, J. 1976. _The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind_. Houghton Mifflin. Self-awareness came along only recently, replacing voices of the gods. Lloyd, D. 1991. Leaping to conclusions: connectionism, consciousness, and the computational mind. In (T. Horgan & J. Tienson, eds) _Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind_. Kluwer. Suggests that conscious states are identical to representational states, and that unconscious representation is impossible; transition between conscious states is non-representational. Appeals to connectionist models in support. van Gulick, R. 1988. A functionalist plea for self-consciousness. Philosophical Review 97:149-88. How functionalism can handle consciousness: Self-consciousness is the possession of reflexive metapsychological information. This helps understand learning, representation, and belief. Phenomenal experience is still tricky. White, S. 1987. What is it like to be a homunculus? Pac Philosophical Quarterly 68:148-74. Weird examples of homunculi that are conscious but not self-conscious. Self-consciousness, not consciousness, is what really counts. 1.6e The Function of Consciousness? [6] ----------------------------------- Bechtel, W. & Richardson, R.C. 1983. Consciousness and complexity: evolutionary perspectives on the mind-body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61:378-95. Contra Popper, evolution doesn't provide an argument against physicalism or epiphenomenalism. Speculation on what the function of consciousness might be, and how it might be realized: e.g. selecting information. Kraemer, E.R. 1984. Consciousness and the exclusivity of function. Mind 93:271-5. Contra Mott 1982: Function needn't be exclusive, and brain processes and consciousness may share a function, due to their close relationship. McGinn, C. 1981. A note on functionalism and function. Philosophical Topics 12:169-70. Function always underdetermines intrinsic nature, so absent/inverted qualia cases aren't incompatible with consciousness having a function. Mott, P. 1982. On the function of consciousness. Mind 91:423-9. Consciousness doesn't have a function, as any function it might have is a function of brain processes. van Gulick, R. 1989. What difference does consciousness make? Philosophical Topics 17:211-30. Trying to counter absent qualia arguments by finding a role for consciousness e.g. in metacognition, or as as a way to achieve semantic transparency. But consciousness doesn't seem necessary for these, so it's still a mystery. Velmans, M. 1992. Is human information-processing conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14:651-69. Uses experimental evidence to argue that consciousness is functionally inessential: the tasks associated with consciousness can be performed without consciousness. Only focal-attentive processing is required. 1.7 Consciousness [76] ----------------- 1.7a Consciousness -- General [22] ----------------------------- Chalmers, D.J. 1994. Consciousness and cognition. Conceptus. Exploring the link between consciousness and judgments about consciousness. Coherence between these => consciousness depends on the functional but isn't reducible. Toward a dual-aspect theory based on pattern and information. Chalmers, D.J. 1995. _Toward a Theory of Consciousness_. MIT Press. Argues against the reductive explanation of consciousness, and for a kind of naturalistic dualism. Argues for principles of structural coherence, organizational invariance, and a double-aspect theory of information. Culbertson, J. 1989. _Consciousness: Natural and Artificial_. Libra. Falk, B. 1993. Consciousness, cognition, and the phenomenal. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:55-73. On conceptual influences on experience, and aspectual seeing, focusing on bodily and dynamic elements. Self-awareness is not of phenomenal states but *in* them. With commentary by S. Mulhall. Flanagan, O.J. 1991. Consciousness. In _The Science of the Mind_. MIT Press. On the mysteries of consciousness. Argues with epiphenomenalism, "conscious inessentialism", and the "new mysterians" (Nagel, McGinn). Toward a naturalistic theory, drawing on ideas of Edelman, Calvin, Dennett. Flanagan, O.J. 1992. _Consciousness Reconsidered_. MIT Press. Argues that consciousness can be accounted for in a naturalistic framework. With arguments against eliminativism and epiphenomenalism, evidence from neuroscience and psychology, and discussions of the stream and the self. Hardcastle, V.G. 1993. The naturalists versus the skeptics: The debate over a scientific understanding of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14:27-50. Argues that consciousness can be handled within a scientific framework. We can translate first-person accounts into third-person accounts. Replies to skeptical objections usng analogies from elsewhere in science. Jackendoff, R. 1987. _Consciousness and the Computational Mind_. MIT Press. Separates computational mind from phenomenological mind, and studies the former, a third-person approach. The residue is the "Mind-Mind" problem. Holds that consc supervenes on intermediate level of representation. Elegant. Matthews, G. 1977. Consciousness and life. Philosophy 52:13-26. McGinn, C. 1991. _The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Toward a Resolution_. Blackwell. A collection of articles on the problem of consciousness, advocating a view on which the phenomenon is natural but permanently mysterious to us. McGinn, C. 1991. Consciousness and the natural order. In _The Problem of Consciousness_. Blackwell. Argues that a naturalistic account of the intentionality of conscious states requires an account of their embodiment; and that embodiment may depend on the hidden structure of conscious states, not accessible to introspection. McGinn, C. 1991. The hidden structure of consciousness. In _The Problem of Consciousness_. Blackwell. Suggests that consciousness may have a hidden structure, analogous to the deep structure of language, that relates its surface properties to physical properties. We may not be able to understand this hidden structure, however. Perkins, M. 1971. Sentience. Journal of Philosophy 68:329-37. Revonsuo, A. 1993. Is there a ghost in the cognitive machinery? Philosophical Psychology 6:387-405. On the place of consciousness in cognitive science. Argues against eliminativism and against Dennett's "multiple drafts" model, appealing to scientific work about consciousness. Ripley, C. 1984. Sperry's concept of consciousness. Inquiry 27:399-423. An in-depth analysis of Sperry's views on consciousness. Sperry is not a dualist; he simply believes in "structural causation" based on emergent properties. Thorough and interesting. Searle, J.R. 1989. Consciousness, unconsciousness, and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 17:193-209. Argues that the first-person view has been ignored too much in the philosophy of mind. Even unconscious states are only mental by virtue of their potential consciousness. Searle, J.R. 1992. _The Rediscovery of the Mind_. MIT Press. On the centrality of consciousness to the mind. Consciousness is irreducible but biological. On the history of the field, the structure of consciousness, its role in constituting intentionality, and problems with computation. Searle, J.R. 1993. The problem of consciousness. In _Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness_ (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). Wiley. On the notion of consciousness, its relation to the brain, and some features that need to be explained: its subjectivity, unity, intentionality, center and periphery, Gestalt structure, aspect of familiarity, and so on. Smith, D.W. 1986. The structure of (self-) consciousness. Topoi 5:149-56. Sperry, R.W. 1969. A modified concept of consciousness. Psychological Review 76:532-36. Consciousness is an emergent property of brain dynamics that itself governs low-level flow of excitation. Midway between mentalism and materialism. Sperry, R.W. 1992. Turnabout on consciousness: A mentalist view. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:259-80. An account of the "new mentalist paradigm". Clarifies earlier work, comments on others' interpretations. The view is monist and functionalist, but consciousness is a distinct emergent quality with a "downward" causal role. Tienson, J.L 1987. Brains are not conscious. Philosophical Papers 16:187-93. A skeptical arguments: single neurons are not conscious, and adding a neuron won't produce consciousness, so finite brains are not conscious. 1.7b Consciousness -- Conceptual Analysis [9] ----------------------------------------- Armstrong, D.M. 1981. What is consciousness? In _The Nature of Mind_. Cornell University Press. On minimal consciousness, perceptual consciousness, and introspective consciousness. Introspective consciousness seems so special because it gives inner awareness of self, and memory of other mental events. Bisiach, E. 1988. The (haunted) brain and consciousness. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_. Oxford University Press. Distinguishes C1 (phenomenal experience) from C2 (access of parts of a system to other parts). C2 is can be scientifically studied, and has a graspable, if fragmented, causal role. C1 is mysterious and perhaps beyond science. Natsoulas, T. 1978. Consciousness. American Psychologist 33:906-14. On the role of consciousness in psychology, and distinguishing various notions of consciousness: mutual knowledge, internal knowledge, awareness, direct awareness, personal unity, wakefulness, and double consciousness. Nelkin, N. 1987. What is it like to be a person? Mind and Language 21:220-41. Critiques three senses of consc: awareness, verbalization and phenomenology. Argues that none are sufficient for person-consciousness. Quite good. Nelkin, N. 1989. Unconscious sensations. Philosophical Psychology 2:129-41. Separates CN (phenomenological) from C1 (info-processing) and C2 (beliefs about C1). Argues for the possibility of unconscious sensations. Nelkin, N. 1993. What is consciousness? Philosophy of Science 60:419-34. On three senses of consciousness: phenomenality, intentionality, and introspectibility. Argues from empirical evidence (especially blindsight cases) that these three are all dissociable. Richards, W. 1984. Self-consciousness and agency. Synthese 61:149-71. Self-consciousness is consciousness of agency. Castaneda/Nozick/Nagel. Rosenthal, D.M. 1990. The independence of consciousness and sensory quality. In (E. Villanueva, ed) _Consciousness_. Ridgeview. Argues that consciousness and sensory quality are independent properties: there can be unconscious sensations. Consciousness is a relational property. Shanon, B. 1990. Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 11:137-51. On three kinds of consciousness -- sensed being, mental awareness, and reflection -- and their relationships. 1.7c Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought (Rosenthal, etc.) [12] ------------------------------------------------------------- Aquila, R. 1990. Consciousness as higher-order thoughts: Two objections. American Philosophical Quarterly 27:81-87. Higher-order thought theories have two unacceptable consequences: one can notice one's hearing a sound without noticing one's consciousness of the sound; and one can unconsciously perceive one's surroundings as gloomy. Carruthers, P. 1989. Brute experience. Journal of Philosophy 435-51. Argues for a distinction between conscious and non-conscious experiences, depending on whether one is conscious of the experience. Animal experiences are of the second kind, and therefore are not morally significant. Dretske, F. 1993. Conscious experience. Mind 102:263-283. Against higher-order thought accounts: one can have a conscious experience without being aware that one is having it. With remarks on thing-awareness vs. fact-awareness and on "inner-sense" accounts. Lycan, W.G. 1993. Consciousness as internal monitoring. Philosophical Perspectives. Argues for a Lockean quasi-perceptual view of consciousness as internal monitoring via second-order states. Contra objections, e.g. Rey's point that it makes consciousness too prevalent -- consciousness isn' an on-off affair. Nisbett, R. & Wilson, T. 1977. Telling more than we can know: verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review 84:231-59. Experimental evidence on our confabulation about our inner processes. Rosenthal, D.M. 1986. Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49:329-59. Consciousness should be construed neither as sensation nor intentionality, but as the existence of higher-order thoughts. Rosenthal, D.M. 1990. A theory of consciousness. Bielefeld Report. A conscious mental state is a state that is the subject of a higher-order thought. Consciousness is not essential to mentality, should be separated from sensory quality, and is not an intrinsic property of conscious states. Rosenthal, D.M. 1990. Why are verbally expressed thoughts conscious? Bielefeld Report. Because verbally expressing and reporting are easily and immediately connected for 1st-order thoughts. But not for 2nd-order thoughts. Hmmm. Rosenthal, D.M. 1993. Thinking that one thinks. In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays_. Blackwell. Conscious states are states that are the contents of higher-order thoughts. Express/report distinction: we report them, and express the HOT (which may be unconscious). Defence against dispositional and collapsing objections. Rosenthal, D.M. 1993. Explaining consciousness. Manuscript. Distinguishes the sense in which we are aware of conscious states; argues for the separation of consciousness and sensation; and outlines how higher-order thoughts might explain the what-it's-like of conscious states. Shoemaker, S. 1990. First-person access. Philosophical Perspectives 4:187-214. We have a limited special authority about the contents of our mental states. This follows from the link between a state and beliefs about it in the functional definition of that kind of state. Shoemaker, S. 1993. Functionalism and consciousness. In _Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness_ (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). Wiley. Argues that introspective access is essential to many sorts of mental state, due to constitutive rationality requirements. Against a perceptual model of introspection; introspecting and introspected states are closer than that. 1.7d Consciousness and Physicalism [15] (see also 1.5, 1.7) ---------------------------------- Chalmers, D.J. 1995. An argument for dualism. In _Toward a Theory of Consciousness_. MIT Press. Argues from the lack of logical supervenience to the falsity of physicalism about consciousness. Objections from a posteriori necessity fail. Argues for a property dualism compatible with a naturalistic account of experience. Elitzur, A. 1989. Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10:1-20. Argues from the fact that we talk about consciousness to the conclusion that consciousness plays an active role, so physical laws must be incomplete. Hill, C.S. 1991. _Sensations: A Defence of Type Materialism_. Cambridge University Press. Defending type materialism, by way of criticism of dualism and functionalism. With treatments of introspection, sensory concepts, and other minds. Kirk, R. 1974. Sentience and behaviour. Mind 81:43-60. Describing a situation where we would be justified in believing in zombies. Argues that zombies are logically possible, which seems incompatible with most or all varieties of materialism. Kirk, R. 1974. Zombies vs materialists. Aristotelian Society Supplement 48:135-52. Materialism requires that physical states logically entail all non-relational states; but zombies are logically possible, so materialism fails. Excellent point. With a description of a zombie, and replies to a verificationist. Kirk, R. 1977. Reply to Don Locke on zombies and materialism. Mind 86:262-4. Reply to Locke 1976: materialism needs zombies to be logically impossible. Kirk, R. 1994. _Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness_. Oxford University Press. Physicalism can explain consciousness in all its glory. Argues against zombies and inverted-spectrum scenarios, and suggests that the explanatory gap can be bridged by an account of directly-active information-processing. Lahav, R. & Shanks, N. 1992. How to be a scientifically respectable `property dualist'. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:211-32. Argues that the hypothesis of consciousness as an irreducible global property of the brain is compatible with what we know of both neuroscience and physics. With interesting remarks on quantum mechanics. Locke, D. 1976. Zombies, schizophrenics, and purely physical objects. Mind 83:97-99. Contra Kirk: the logical possibility of zombies is compatible with empirical materialism. With some comments on Kirk's thought-experiment. McGinn, C. 1993. Consciousness and cosmology: Hyperdualism ventilated. In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays_. Blackwell. A dialogue with a "hyperdualist". On the pros and cons of materialist vs. dualist ontology and cosmology. Dualism avoids the "magic" of emergence at the cost of an inflated and bizarre ontology. Sellars, W. 1981. Is consciousness physical? Monist 64:66-90. On the place of "occurrent pink" and the "sensorium" in the physical world. It may turn out that the physics of the brain differs from other physics, in order to accommodate the causal role of sensations. Seager, W.E. 1992. _Metaphysics of Consciousness_. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Consciousness could be physical even if not explicable; but supervenience worries make it hard to see how it *could* be physical, though causal role suggests that it must be. We need a new conception. A stimulating book. Snyder, D. 1990. On Elitzur's discussion of the impact of consciousness on the physical world. Journal of Mind and Behavior. Argues with Elitzur on quantum mechanics and consciousness. With response. Sprigge, T.L.S. 1994. Consciousness. Synthese 98:73-93. On the non-physical nature of consciousness, and the threat of a merely contingent connection to behavior; suggests a denial of "Hume's principle". Perhaps consciousness is the noumenal essence of the physical. A nice paper. Squires, R. 1974. Zombies vs materialists II. Aristotelian Society Supplement 48:153-63. 1.7e Consciousness -- Eliminativist Perspectives [10] ------------------------------------------------ Allport, A. 1988. What concept of consciousness? In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_. Oxford University Press. Churchland, P.S. 1983. Consciousness: the transmutation of a concept. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:80-95. Experimental evidence against consciousness/introspection/transparency. Dennett, D.C. 1981. Wondering where the yellow went. Monist 64:102-8. A response to Sellars. All there is to seeing occurrent yellow is the judgment that one is seeing occurrent yellow. Jacoby, H. 1985. Eliminativism, meaning, and qualitative states. Philosophical Studies 47:257-70. Arguing against eliminativism for qualia. Even if nothing satisfies all the common-sense properties of qualia, reference of qualia terms is still fixed under a Putnam-style theory of meaning. Argues for scientific functionalism. Nikolinakos, D. 1994. General anesthesia, consciousness, and the skeptical challenge. Journal of Philosophy 2:88-104. Consciousness is an indispensable concept in anesthesiology, and therefore (contra Churchland and Wilkes) is a scientifically legitimate kind. With empirical details and anesthesiological theory on levels of consciousness. Rey, G. 1982. A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness. In (R. Davidson, S. Schwartz, & D. Shapiro, eds) _Consciousness and Self-Regulation_, Vol 3. Plenum Press. One could make a machine, duplicating the usual abilities that go along with consciousness, but surely it wouldn't be conscious. So what are the conditions for consciousness? Maybe there are none. Rey, G. 1986. A question about consciousness. In (H. Otto & J. Tuedio, eds) _Perspectives on Mind_. Kluwer. A rerun of Rey 1982: An unconscious machine could duplicate all the obvious criteria for consciousness, so maybe even we aren't conscious. With remarks on the relation between our belief in consciousness and consciousness itself. Smith, D.W. 1986. In (H. Otto & J. Tuedio, eds) _Perspectives on Mind_. Kluwer. Commentary on Rey 1986: we are directly aware of our consciousness. It's not a theoretical entity, but rather something to be explained. Wilkes, K.V. 1984. Is consciousness important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35:223-43. No, and it's not very coherent either. It divides into awakeness, sensation, sensory experience, and propositional attitudes. Also a history of the term. Wilkes, K.V. 1988. Yishi, Duh, Um and consciousness. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_. Oxford University Press. 1.7f Consciousness and Intentionality [9] ------------------------------------- Cam, P. 1984. Consciousness and content-formation. Inquiry 27:381-98. Gunderson, K. 1990. Consciousness and intentionality: Robots with and without the right stuff. In (C.A. Anderson & J. Owens, eds) _Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Language, Logic, and Mind_. CSLI. McGinn, C. 1988. Consciousness and content. Proceedings of the British Academy 74:219-39. Reprinted in _The Problem of Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1991). Comparing the problems of consciousness and content, and reconciling optimism on content with pessimism on consciousness. The phenomenological nature of content may be mysterious, but the individuation of contents is not. Natsoulas, T. 1992. Intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:281-308. Nelkin, N. 1989. Propositional attitudes and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49:413-30. About conscious beliefs. We are not "conscious of" beliefs, merely "conscious that" -- i.e. belief is not phenomenological. Nelkin, N. 1993. The connection between intentionality and consciousness. In (M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds) _Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays_. Blackwell. Against Searle: some intentional states aren't even potentially conscious (blindsight, etc) and intentional content doesn't require a particular phenomenal feel. So there's no essential link. With remarks on McGinn. Searle, J.R. 1984. Intentionality and its place in nature. Synthese. (Subjective) intentionality sure is real. It causes and is caused. Searle, J.R. 1990. Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13:585-642. Intentional states must be (potentially) conscious; if they're not, they're brutely neurophysiological. Talk of "intentional" cognitive mechanisms below the conscious level, e.g. by Chomsky, is unjustified. van Gulick, R. 1988. Consciousness, intrinsic intentionality, and self-understanding machines. In (A. Marcel & E. Bisiach, eds) _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_. Oxford University Press. 1.8 Mind-Body Problem, General [28] ------------------------------ Campbell, C. 1970. _Body and Mind_. Doubleday. Cheng, C. (ed) 1975. _Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem_. Hawaii University Press. Double, R. 1983. Nagel's argument that mental properties are nonphysical. Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22. Feigl, H. 1960. The mind-body problem: Not a pseudo-problem. In (S. Hook, ed) _Dimensions of Mind_. New York University Press. Fodor, J.A. 1981. The mind-body problem. Scientific American 244:114-25. An overview: behaviorism, identity theory, functionalism, etc. Foss, J. 1987. Is the mind-body problem empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17:505-32. Yes it is. Empirical evidence bears on materialism, property dualism, emergentism, functionalism, interactive dualism, idealism, etc. Fox, M. 1978. Beyond materialism. Dialogue 17:367-70. Gunderson, K. 1970. Asymmetries and mind-body perplexities. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4:273-309. The core of the mind-body problem is the first/third-person asymmetry. It's like a periscope trying to place itself between its crosshairs. Honderich, T. 1981. Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24:277-303. Defending lawlike connections between physical states & conscious occurrents. Contra anomalous monism and identity theory for occurrents. But occurrents may not be causally efficacious. Comments by Wilson/Sprigge/Mackie/Stich. Howard, D.J. 1986. The new mentalism. International Philosophical Quarterly 26:353-7. Jackson, F. 1994. Finding the mind in the natural world. In (R. Casati, B. Smith, & S. White, eds) _Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences_. On why materialism requires conceptual analysis to locate mental properties in the natural world. Even a posteriori necessary connections have to be backed by a priori links. With remarks on supervenience. A nice paper. Kirk, R. 1979. From physical explicability to full-blooded materialism. Philosophical Quarterly 29:229-37. If every physical events has a physical explanation, and the mental is causally efficacious, then mental facts are strictly implied by physical facts. Nice argument. Kirk, R. 1982. Physicalism, identity, and strict implication. Ratio 24:131-41. Physicalism requires that all mental facts be strictly implied by the physical facts. Once this is recognized, questions about necessary or contingent identity are beside the point, and indeed identity is irrelevant. Kirk, R. 1991. Why shouldn't we be able to solve the mind-body problem? Analysis 51:17-23. McGinn asks too much of a solution to the M-B problem. We might understand consciousness without understanding specific experiences; we could get at it by studying brain and consciousness not separately but simultaneously. Kraemer, E.R. 1980. Imitation-man and the `new' epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10:479-487. If Campbell's imitation man is possible, then the causal relation between the physical and phenomenal is unreliable. Levin, M. _Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem_. Oxford University Press. Madell, G. 1988. _Mind and materialism_. Edinburgh University Press. On the problems posed for materialism by intentionality, autonomy, awareness, and indexicality. Tentatively advocates a Cartesian position. Margolis, J. 1978. _Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Non-Reductive Materialism_. D. Reidel. Matson, W.I. 1976. _Sentience_. University of California Press. McGinn, C. 1989. Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98:349-66. Reprinted in _The Problem of Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1991). Argues that the mind-body problem might be solvable in principle, but beyond human capacities. Neither perception of the brain nor introspection of consciousness can uncover the property by which consciousness arises. Nagel, T. 1979. Panpsychism. In _Mortal Questions_. Cambridge University Press. Material composition, nonreductionism, realism, non-emergence => panpsychism. Nagel, T. 1993. What is the mind-body problem? In _Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness_ (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). Wiley. On ways in which we might locate consciousness within the natural world via scientific study. Perhaps we need an wider conception of objective reality. Robinson, H. 1976. The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy. Zygon 11:346-360. A discussion of materialism and its difficulties. The conceivability of zombies poses special problems. Criticism of Smart's & Armstrong's analyses. Robinson, H. 1982. _Matter and Sense_. Cambridge University Press. Robinson, W.S. 1988. _Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and its Causal Conditions_. Temple University Press. Rosenthal, D.M. (ed) 1971. _Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem_. Prentice-Hall. A collection of essays from the 1960s on the identity theory, functionalism, eliminative materialism. Sperry, R. 1980. Mind-brain interaction: Mentalism yes, dualism no. Neuroscience 5:195-206. A summary of the position whereupon mental properties are emergent and have independent causal powers. With a contrast to Popper and Eccles' dualism. Tye, M. 1983. On the possibility of disembodied existence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61:275-282. There's no reason to believe that disembodied existence is possible: lack of logical contradiction doesn't imply possibility, conceivability is too weak a criterion, and it's not obvious that the situation is imaginable. van Cleve, J. 1990. Mind -- dust or magic? Panpsychism versus emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:215-226. On Nagel 1979: emergence is more plausible than panpsychism. A construal of emergence as nomological supervenience without logical supervenience. 1.9 The Identity Theory (Smart, etc) [54] ------------------------------------ Feigl, H. 1958. The `mental' and the `physical'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:370-497. Feigl, H. 1960. Mind-body, not a pseudoproblem. In (S. Hook, ed) _Dimensions of Mind_. New York UP. Place, U.T. 1956. Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology 47:44-50. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_ (Blackwell, 1990). The idea that consciousness is a brain process is logically coherent. It's a scientific hypothesis, not a necessary truth. On the "is" of composition vs the "is" of definition, and the fallacy of the internal phenomenal field. Smart, J.J.C. 1959. Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68:141-56. Defending the thesis that sensations are contingently identical to brain processes against various objections. Topic-neutral analysis of sensation reports. Materialism beats epiphenomenalism on grounds of simplicity. Abelson, R. 1970. A refutation of mind-body identity. Philosophical Studies 18:85-90. The number of possible mental states is infinite (think of any number), whereas there are only finitely many brain states, so they're not identical. Armstrong, D.M. 1968. The headless woman and the defense of materialism. Analysis 29. Likens the anti-materialist position to the "headless woman" fallacy: "I'm not aware the mental states are physical", so "I'm aware that mental states are non-physical". Armstrong, D.M. 1973. Epistemological foundations for a materialist theory of mind. Philosophy of Science 40:178-93. A prima facie case for materialism based on grounds of rational consensus, arising especially from common-sense and scientific evidence. Mental states exist (common-sense) but should be analyzed causally (evidence from science). Baier, K. 1962. Smart on sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40:57-68. Mental states are necessarily private, and so cannot be physical states, which are public. We have epistemological authority about our mental states. Borst, C.V. (ed) 1970. _The Mind/Brain Identity Theory_. Macmillan. An anthology of central articles on the identity theory. Bradley, M.C. 1963. Sensations, brain-processes, and colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41. Brandt, R. 1960. Doubts about the identity theory. In (S. Hook, ed) _Dimensions of Mind_. New York UP. Brandt, R. & Kim, J. 1967. The logic of the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 66:515-537. Arguing for an event-identity construal of the identity theory. Comparing the identity theory to the weaker "principle of simultaneous isomorphism". The only reason to accept the identity theory is ontological simplicity. Candlish, S. 1970. Mind, brain, and identity. Mind 79:502-18. Carney, J. 1971. The compatibility of mind-body identity with dualism. Mind. Argues that the identity theory is compatible with linguistic dualism, as the mental and the physical may differ in intensional properties only. Clarke, J. 1971. Mental structure and the identity theory. Mind 80:521-30. Coder, D. 1973. The fundamental error of central-state materialism. American Philosophical Quarterly 10:289-98. On problems with theories that leave the nature of mind open a priori: how can we even understand the possibilities? Cornman, J. 1962. The identity of mind and body. Journal of Philosophy 59:486-92. Coburn, R.C. 1963. Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes. Journal of Philosophy 60:89. Location of mental states by convention (Shaffer 1961) won't work, as it (a) makes mental states public, and (b) conflicts with connections to behavior. Feigl, H. 1971. Some crucial issues of mind-body monism. Synthese. Heil, J. 1970. Sensations, experiences, and brain processes. Philosophy 45:221-6. Joske, W. 1960. Sensations and brain processes: A reply to Professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:150-7, 1960. On topic-neutral reports, after-images, and after-radishes. Such a report requires epistemic access to physical resemblance, which we don't have. Kim, J. 1966. On the psycho-physical identity theory. American Philosophical Quarterly 3:227-35. There's no empirical support for identity, over and above that for correlation; and unity of science gives no reason to accept identity. The only reason might be that of ontological simplicity. Kim, J. 1972. Phenomenal properties, psychophysical laws and the identity theory. Monist 56:178-92. Deal with phenomenal properties by allowing only mental events, and eliminating mental objects. Identity theories needn't suppose psychophysical laws. With defense against multiple realizability arguments. Kitcher, P.S. 1982. Two versions of the identity theory. Erkenntnis 17:213-28. Recasting the identity theory and functionalism, using Kripkean theories of reference, so mental states can refer to physiological or psychological states that we don't yet understand; and qualia problems are handled better. Lewis, D. 1965. An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 63:17-25. Reprinted in _Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1_ (Oxford University Press, 1980). Mental states are defined by their causal roles. So, by the completeness of physics, they must be physical states. Locke, D. 1971. Must a materialist pretend he's anaesthetized? Philosophical Quarterly 21:217-31. On how materialism, as opposed to a double aspect view, can handle mental features -- by moving them into the world via a realist theory of perception. Remarks on identification of states. After-images, etc, cause problems. Lockwood, M. 1984. Einstein and the identity theory. Analysis. Using the special theory of relativity to show that if mental events have a temporal location, then they must have a spatial location. Malcolm, N. 1964. Scientific materialism and the identity theory. Dialogue 3:115-25. The identity theory is meaningless, if identity is analyzed as spatiotemporal coincidence, as thoughts don't have location. Thoughts also require context. Even if identity holds, explaining brain doesn't imply explaining mind. McDonald, C. 1989. _Mind-Body Identity Theories_. Routledge. Meehl, P. 1966. The compleat autocerebroscopist: A thought-experiment on Professor Feigl's mind-body identity thesis. In (P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell, eds) _Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl_. University of Minnesota Press. Mucciolo, L. 1974. The identity theory and criteria for the mental. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35. Munsat, S. 1969. Could sensations be processes? Mind. Sensations and processes have different logical type, so it is a priori impossible that they should be identical. Nagel, T. 1965. Physicalism. Philosophical Review 74:339-56, 1965. Noren, S.J. 1970. Smart's materialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Pitcher, G. 1960. Sensations and brain processes: A reply to Professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:150-7, 1960. Identity requires explanation to be accepted, but Smart doesn't provide this. But one can deny identity without claiming dualism -- e.g. a "duck-rabbit" theory of mind/brain. With remarks on the completeness of descriptions. Place, U.T. 1960. Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review 69:101-4. Contra Smart 1959: Materialism is a scientific hypothesis, if we accept certain logical criteria for what a sensation is; otherwise it's just false. Place, U.T. 1972. Sensations and processes: A reply to Munsat. Mind. Place, U.T. 1988. Thirty years on -- Is consciousness still a brain process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:208-19. Comparing contemporary materialism to Pace's 1956 variety. With remarks on whether the thesis is empirical or a priori, and on deciding the issue between materialism and epiphenomenalism. Place, U.T. 1989. Low claim assertions. In (J. Heil, ed) _Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin_. Kluwer. Discusses a paper of Martin's and the genesis of the identity theory, with a focus on `public' and 'private logic' and topic-neutral descriptions. Puccetti, R. 1978. The refutation of materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8:157-62. The identity theory must be false, as pain centers in vitro will not be pains. With a reply by G. Pearce and a rejoinder. Rosenbaum, S. 1977. The property objection and the principles of identity. Philosophical Studies 32. Routley, R. & MaCrae, V. 1966. On the identity of sensations and physiological occurrences. American Philosophical Quarterly 3. Scriven, M. 1966. The limitations of the identity theory. In (P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell, eds) _Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl_. University of Minnesota Press. On the identity theory as a linguistic proposal, compatible with dualism; epiphenomenalism and parallelism must be false, leaving interactionism. Shaffer, J. 1961. Could mental states be brain processes? Journal of Philosophy 58:813-22. Mental states don't have a location, and brain processes do; but we could stipulate a location for mental states. With remarks on possible relations between mental and physical features, states, and concepts. Shaffer, J. 1963. Mental events and the brain. Journal of Philosophy 60:160-6, 1963. We identify mental events by noticing mental features that must be nonphysical, but still might be empirically reducible. Against topic-neutral definitions, and with response to Coburn 1963 on location. Smart, J.J.C, 1961. Further remarks on sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review. Reply to Stevenson 1960: There are no irreducible mental properties; they reduce to physical properties via topic-neutral definitions. Smart, J.J.C. 1962. Brain processes and incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40:68-70. Reply to Baier 1962: epistemological authority is compatible with materialism. Mental state reports are not completely incorrigible, though. Smart, J.J.C. 1963. Materialism. Journal of Philosophy 60:651-62. Defending topic-neutral analyses of mental reports, and arguing against Wittgensteinian behaviorism via brain-in-vat examples. With remarks on the appeal of materialism and on compatibility with ordinary language. Smart, J.J.C. 1972. Further thoughts on the identity theory. Monist 56:177-92. On some problems for the identity theory arising from the intensionality of mental states and from the appeal to properties, and on how to modify the translation form of the theory without embracing the disappearance version. Stevenson, J.T. 1960. `Sensations and brain processes': A reply to J.J.C. Smart. Philosophical Review 69:505-10. Identity theory implies nomological danglers, due to the irreducibility of defining mental properties. Stoutland, F. 1971. Ontological simplicity and the identity hypothesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. The identity thesis isn't ontologically simpler than dualism: we still need a dualism of properties, and explanatory danglers. Not much turns on the issue, except in teleological explanation. Sosa, E. 1965. Professor Malcolm on `Scientific materialism and the identity theory'. Dialogue 3:422-23. Contra Malcolm 1965: explaining brain will explain mind, if the explanation is conjoined with the identity statement. With rejoinder from Malcolm. Swartz, N. 1974. Can the theory of contingent identity between sensation-states and brain-states be made empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3:405-17. Thalberg, I. 1978. A novel approach to mind-brain identity. Philosophy of Science 3:255-72. Suggests a theory in which neural states are components of, but not identical to, overall psychological states. This can accommodate raw feels if necessary as a further component, but is mostly materialistic. 1.10 Essentialism and the Identity Theory (Kripke) [30] -------------------------------------------------- Kripke, S.A. 1971. Identity and necessity. In (M. Munitz, ed) _Identity and Individuation_. An identity between mental and physical states can't be contingent, as it relates rigid designators. But nevertheless the co-occurrence of certain mental and physical states is contingent, so the identity theory is false. Kripke, S.A. 1972. _Naming and Necessity_. Harvard University Press. Both "pain" and "C-fibres firing" are rigid designators, so if they are identical, this must be necessary. But their co-occurrence is contingent, and this can't be explained away epistemically, so the identity theory fails. Barnette, R. 1977. Kripke's pains. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15. Argues that pain and the associated epistemic situation are inequivalent. Beliefs about pain are simply produced by mechanisms, and could come about without any sensation. Bayne, S.R. 19xx. Kripke's Cartesian argument. Philosophia. Trying to turn Kripke's argument against him: it's possible that pains and C-fibre stimulations are identical, so it's necessary that they're identical. Bealer, G. 1994. Mental properties. Journal of Philosophy 91:185-208. On four arguments against the identity theory: multiple-realizability, modal, knowledge, and certainty arguments. All face difficulties due to scientific essentialism, but the latter two can be reformulated to avoid them. Blumenfeld, J. 1975. Kripke's refutation of materialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53:151-6. Kripke's argument doesn't refute token identity. Pains can have other essential properties besides painfulness, so psychophysical token identities can be necessary. Boyd, R. 1980. Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, vol 1. Harvard University Press. Materialism doesn't need rigid identities, due to the compositional plasiticity of mental states. So the possibility of disembodiment is compatible with materialism. The possibility of zombies is illusory. Carney, J. & von Bretzel, P. 1973. Modern materialism and essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51:78-81. A materialist must deny essentialism to meet Kripke's argument. Carney, J. 1975. Kripke and materialism. Philosophical Studies 27:279-282. Comments on Feldman 1974: Feldman's view requires rejection of Kripke's views on necessity, or a problematic mixed view on rigid designators. Cole, D.J. & Foelber, F. 1984. Contingent materialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65:74-85. Argues that materialism is only contingently true, as it's conceptually possible that we could become immaterial by gradual replacement. Della Rocca, M. 1993. Kripke's essentialist arguments against the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 69:101-112. Kripke's premise that pains are essentially mental either begs the question (by assuming pains don't have physical properties) or weakens the premise that physical events aren't essentially mental. Double, R. 1976. The inconclusiveness of Kripke's argument against the identity theory. Auslegung 3:156-65. Feldman, F. 1973. Kripke's argument against materialism. Philosophical Studies 24:416-19. Painfulness need not be an essential feature of pains. Feldman, F. 1974. Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71:665-76. Kripke's arguments against person-body and mind-brain identity rely on the essentialness of aliveness to persons and painfulness to pains. There's no reason to grant this. If we do, rigidity is irrelevant to the argument. Feldman, F. 1980. Identity, necessity, and events. In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol. 1. Harvard University Press. Defending a contingent event identity thesis against Kripke. Mental properties (which are distinct from physical properties) may not be essential properties of an event. Gjelsvik, O. 1988. A Kripkean objection to Kripke's arguments against the identity-theories. Inquiry 30:435-50. Uses Kripke's 1979 direct-reference theory against him. When rigid designators don't have associated reference-fixing descriptions, we can't expect the "explaining away" strategy to work. Hill, C.S. 1981. Why Cartesian intuitions are compatible with the identity thesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42:254-65. The apparent contingency of identity is due to the fact that one can be aware of pain without being aware of C-fibers and vice versa, as well as to the fact that "C-fibers" may be picked out by a contingent description. Holman, E. 1988. Qualia, Kripkean arguments, and subjectivity. Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-29. Defending Kripkean arguments against various objections. Analysis in terms of manifest properties and their role in fixing reference to the subjective and objective. Jackson, F. 1980. A note on physicalism and heat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58:26-34. A Kripkean argument against non-analytic physicalism. Even if pain rigidly designates a brain state, the physicalist still has problems explaining the property of "pain-presents". Jacquette, D. 1987. Kripke and the mind-body problem. Dialectica 41:293-300. Kripke's argument doesn't refute contingent identity between minds and nonrigidly designated bodies, which is all materialism needs. Kirk, R. 1982. Physicalism, identity, and strict implication. Ratio 24:131-41. Materialism doesn't need a identity thesis. The requirement that mental facts are entailed by physical facts plays the role played by Kripke's requirement of necessary identity, and is more reasonable. Leplin, J. 1979. Theoretical identification and the mind-body problem. Philosophia 8:673-88. Some theoretical identification are analogous to mental-physical identifications -- entities are introduced by properties considered essential within a theory, but this doesn't preclude identification. Levin, M. 1975. Kripke's argument against the identity thesis. Journal of Philosophy 72:149-67. The reference of "pain" is fixed not by essential features but by contingent topic-neutral descriptions; this is the real moral of Wittgenstein's private language argument. So Kripke's apparent contingency can be explained away? Lycan, W.G. 1974. Kripke and the materialists. Journal of Philosophy 71:677-89. Kripke equivocates on "pain-sensation": pains aren't the same as impressions of pain. Argues that imaginability arguments aren't decisive, and that functionalism may be less vulnerable than the identity theory. Lycan, W.G. 1987. Functionalism and essence. In _Consciousness_. MIT Press. Painfulness needn't be essential to pains: pains are events, not objects, and events don't have essences; and the reference of "pain" is fixed by topic-neutral descriptions. With remarks on pains vs. pain-sensations. Maxwell, G. 1979. Rigid designators and mind-brain identity. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9. McGinn, C. 1977. Anomalous monism and Kripke's Cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2:78-80. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Token identity theories aren't vulnerable to Kripke's argument: it may be essential to this pain that it is a C-fibre firing, although not to pain as a type. McMullen, C. 1984. An argument against the identity theory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65:277-87. We can explain away the apparent contingency of identity in terms of possible differences in *evidence* for the physical state. With a discussion on identities between something perceived and something described. Mucciolo, L. 1975. On Kripke's argument against the identity thesis. Philosophia 5:499-506. "Pain" need not be a rigid designator, but instead may pick out a state by its causal role. If it is a rigid designator, then the apparent contingency of identity comes from imagining something else filling the causal role. Sher, G. 1977. Kripke, Cartesian intuitions, and materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7:227-38. The reference of "C-fibre stimulation" might be fixed contingently, allowing the intuitive contingency of identity to be explained away. -- Compiled by David Chalmers, Department of Philosophy, Washington University. (c) 1994 David J. Chalmers. Part 2: Mental Content [375] ====================== Contents -------- 2.1 The Status of Propositional Psychology [132] 2.1a The Language of Thought (Fodor) [27] 2.1b Instrumentalism (Dennett) [24] 2.1c Syntactic Functionalism (Stich) [6] 2.1d Eliminativism (Churchlands) [38] 2.1e Propositional Attitudes, General [17] 2.1f The Nature of Folk Psychology [20] 2.2 Narrow/Wide Content [114] 2.2a Is Meaning in the Head? (Putnam, Burge) [21] 2.2b Individualism and Externalism in Psychology (Burge, Fodor) [38] 2.2c The Status of Narrow Content [32] 2.2d Content and Self-Knowledge [8] 2.2e Miscellaneous [15] 2.3 Causal Theories of Content [64] 2.3a Information-Based Accounts (Dretske, etc) [21] 2.3b Asymmetric Dependence (Fodor) [11] 2.3c Causal Accounts, General [9] 2.3d Teleological Approaches (Millikan, etc) [23] 2.4 Conceptual Role Semantics [13] 2.5 Representation (General) [18] 2.6 The Explanatory Role of Content [10] 2.7 Mental Content, Misc [24] 2.1 The Status of Propositional Psychology [132] ------------------------------------------ 2.1a The Language of Thought (Fodor) [27] ------------------------------------ Fodor, J.A. 1975. _The Language of Thought_. Harvard University Press. Argues that thought involves computation upon representations, and that these are structured as sentences in a mental language. With linguistic and psychological evidence, and arguments that the mental language is innate. Fodor, J.A. 1987. Why there still has to be a Language of Thought. In _Psychosemantics_. MIT Press. Because it fits explanatory methodology, it coheres with the usual ontology of psychological processes, and it explains systematicity. Fodor, J.A. 1978. Propositional attitudes. Monist 61:501-23. Reprinted in _RePresentations_ (MIT Press, 1980). About what PA's are, and why they're at the foundations of thought. Bonjour, L. 1991. Is thought a symbolic process? Synthese 89:331-52. Argues that symbol processing can't account for the intrinsically contentful nature of thought: using a symbol doesn't give understanding of its content. With defence against arguments from twin earth and conceptual-role semantics. Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Fitzpatrick, J. 1990. Explanation and the language of thought. Synthese 83:3-29. No need to postulate LOT: diachronic explanation is as good as synchronic, and high-level laws can exist without high-level causal connections. Clark, A. 1988. Thoughts, sentences and cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology 1:263-78. Dennett, D.C. 1977. A cure for the common code. Mind. Reprinted in _Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). Review of Fodor's LOT. Fodor's view is too strong: function, not structure, is criterial for content. The structure of a predictive theory need not be directly reflected in inner processing. Dennett, D.C. 1975. Brain writing and mind reading. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:403-15. Reprinted in _Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). On the explicit representation of belief: criteria, plausibility, and relationship to verbal reports and conscious judgments. Egan, M.F. 1991. Propositional attitudes and the language of thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21:379-88. Contra two of Fodor's arguments for LOT. Complex causes need not have LOT constituency structure; and evidence from psychological theory falls short. Field, H. 1978. Mental representation. Erkenntnis 13:9-18. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Analyzes belief into a relation between a person and an internal sentence, along with a semantic relation between that sentence and e.g. a proposition. With arguments against functionalist analyses, and against propositions. Harman, G. 1973. _Thought_. Princeton University Press. Harman, G. 1975. Language, thought, and communication. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:270-298. Argues that the primary role of language is in thought rather than in communication, and the language of thought incorporates natural language. Harman, G. 1977. How to use propositions. American Philosophical Quarterly. Harman, G. 1978. Is there mental representation? Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9. Heil, J. 1981. Does cognitive psychology rest on a mistake? Mind 90:321-42. LOT confuses processes with descriptions of processes. Also, symbols cannot denote solely in virtue of structure, so must rely on human interpretation. Loar, B. 1982. Must beliefs be sentences? Philosophy of Science Association. Lycan, W.G. 1982. Toward a homuncular theory of believing. Cognition and Brain Theory 4:139-59. Defends sententialism of the homuncular variety: little modules all the way in. Lots of pro-belief arguments. Lycan, W.G. 1990. Mental content in linguistic form. Philosophical Studies 58:147-54. Distinguishes varieties of Sententialism, reasonable vs. mad-dog. Matthews, R.J. 1989. The alleged evidence for representationalism. In (S. Silvers, ed) _Rerepresentation_. Kluwer. Argues that contrary to some claims, cognitive psychology does not provide much support for a computational/representational theory of propositional attitudes. Specifically considers research in psycholinguistics and vision. Matthews, R.J. 1991. Is there vindication through representationalism? In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. Fodor's theory can't deal with inexplicit attitudes: the core/derivative distinction is untenable. But we can make sense of intentional causation and psychological explanation without explicit representation. Millikan, R. 1993. On mentalese orthography. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and his Critics_. Blackwell, 1993. On some problems typing tokens in the language of thought. There's no principled distinction between type-identical tokens and type-distinct tokens with an identity judgment. With interesting remarks on co-identification. Pessin, A. 1993. Mentalese syntax: Between a rock and two hard places. Philosophical Studies. Argues that there is no good way to individuate syntactic types in Mentalese. Neural typing, causal typing, and semantic typing all fail. Schiffer, S. 1991. Does Mentalese have a compositional semantics? In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. Argues that the language of thought need not have a compositional semantics; productivity and systematicity can be explained without it. Stalnaker, R.C. 1990. Mental content and linguistic form. Philosophical Studies 58:129-46. Sterelny, K. 1983. Mental representation: What language is Brainese? Philosophical Studies, 43:365-82. Motivates LOT and defends it against various objections: e.g. tacit belief, identity conditions, infinite regress, and semantic nativism. Stich, S.P. 1978. Beliefs and subdoxastic states. Philosophy of Science 45:499-518. Tienson, J. 1990. Is this any way to be a realist? Philosophical Psychology. 2.1b Instrumentalism (Dennett) [24] ------------------------------ Dennett, D.C. 1978. _Brainstorms_. MIT Press. Dennett, D.C. 1971. Intentional systems. Journal of Philosophy 68:87-106 Reprinted in _Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978).. Can view systems from physical stance, design stance, or intentional stance. Beliefs/desires are attributed under the intentional stance, with help from certain idealized norms of rationality and accuracy licensed by evolution. Dennett, D.C. 1981. Making sense of ourselves. Philosophical Topics 12:63-81. Reprinted in _The Intentional Stance_ (MIT Press, 1987). Reply to Stich 1981. Irrationality is misdesign (take design stance). Etc. Dennett, D.C. 1987. _The Intentional Stance_. MIT Press. Beliefs/desires are useful predictive attributions. This isn't inconsistent with a certain degree of realism (abstracta/illata distinction). Dennett, D.C. 1988. Precis of _The Intentional Stance_. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. TIS, with commentaries and replies. Dennett, D.C. 1990. The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Supplement) 50. Mental states are underdetermined: like interpreting a text, or finding an object's function. Even adaptationist teleology gives no fact of the matter. Dennett, D.C. 1991. Real patterns. Journal of Philosophy 88:27-51. Proposition attitudes have the ontological status of a noisy pattern that helps make sense of behavior. This degree of realism falls on a scale: Fodor > Davidson > Dennett > Rorty > Churchland. Baker, L.R. 1987. Instrumentalism: Back from the brink? In _Saving Belief_. Princeton University Press. Dennett vacillates between stance-dependence, -independence; e.g. on rationality, design features. Instrumentalism can't be rescued. Bechtel, W. 1985. Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance. Cognitive Science 9:265-92. Dennett should be a realist, of the relative-to-environment variety. Cam, P. 1984. Dennett on intelligent storage. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:247-62. Clark, A. 1990. Belief, opinion and consciousness. Philosophical Psychology. Argues contra Dennett and Smolensky that language is fundamental, not just an add-on. Cummins, R. 1981. What can be learned from _Brainstorms_? Philosophical Topics 12:83-92. Questioning Dennett on the bridge between intentional characterization and functional characterization. Arguing for the importance of context. Fodor, J.A. 1981. Three cheers for propositional attitudes. In _Representations_. MIT Press. Dennett's rationality/intentional idealization assumptions should not be viewed as Platonic but epistemic. PA's are real and play real roles. Fodor, J.A. and LePore, E. 1993. Is intentional ascription intrinsically normative? In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and His Critics_. Blackwell. Against "interpretivism" about intentionality: projectivism is hopeless, and Dennett's arguments for normativism (via charity and evolution) go wrong or beg the question. Haugeland, J. 1993. Pattern and being. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and His Critics_. Blackwell. Lyons, W. 1990. Intentionality and modern philosophical psychology, I. The modern reduction of intentionality. Philosophical Psychology 3:247-69. Matthews, R.J. 1990. The measure of mind. Bielefeld Report. A theory of propositional attitude ascription as like numerical measurement. McCulloch, G. 1990. Dennett's little grains of salt. Philosophical Quarterly 40:1-12. Dennett must be one of: realist, eliminativist, instrumentalist. Nelkin, N. 1993. Patterns. Manuscript. Dennett's instrumentalism can't explain the acquisition of intentional concepts. Proposition attitudes are directly introspectible entities, although still theoretical and still patterns. Richardson, R.C. 1980. Intentional realism or intentional instrumentalism? Cognition and Brain Theory 3:125-35. Sharpe, R. 1989. Dennett's journey towards panpsychism. Inquiry 32:233-40. Stich, S.P. 1980. Headaches. Philosophical Books 21:65-73. Critical review of Brainstorms, with response. Stich, S.P. 1981. Dennett on intentional systems. Philosophical Topics 12:39-62. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Dennett has problems with rationality, realism, etc. Hard line/soft line: either intentional stance is too close to FP or too far away. Yu, P. & Fuller, G. 1986. A critique of Dennett. Synthese 66:453-76. Very thorough account of the evolution of Dennett's views. Elucidates abstracta/illata, criticizes intentional subpersonal psychology. 2.1c Syntactic Functionalism (Stich) [6] ------------------------------------ Stich, S.P. 1983. _From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science_. MIT Press. Beliefs/desires are out, new Syntactic Theory is in. Crane, T. 1990. The language of thought: No syntax without semantics. Mind and Language 5:187-213. Egan, M.F. 1989. What's wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind. Philosophy of Science 56:664-74. Stich is confused about type-token, syntax/content, etc. Jacquette, D. 1990. Intentionality and Stich's theory of brain sentence syntax. Philosophical Quarterly, 40:169-82. Things are only syntactic (in SS's sense) in virtue of intentionality. True. Possin, K. 1986. The case against Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind. Philosophical Studies 49:405-18. Stich is wrong, circular, and representational anyway. Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1987. What's in a mind? Synthese 70:97-122. Must individuate mental states by semantics, not just by function. 2.1d Eliminativism (Churchlands) [38] -------------------------------- Churchland, P.S. 1980. Language, thought, and information processing. Nous 14:147-70. Sentential processing is out. Against Harman's mental English and Fodor's Mentalese. Arguments from learning, evolution, neuroscience, mental images. Churchland, P.M. 1981. Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78:67-90. Reprinted in _A Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989). Eliminate beliefs/desires, remnants of a stagnant folk theory. Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. 1983. Stalking the wild epistemic engine. Nous 17:5-20. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). How to dethrone language and still handle content. Churchland, P.M. 1985. On the speculative nature of our self-conception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 11:157-173. Reply to Foss 1985: EM is plausible, though certainly not applicable everywhere -- e.g. sensations will be reduced, not eliminated. Churchland, P.M. 1989. _A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science_. MIT Press. 14 glimpses of the neurophilosophical golden age. Churchland, P.M. 1993. Theory, taxonomy, and metholodology: A reply to Haldane's "Understanding folk". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:313-19. Reply to Haldane 1988. Even observations can be reconceived. With remarks perceptual plasticity and propositions, and a rejoinder by Haldane. Churchland, P.M. 1993. Evaluating our self-conception. Mind and Language 8:211-22. It's "bad faith" to accept modern epistemology but to deny the possibility of eliminativism. On various objections: "functional kinds", "self-defeating", "what could falsify it?", "different purposes", "no alternatives". Baker, L.R. 1987. The threat of cognitive suicide. In _Saving Belief_. Princeton University Press. Elaborating the paradoxes of disbelieving in belief. Rational acceptability, assertion, and truth are all at risk. Baker, L.R. 1988. Cognitive suicide. In (R. Grimm & D. Merrill, eds) _Contents of Thought_. University of Arizona Press. Eliminativism is pragmatically incoherent, as it implies that language isn't meaningful and that the thesis isn't formulable. Folk psychology needn't be scientifically reduced to be true. With comments by Chastain, and reply. Bickle, J. 1992. Revisionary physicalism. Biology and Philosophy 7:411-30. Argues for a revisionary reduction of the propositional attitudes, rather than elimination or smooth reduction. Sentential aspects will go, but coarse-grained functional profiles and content will remain. Boghossian, P. 1990. The status of content. Philosophical Review 99:157-84. Irrealism about mental content (and therefore truth-conditions) can't be made sense of. An error thesis presupposes factual truth-conditions, and a non-factualist thesis presupposes a non-deflationary theory of truth. Boghossian, P. 1991. The status of content revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71:264-78. Reply to Devitt 1990. Cling, A. 1989. Eliminative materialism and self-referential inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 56:53-75. Unbelief in belief is not incoherent. Argues with Baker. Cling, A. 1990. Disappearance and knowledge. Philosophy of Science 57:226-47. Cling, A. 1991. The empirical virtues of belief. Philosophical Psychology 4:303-23. Cognitive states like belief are necessary to explain the dependence of behavior on perceptual features of the environment. Informational states alone are not enough, as they can't explain selective response to features. Devitt, M. 1990. Transcendentalism about content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71:247-63. Against Boghossian's critique: the eliminativism will express her claim in a new framework, so appeals to truth beg the question. With a response. Devitt, M. & Rey, G. 1991. Transcending transcendentalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72:87-100. Rejoinder to Boghossian 1990. Foss, J. 1985. A materialist's misgivings about eliminative materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 11:105-33. EM needs much more evidence before being so gung ho. Greenwood, J.D. 1991. Reasons to believe. In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future of Folk Psychology_. Cambridge University Press. Argues that folk psychological states exist, even if they aren't useful as causal explanation. We have independent reason to believe in them, e.g. from self-knowledge. They're useful in social psychology, too. Haldane, J. 1988. Understanding folk. Aristotelian Society Supplement 62:222-46. Argues that folk psychology is not a theory, and that psychological knowledge is a pre-theoretical given. With remarks on laws, the prediction of behavior, and neuroscience. Hannan, B. 1990. `Non-scientific realism' about propositional attitudes as a response to eliminativist arguments. Behavior and Philosophy 21-31. Hannan, B. 1993. Don't stop believing: the case against eliminative materialism. Mind and Language 8:165-179. A bundle of arguments against eliminativism, e.g. from incoherence, the lack of alternatives, and against the folk-theory-theory. With commentary. Horgan, T. & Woodward, J. 1985. Folk psychology is here to stay. Philosophical Review 94:197-225. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Defending folk psychology against the arguments of Churchland and Stich: e.g. incompleteness, stagnation, irreducibility, dual-control, modularity, and unfalsifiability. Even with no neat reduction, folk psychology may be OK. Horgan, T. & Graham, G. 1990. In defense of Southern Fundamentalism. Philosophical Studies 62:107-134. FP is almost certainly true, irrespective of scientific absorbability or the language of thought. FP's commitments are austere, and mostly behavioral. Arguments from semantic competence and conceptual conservatism. Horgan, T. 1993. The austere ideology of folk psychology. Mind and Language. Argues that FP is not committed to much. The austere conception is supported by intuitions, conservatism, and the inconceivability of dropping it. Responds to phlogiston objections: they are not analogous. Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. 1990. In defence of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies 59:31-54. FP holds that beliefs/desires play a certain functional role, and it's almost certain that objects playing that role exist, so FP is fine, whether or not PAs are good scientific entities. Nice. Jacoby, H. 1985. Eliminativism, meaning and qualitative states. Philosophical Studies. Even if nothing satisfies all or most common-sense properties of mental terms, reference can still be fixed under a Putnam style theory of meaning. (More about qualia than about intentional states.) Kitcher, P.S. 1984. In defense of intentional psychology. Journal of Philosophy 81:89-106. The Churchlands underestimate the resources of intentional psychology. O'Brien, G. 1987. Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 52:49-70. Uses empirical evidence to argue that there is prelinguistic awareness, so nominalistic arguments for eliminativism fail. And some awareness is innate, so we can't reconceive things in less than evolutionary time. Ramsey, W. 1990. Where does the self-refutation objection take us? Inquiry 33:453-65. The self-refutation objection reduces to other standard objections: counterexample, promissory note or reductio. Ramsey, W., Stich, S.P. & Garon, J. 1991. Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology. In (W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart, eds) _Philosophy and Connectionist Theory_. Erlbaum. If connectionism is true, then eliminativism is true, as you can't isolate the causal role of individual beliefs in a connectionist system. Reppert, V. 1991. Ramsey on eliminativism and self-refutation. Inquiry 34:499-508. Response to Ramsey 1990: If there are no beliefs and so no assertions, there is no identifiable propositional content, and truth and knowledge are out. Eliminativism is pragmatically self-refuting. Reppert, V. 1992. Eliminative materialism, cognitive suicide, and begging the question. Metaphilosophy 23:378-92. A careful analysis of whether self-refutation arguments against eliminativism beg the question by supposing that assertion requires belief. An account of what it is to beg the question, and a comparison to arguments about vitalism. Robinson, W. 1985. Toward eliminating Churchland's eliminationism. Philosophical Topics 13:60-67. There's no reason to abandon FP, even if it doesn't reduce. Rosenberg, A. 1991. How is eliminative materialism possible? In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Mind and Common Sense_. Cambridge University Press. Explaining how singular causal claims based on FP may be true even if FP is false; by analogy with phlogiston, and also because of near-vacuousness. EM isn't incoherent, as we can use a non-intentional replacement for belief. Saidel, E. 1992. What price neurophilosophy? Philosophy of Science Association 1:461-68. Folk psychology is compatible with neuroscientific models, but it need not smoothly reduce to neuroscience to have an important role. Stich, S.P. 1991. Do true believers exist? Aristotelian Society Supplement 65:229-44. Eliminativism may have no determinate truth-conditions, as if folk psychology is a poor theory, the question of whether or not "belief" refers may be empty. Stich, S.P. 1992. What is a theory of mental representation? Mind 101:243-61. Philosophical analysis isn't sufficient to understand intentional concepts; real cognitive science is required, with conceptual revision. The truth of eliminativism will be relative to the theory of reference that we choose. 2.1e Propositional Attitudes, General [17] ------------------------------------- Baker, L.R. 1987. _Saving Belief_. Princeton University Press. Beliefs are OK, despite no physicalist reduction of content. Baker, L.R. 1993. What beliefs are not. In (S. Wagner & R. Warner, eds) _Critical Appraisal_. Against beliefs construed as physically realized internal causes of behavior: syntax of these states can't be determinate, and their explanatory role wrt causation leads to a circle. Belief is irreducible. Bennett, J. 1991. Analysis without noise. In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Mind and Common Sense_. Cambridge University Press. Remarks on the conceptual analysis of belief/desire attribution. On the roles of causation, inner-route explanations, belief-desire-action triangles, teleology, unity, the presumption of simplicity, and evolution. Bennett, J. 1991. Folk-psychological explanations. In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future of Folk Psychology_. Cambridge University Press. On requirements for belief/desire explanations: input/output patterns, the unity condition (i.e. no single associated mechanism), and teleological bases for generalizations, e.g. through evolution or educability. Butler, K. 1992. The physiology of desire. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:69-88. Argues that desire will smoothly reduce to a neurophysiological kind. Clark, A. 1991. Radical ascent. Aristotelian Society Supplement 65:211-27. The conditions on being a believer are mostly behavioral; to claim otherwise is to fall into a "modularity trap". A counterfactual account of mental causation is enough. With a defense of mentality for giant look-up tables. Crimmins, M. 1992. Tacitness and virtual beliefs. Mind and Language 7:240-63. Fodor, J.A. 1986. Fodor's guide to mental representation: The intelligent auntie's vade-mecum. Mind 94:76-100. Reprinted in _A