Immanuel Kant's

trans. by Norman Kemp Smith

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BACO DE VERULAMIO
INSTAURATIO MAGNA. PRAEFATIO.
De nobis ipsis silemus:  De re autem, quae agitur, petimus: ut
homines eam non Opinionem, sed Opus esse cogitent; ac pro certo
habeant, non Sectae nos alicujus, aut Placiti, sed utilitatis et
amplitudinis humanae fundamenta moliri. Deinde ut suis commodis
aequi ... in commune consulant, ... et ipsi in partem veniant. Praeterea
ut bene sperent, neque Instaurationem nostram ut quiddam infinitum
et ultra mortale fingant, et animo concipiant; quum revera sit
infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus.
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To his Excellency
The Royal Minister of State
Baron von Zedlitz
HONOURED SIR,
 To further, so far as in us lies, the growth of the sciences is
to work along the lines of your Excellency's own interests, which
are closely bound up with the sciences, not only in virtue of your
exalted position as a patron, but through your more intimate
relation to them as lover and enlightened judge. I therefore avail
myself of the only means that is in any degree in my power, of
expressing my gratitude for the gracious confidence with which your
Excellency honours me, if that I could perhaps be of assistance in
this respect.
 To the same gracious attention with which your Excellency has
honoured the first edition of this work I now dedicate this second
edition, and therewith I crave the protection of all the other 
concerns of my literary mission, and remain with the most profound
reverence,
Your Excellency's
Humble, most obedient servant,
IMMANUEL KANT.
Whoever limiting his worldly ambitions finds satisfaction in the speculative
life has in the approval of an enlightened and competent judge a powerful
incentive to labours, the benefits of which are great but remote, and
therefore such as the vulgar altogether fail to recognise.
 To such a judge and to his gracious attention I now dedicate this work, and
to his
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION
 PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION
HUMAN reason has this peculiar fate that in one species
of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed
by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to
ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also
not able to answer.
 The perplexity into which it thus falls is not due to any
fault of its own. It begins with principles which it has no
option save to employ in the course of experience, and which
this experience at the same time abundantly justifies it in
using. Rising with their aid (since it is determined to this
also by its own nature) to ever higher, ever more remote,
conditions, it soon becomes aware that in this way -- the
questions never ceasing -- its work must always remain
incomplete; and it therefore finds itself compelled to resort
to principles which overstep all possible empirical 
employment, and which yet seem so unobjectionable that even
ordinary consciousness readily accepts them. But by this
procedure human reason precipitates itself into darkness
and contradictions; and while it may indeed conjecture
that these must be in some way due to concealed errors,
it is not in a position to be able to detect them. For since
the principles of which it is making use transcend the limits
of experience, they are no longer subject to any empirical
test. The battle-field of these endless controversies is called
metaphysics.
 Time was when metaphysics was entitled the Queen of
all the sciences; and if the will be taken for the deed, the pre-
eminent importance of her accepted tasks gives her every
right to this title of honour. Now, however, the changed
fashion of the time brings her only scorn; a matron outcast
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and forsaken, she mourns like Hecuba: Modo maxima rerum,
tot generis natisque potens -- nunc trahor exul, inops.
Her government, under the administration of the dogmatists,
was at first despotic. But inasmuch as the legislation
still bore traces of the ancient barbarism, her empire 
gradually through intestine wars gave way to complete anarchy;
and the sceptics, a species of nomads, despising all settled
modes of life, broke up from time to time all civil society.
Happily they were few in number, and were unable to prevent
its being established ever anew, although on no uniform and
self-consistent plan. In more recent times, it has seemed as
if an end might be put to all these controversies and the
claims of metaphysics receive final judgment, through a
certain physiology of the human understanding -- that of the
celebrated Locke. But it has turned out quite otherwise. For
however the attempt be made to cast doubt upon the 
pretensions of the supposed Queen by tracing her lineage to
vulgar origins in common experience, this genealogy has,
as a matter of fact, been fictitiously invented, and she has
still continued to uphold her claims. Metaphysics has accordingly
lapsed back into the ancient time-worn dogmatism, and
so again suffers that depreciation from which it was to have
been rescued. And now, after all methods, so it is believed,
have been tried and found wanting, the prevailing mood is
that of weariness and complete indifferentism -- the mother,
in all sciences, of chaos and night, but happily in this case
the source, or at least the prelude, of their approaching
reform and restoration. For it at least puts an end to that ill-
applied industry which has rendered them thus dark, confused,
and unserviceable.
 But it is idle to feign indifference to such enquiries,
the object of which can never be indifferent to our human
nature. Indeed these pretended indifferentists, however
they may try to disguise themselves by substituting a
popular tone for the language of the Schools, inevitably
fall back, in so far as they think at all, into those very
metaphysical assertions which they profess so greatly to
despise.
 Ovid, Metam.
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None the less this indifference, showing itself in the
midst of flourishing sciences, and affecting precisely those
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sciences, the knowledge of which, if attainable, we should
least of all care to dispense with, is a phenomenon that
calls for attention and reflection. It is obviously the effect
not of levity but of the matured judgment of the age, which
refuses to be any longer put off with illusory knowledge. It is
a call to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of all
its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute
a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and
dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees,
but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable
laws. This tribunal is no other than the critique of pure
reason.
 I do not mean by this a critique of books and systems,
but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all 
knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience.
It will therefore decide as to the possibility or impossibility
of metaphysics in general, and determine its sources,
its extent, and its limits -- all in accordance with principles.
 I have entered upon this path -- the only one that has remained
unexplored -- and flatter myself that in following it I
have found a way of guarding against all those errors which
have hitherto set reason, in its non-empirical employment, at
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variance with itself.
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 We often hear complaints of shallowness of thought in our age
and of the consequent decline of sound science. But I do not see
that the sciences which rest upon a secure foundation, such as mathematics,
physics, etc. , in the least deserve this reproach. On the contrary,
they merit their old reputation for solidity, and, in the case
of physics, even surpass it. The same spirit would have become
active in other kinds of knowledge, if only attention had first been
directed to the determination of their principles. Till this is done, 
indifference, doubt, and, in the final issue, severe criticism, are 
themselves proofs of a profound habit of thought. Our age is, in especial
degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism everything must submit.
Religion through its sanctity, and law-giving through its majesty,
may seek to exempt themselves from it. But they then awaken just
suspicion, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason accords
only to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open
examination.
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I have not evaded its questions by pleading
the insufficiency of human reason. On the contrary, I have
specified these questions exhaustively, according to 
principles; and after locating the point at which, through 
misunderstanding, reason comes into conflict with itself, I have
solved them to its complete satisfaction. The answer to these
questions has not, indeed, been such as a dogmatic and 
visionary insistence upon knowledge might lead us to expect --
that can be catered for only through magical devices, in which
I am no adept. Such ways of answering them are, indeed, not
within the intention of the natural constitution of our reason;
and inasmuch as they have their source in misunderstanding,
it is the duty of philosophy to counteract their deceptive 
influence, no matter what prized and cherished dreams may have
to be disowned. In this enquiry I have made completeness
my chief aim, and I venture to assert that there is not a single
metaphysical problem which has not been solved, or for the
solution of which the key at least has not been supplied. Pure
reason is, indeed, so perfect a unity that if its principle were
insufficient for the solution of even a single one of all the
questions to which it itself gives birth we should have no
alternative but to reject the principle, since we should then no
longer be able to place implicit reliance upon it in dealing
with any one of the other questions.
 While I am saying this I can fancy that I detect in the face
of the reader an expression of indignation, mingled with 
contempt, at pretensions seemingly so arrogant and vain-glorious.
Yet they are incomparably more moderate than the claims
of all those writers who on the lines of the usual programme
profess to prove the simple nature of the soul or the necessity
of a first beginning of the world. For while such writers pledge
themselves to extend human knowledge beyond all limits of
possible experience, I humbly confess that this is entirely 
beyond my power. I have to deal with nothing save reason itself
and its pure thinking; and to obtain complete knowledge of
these, there is no need to go far afield, since I come upon them
in my own self. Common logic itself supplies an example, how
all the simple acts of reason can be enumerated completely
and systematically. The subject of the present enquiry is the
[kindred] question, how much we can hope to achieve by
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reason, when all the material and assistance of experience are
taken away.
 So much as regards completeness in our determination of
each question, and exhaustiveness in our determination of all
the questions with which we have to deal. These questions are
not arbitrarily selected; they are prescribed to us, by the very
nature of knowledge itself, as being the subject-matter of our
critical enquiry.
 As regards the form of our enquiry, certainty and clearness
are two essential requirements, rightly to be exacted from 
anyone who ventures upon so delicate an undertaking.
 As to certainty, I have prescribed to myself the maxim,
that in this kind of investigation it is in no wise permissible to
hold opinions. Everything, therefore, which bears any manner
of resemblance to an hypothesis is to be treated as contraband;
it is not to be put up for sale even at the lowest price,
but forthwith confiscated, immediately upon detection. Any
knowledge that professes to hold a priori lays claim to be
regarded as absolutely necessary. This applies still more to any
determination of all pure a priori knowledge, since such 
determination has to serve as the measure, and therefore as the
[supreme] example, of all apodeictic (philosophical) certainty.
Whether I have succeeded in what I have undertaken must be
left altogether to the reader's judgment; the author's task is
solely to adduce grounds, not to speak as to the effect which
they should have upon those who are sitting in judgment. But
the author, in order that he may not himself, innocently, be
the cause of any weakening of his arguments, may be permitted
to draw attention to certain passages, which, although merely
incidental, may yet occasion some mistrust. Such timely 
intervention may serve to counteract the influence which even quite
undefined doubts as to these minor matters might otherwise
exercise upon the reader's attitude in regard to the main
issue.
 I know no enquiries which are more important for exploring
the faculty which we entitle understanding, and for
determining the rules and limits of its employment, than those
which I have instituted in the second chapter of the 
Transcendental Analytic under the title Deduction of the Pure
Concepts of Understanding. They are also those which have
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cost me the greatest labour -- labour, as I hope, not 
unrewarded. This enquiry, which is somewhat deeply grounded,
has two sides. The one refers to the objects of pure 
understanding, and is intended to expound and render intelligible
the objective validity of its a priori concepts. It is therefore
essential to my purposes. The other seeks to investigate the
pure understanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive
faculties upon which it rests; and so deals with it in its 
subjective aspect. Although this latter exposition is of great
importance for my chief purpose, it does not form an essential
part of it. For the chief question is always simply this: -- what
and how much can the understanding and reason know apart
from all experience? not: -- how is the faculty of thought itself
possible? The latter is, as it were, the search for the cause of
a given effect, and to that extent is somewhat hypothetical
in character (though, as I shall show elsewhere, it is not really
so); and I would appear to be taking the liberty simply of
expressing an opinion, in which case the reader would be free
to express a different opinion. For this reason I must forestall
the reader's criticism by pointing out that the objective 
deduction with which I am here chiefly concerned retains its full
force even if my subjective deduction should fail to produce
that complete conviction for which I hope. On this matter,
what has been said on pp. 92-93 should in any case suffice
by itself.
 As regards clearness, the reader has a right to demand, in
the first place, a discursive (logical) clearness, through 
concepts, and secondly, an intuitive (aesthetic) clearness, through
intuitions, that is, through examples and other concrete
illustrations. For the first I have sufficiently provided. That
was essential to my purpose; but it has also been the incidental
cause of my not being in a position to do justice to the second
demand, which, if not so pressing, is yet still quite reasonable.
I have been almost continuously at a loss, during the progress
of my work, how I should proceed in this matter. Examples
and illustrations seemed always to be necessary, and so took
their place, as required, in my first draft. But I very soon
became aware of the magnitude of my task and of the multiplicity
of matters with which I should have to deal; and as
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I perceived that even if treated in dry, purely scholastic
fashion, the outcome would by itself be already quite sufficiently
large in bulk, I found it inadvisable to enlarge it yet
further through examples and illustrations. These are 
necessary only from a popular point of view; and this work can
never be made suitable for popular consumption. Such
assistance is not required by genuine students of the science,
and, though always pleasing, might very well in this case
have been self-defeating in its effects. Abbot Terrasson has
remarked that if the size of a volume be measured not by the
number of its pages but by the time required for mastering it,
it can be said of many a book, that it would be much shorter
if it were not so short. On the other hand, if we have in view
the comprehensibility of a whole of speculative knowledge,
which, though wide-ranging, has the coherence that follows
from unity of principle, we can say with equal justice that
many a book would have been much clearer if it had not made
such an effort to be clear. For the aids to clearness, though
they may be of assistance in regard to details, often interfere
with our grasp of the whole. The reader is not allowed to
arrive sufficiently quickly at a conspectus of the whole; the
bright colouring of the illustrative material intervenes to cover
over and conceal the articulation and organisation of the
system, which, if we are to be able to judge of its unity and
solidity, are what chiefly concern us.
 The reader, I should judge, will feel it to be no small
inducement to yield his willing co-operation, when the author
is thus endeavouring, according to the plan here proposed, to
carry through a large and important work in a complete and
lasting manner. Metaphysics, on the view which we are adopting,
is the only one of all the sciences which dare promise
that through a small but concentrated effort it will attain,
and this in a short time, such completion as will leave no
task to our successors save that of adapting it in a didactic
manner according to their own preferences, without their
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being able to add anything whatsoever to its content. For it
is nothing but the inventory of all our possessions through
pure reason, systematically arranged. In this field nothing
can escape us. What reason produces entirely out of itself
cannot be concealed, but is brought to light by reason itself
immediately the common principle has been discovered.
The complete unity of this kind of knowledge, and the fact
that it is derived solely from pure concepts, entirely 
uninfluenced by any experience or by special intuition, such as
might lead to any determinate experience that would enlarge
and increase it, make this unconditioned completeness not
only practicable but also necessary. Tecum habita, et noris
quam sit tibi curta supellex. 
 Such a system of pure (speculative) reason I hope myself
to produce under the title Metaphysics of Nature. It will be
not half as large, yet incomparably richer in content than this
present Critique, which has as its first task to discover the
sources and conditions of the possibility of such criticism,
clearing, as it were, and levelling what has hitherto been 
wasteground. In this present enterprise I look to my reader for the
patience and impartiality of a judge; whereas in the other I
shall look for the benevolent assistance of a fellow-worker.
For however completely all the principles of the system are
presented in this Critique, the completeness of the system
itself likewise requires that none of the derivative concepts
be lacking. These cannot be enumerated by any a priori 
computation, but must be discovered gradually. Whereas, therefore,
in this Critique the entire synthesis of the concepts has
been exhausted, there will still remain the further work of
making their analysis similarly complete, a task which is
rather an amusement than a labour.
 I have only a few remarks to add of a typographical
character. As the beginning of the printing was delayed, I
was not able to see more than about half of the proof-sheets,
and I now find some misprints, which do not, however, affect
the sense except on p. 379, line 4 from the bottom, where
specific has to be read in place of sceptical.
 Persius.
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The antinomy
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of pure reason, from p. 425 to p. 461, has been so arranged,
in tabular form, that all that belongs to the thesis stands
on the left and what belongs to the antithesis on the right.
This I have done in order that proposition and counter-
proposition may be the more easily compared with one
another.

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