Immanuel Kant's

trans. by Norman Kemp Smith

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P 485
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
BOOK II
CHAPTER III
THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON
Section I
THE IDEAL IN GENERAL
WE have seen above that no objects can be represented
through pure concepts of understanding, apart from the
conditions of sensibility. For the conditions of the objective
reality of the concepts are then absent, and nothing is to be
found in them save the mere form of thought. If, however,
they are applied to appearances, they can be exhibited in
concreto, because in the appearances they obtain the appropriate
material for concepts of experience -- a concept of
experience being nothing but a concept of understanding in
concreto. But ideas are even further removed from objective
reality than are categories, for no appearance can be found in
which they can be represented in concreto. They contain a
certain completeness to which no possible empirical knowledge
ever attains. In them reason aims only at a systematic
unity, to which it seeks to approximate the unity that is
empirically possible, without ever completely reaching it.
But what I entitle the ideal seems to be further removed
from objective reality even than the idea. By the ideal I understand
the idea, not merely in concreto, but in individuo, that is,
as an individual thing, determinable or even determined by
the idea alone.
Humanity [as an idea] in its complete perfection contains
not only all the essential qualities which belong to human
nature and constitute our concept of it -- and these so extended
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as to be in that complete conformity with their ends which
would be our idea of perfect humanity -- but also everything
which, in addition to this concept, is required for the complete
determination of the idea. For of all contradictory predicates
one only [of each pair] can apply to the idea of the perfect
man. What to us is an ideal was in Plato's view an idea of
the divine understanding, an individual object of its pure
intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible being,
and the archetype of all copies in the [field of] appearance.
 Without soaring so high, we are yet bound to confess that
human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals also, which
although they do not have, like the Platonic ideas, creative
power, yet have practical power (as regulative principles), and
form the basis of the possible perfection of certain actions.
Moral concepts, as resting on something empirical (pleasure
or displeasure), are not completely pure concepts of reason.
None the less, in respect of the principle whereby reason sets
bounds to a freedom which is in itself without law, these
concepts (when we attend merely to their form) may well serve as
examples of pure concepts of reason. Virtue, and therewith
human wisdom in its complete purity, are ideas. The wise
man (of the Stoics) is, however, an ideal, that is, a man existing
in thought only, but in complete conformity with the idea
of wisdom. As the idea gives the rule, so the ideal in such a
case serves as the archetype for the complete determination
of the copy; and we have no other standard for our actions
than the conduct of this divine man within us, with which
we compare and judge ourselves, and so reform ourselves,
although we can never attain to the perfection thereby
prescribed. Although we cannot concede to these ideals objective
reality (existence), they are not therefore to be regarded as
figments of the brain; they supply reason with a standard
which is indispensable to it, providing it, as they do, with a
concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, and
thereby enabling it to estimate and to measure the degree and
the defects of the incomplete. But to attempt to realise the
ideal in an example, that is, in the [field of] appearance, as, for
instance, to depict the [character of the perfectly] wise man in
a romance, is impracticable. There is indeed something absurd,
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and far from edifying, in such an attempt, inasmuch as the
natural limitations, which are constantly doing violence to the
completeness of the idea, make the illusion that is aimed at
altogether impossible, and so cast suspicion on the good itself
-- the good that has its source in the idea -- by giving it the air
of being a mere fiction.
Such is the nature of the ideal of reason, which must
always rest on determinate concepts and serve as a rule and
archetype, alike in our actions and in our critical judgments.
The products of the imagination are of an entirely different
nature; no one can explain or give an intelligible concept of
them; each is a kind of monogram, a mere set of particular
qualities, determined by no assignable rule, and forming
rather a blurred sketch drawn from diverse experiences than a
determinate image -- a representation such as painters and
physiognomists profess to carry in their heads, and which they
treat as being an incommunicable shadowy image of their
creations or even of their critical judgments. Such
representations may be entitled, though improperly, ideals of
sensibility, inasmuch as they are viewed as being models
(not indeed realisable) of possible empirical intuitions, and yet
furnish no rules that allow of being explained and examined.
Reason, in its ideal, aims, on the contrary, at complete
determination in accordance with a priori rules. Accordingly
it thinks for itself an object which it regards as being
completely determinable in accordance with principles. The
conditions that are required for such determination are not,
however, to be found in experience, and the concept itself is
therefore transcendent.
CHAPTER III
Section 2
THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAL
(Prototypon Transcendentale)
Every concept is, in respect of what is not contained in it,
undetermined, and is subject to the principle of determin-
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ability. According to this principle, of every two contradictorily
opposed predicates only one can belong to a concept.
This principle is based on the law of contradiction, and is
therefore a purely logical principle. As such, it abstracts from
the entire content of knowledge and is concerned solely with
its logical form.
But every thing, as regards its possibility, is likewise subject
to the principle of complete determination, according to
which if all the possible predicates of things be taken together
with their contradictory opposites, then one of each pair of
contradictory opposites must belong to it. This principle does
not rest merely on the law of contradiction; for, besides
considering each thing in its relation to the two contradictory
predicates, it also considers it in its relation to the sum of
all possibilities, that is, to the sum-total of all predicates of
things. Presupposing this sum as being an a priori condition,
it proceeds to represent everything as deriving its own
possibility from the share which it possesses in this sum of all
possibilities. The principle of complete determination concerns,
therefore, the content, and not merely the logical form.
It is the principle of the synthesis of all predicates which are
intended to constitute the complete concept of a thing, and not
simply a principle of analytic representation in reference merely
to one of two contradictory predicates. It contains a
transcendental presupposition, namely, that of the material for all
possibility, which in turn is regarded as containing a priori
the data for the particular possibility of each and every thing.
The proposition, everything which exists is completely
determined, does not mean only that one of every pair of given
contradictory predicates, but that one of every [pair of] possible
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predicates, must always belong to it.
P 488n
++ In accordance with this principle, each and every thing is therefore
related to a common correlate, the sum of all possibilities. If this
correlate (that is, the material for all possible predicates) should be
found in the idea of some one thing, it would prove an affinity of all
possible things, through identity of the ground of their complete
determination. Whereas the determinability of every concept is
subordinate to the universality (universalitas) of the principle of
excluded middle, the determination of a thing is subordinate to the
totality (universitas) or sum of all possible predicates.
P 489
In terms of this proposition
the predicates are not merely compared with one another
logically, but the thing itself is compared, in transcendental
fashion, with the sum of all possible predicates. What the
proposition therefore asserts is this: that to know a thing
completely, we must know every possible [predicate], and must
determine it thereby, either affirmatively or negatively. The
complete determination is thus a concept, which, in its
totality, can never be exhibited in concreto. It is based upon
an idea, which has its seat solely in the faculty of reason --
the faculty which prescribes to the understanding the rule of
its complete employment.
Although this idea of the sum of all possibility, in so far
as it serves as the condition of the complete determination of
each and every thing, is itself undetermined in respect of the
predicates which may constitute it, and is thought by us as
being nothing more than the sum of all possible predicates,
we yet find, on closer scrutiny, that this idea, as a primordial
concept, excludes a number of predicates which as derivative
are already given through other predicates or which are
incompatible with others; and that it does, indeed, define itself
as a concept that is completely determinate a priori. It thus
becomes the concept of an individual object which is
completely determined through the mere idea, and must
therefore be entitled an ideal of pure reason.
When we consider all possible predicates, not merely
logically, but transcendentally, that is, with reference to such
content as can be thought a priori as belonging to them, we
find that through some of them we represent a being, through
others a mere not-being. Logical negation, which is indicated
simply through the word not, does not properly refer
to a concept, but only to its relation to another concept in a
judgment, and is therefore quite insufficient to determine a
concept in respect of its content. The expression non-mortal
does not enable us to declare that we are thereby representing
in the object a mere not-being; the expression leaves all content
unaffected. A transcendental negation, on the other hand,
signifies not-being in itself, and is opposed to transcendental
affirmation, which is a something the very concept of which
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in itself expresses a being. Transcendental affirmation is therefore
entitled reality, because through it alone, and so far only
as it reaches, are objects something (things), whereas its
opposite, negation, signifies a mere want, and, so far as it
alone is thought, represents the abrogation of all thinghood.
Now no one can think a negation determinately, save by
basing it upon the opposed affirmation. Those born blind cannot
have the least notion of darkness, since they have none of
light. The savage knows nothing of poverty, since he has no
acquaintance with wealth. The ignorant have no concept of
their ignorance, because they have none of knowledge etc.
All concepts of negations are thus derivative; it is the realities
which contain the data, and, so to speak, the material or
transcendental content, for the possibility and complete
determination of all things.
If, therefore, reason employs in the complete determination
of things a transcendental substrate that contains, as
it were, the whole store of material from which all possible
predicates of things must be taken, this substrate cannot be
anything else than the idea of an omnitudo realitatis. All
true negations are nothing but limitations -- a title which
would be inapplicable, were they not thus based upon the
unlimited, that is, upon "the All. "
But the concept of what thus possesses all reality is just the
concept of a thing in itself as completely determined; and since
in all possible [pairs of] contradictory predicates one predicate,
namely, that which belongs to being absolutely, is to be
found in its determination, the concept of an ens realissimum
is the concept of an individual being. It is therefore a
transcendental ideal which serves as basis for the complete
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determination that necessarily belongs to all that exists.
P 490n
++ The observations and calculations of astronomers have taught
us much that is wonderful; but the most important lesson that they
have taught us has been by revealing the abyss of our ignorance,
which otherwise we could never have conceived to be so great.
Reflection upon the ignorance thus disclosed must produce a great
change in our estimate of the purposes for which our reason should
be employed.
P 491
This ideal
is the supreme and complete material condition of the possibility
of all that exists -- the condition to which all thought of
objects, so far as their content is concerned, has to be traced
back. It is also the only true ideal of which human reason is
capable. For only in this one case is a concept of a thing -- a
concept which is in itself universal -- completely determined in and
through itself, and known as the representation of an individual.
The logical determination of a concept by reason is based
upon a disjunctive syllogism, in which the major premiss
contains a logical division (the division of the sphere of a
universal concept), the minor premiss limiting this sphere to
a certain part, and the conclusion determining the concept by
means of this part. The universal concept of a reality in general
cannot be divided a priori, because without experience we do
not know any determinate kinds of reality which would be
contained under that genus. The transcendental major premiss
which is presupposed in the complete determination of all
things is therefore no other than the representation of the sum
of all reality; it is not merely a concept which, as regards its
transcendental content, comprehends all predicates under
itself; it also contains them within itself; and the complete
determination of any and every thing rests on the limitation of
this total reality, inasmuch as part of it is ascribed to the thing,
and the rest is excluded -- a procedure which is in agreement
with the 'either-or' of the disjunctive major premiss and with
the determination of the object, in the minor premiss, through
one of the members of the division. Accordingly, reason, in
employing the transcendental ideal as that by reference to which
it determines all possible things, is proceeding in a manner
analogous with its procedure in disjunctive syllogisms -- this,
indeed, is the principle upon which I have based the systematic
division of all transcendental ideas, as parallel with, and
corresponding to, the three kinds of syllogism.
It is obvious that reason, in achieving its purpose, that,
namely, of representing the necessary complete determination
of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being that
corresponds to this ideal, but only the idea of such a being, and
this only for the purpose of deriving from an unconditioned
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totality of complete determination the conditioned totality,
that is, the totality of the limited. The ideal is, therefore, the
archetype (prototypon) of all things, which one and all, as
imperfect copies (ectypa), derive from it the material of their
possibility, and while approximating to it in varying degrees,
yet always fall very far short of actually attaining it.
All possibility of things (that is, of the synthesis of the
manifold, in respect of its content) must therefore be regarded as
derivative, with only one exception, namely, the possibility of
that which includes in itself all reality. This latter possibility
must be regarded as original. For all negations (which are the
only predicates through which anything can be distinguished
from the ens realissimum) are merely limitations of a greater,
and ultimately of the highest, reality; and they therefore
presuppose this reality, and are, as regards their content, derived
from it. All manifoldness of things is only a correspondingly
varied mode of limiting the concept of the highest reality which
forms their common substratum, just as all figures are only
possible as so many different modes of limiting infinite space. The
object of the ideal of reason, an object which is present to us only
in and through reason, is therefore entitled the primordial being
(ens originarium). As it has nothing above it, it is also entitled
the highest being (ens summum); and as everything that is
conditioned is subject to it, the being of all beings (ens entium).
These terms are not, however, to be taken as signifying the
objective relation of an actual object to other things, but of an
idea to concepts. We are left entirely without knowledge as to
the existence of a being of such outstanding pre-eminence.
We cannot say that a primordial being consists of a number
of derivative beings, for since the latter presuppose the former
they cannot themselves constitute it. The idea of the
primordial being must therefore be thought as simple.
Consequently, the derivation of all other possibility from
this primordial being cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as
a limitation of its supreme reality, and, as it were, a division
of it. For in that case the primordial being would be treated as a
mere aggregate of derivative beings; and this, as we have just
shown, is impossible, although in our first rough statements
we have used such language. On the contrary, the supreme
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reality must condition the possibility of all things as their
ground, not as their sum; and the manifoldness of things
must therefore rest, not on the limitation of the primordial
being itself, but on all that follows from it, including therein
all our sensibility, and all reality in the [field of] appearance
-- existences of a kind which cannot, as ingredients, belong
to the idea of the supreme being.
If, in following up this idea of ours, we proceed to hypostatise
it, we shall be able to determine the primordial being
through the mere concept of the highest reality, as a being that
is one, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, etc. In short, we shall be
able to determine it, in its unconditioned completeness, through
all predicaments. The concept of such a being is the concept of
God, taken in the transcendental sense; and the ideal of pure
reason, as above defined, is thus the object of a transcendental
theology.
In any such use of the transcendental idea we should, however,
be overstepping the limits of its purpose and validity.
For reason, in employing it as a basis for the complete determination
of things, has used it only as the concept of all reality,
without requiring that all this reality be objectively given and
be itself a thing. Such a thing is a mere fiction in which we
combine and realise the manifold of our idea in an ideal,
as an individual being. But we have no right to do this,
nor even to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis. Nor
do any of the consequences which flow from such an ideal have
any bearing upon the complete determination of things, or
exercise in that regard the least influence; and it is solely as
aiding in their determination that the idea has been shown to
be necessary.
But merely to describe the procedure of our reason and its
dialectic does not suffice; we must also endeavour to discover
the sources of this dialectic, that we may be able to explain, as
a phenomenon of the understanding, the illusion to which it
has given rise. For the ideal, of which we are speaking, is
based on a natural, not on a merely arbitrary idea. The question
to be raised is therefore this: how does it happen that
reason regards all possibility of things as derived from one
single fundamental possibility, namely, that of the highest
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reality, and thereupon presupposes this to be contained in an
individual primordial being?
The answer is obvious from the discussions in the Transcendental
Analytic. The possibility of the objects of the senses
is a relation of these objects to our thought, in which
something (namely, the empirical form) can be thought a priori,
while that which constitutes the matter, reality in the [field of]
appearance (that which corresponds to sensation), must be
given, since otherwise it could not even be thought, nor its
possibility represented. Now an object of the senses can be
completely determined only when it is compared with all the
predicates that are possible in the [field of] appearance, and
by means of them is represented either affirmatively or negatively.
But since that which constitutes the thing itself, namely,
the real in the [field of] appearance, must be given -- otherwise
the thing could not be conceived at all -- and since that
)wherein the real of all appearances is given is experience,
considered as single and all-embracing, the material for the
possibility of all objects of the senses must be presupposed as
given in one whole; and it is upon the limitation of this whole
that all possibility of empirical objects, their distinction from
each other and their complete determination, can alone be
based. No other objects, besides those of the senses, can, as a
matter of fact, be given to us, and nowhere save in the context
of a possible experience; and consequently nothing is an
object for us, unless it presupposes the sum of all empirical
reality as the condition of its possibility. Now owing to a
natural illusion we regard this principle, which applies only
to those things which are given as objects of our senses, as
being a principle which must be valid of things in general.
Accordingly, omitting this limitation, we treat the empirical
principle of our concepts of the possibility of things, viewed as
appearances, as being a transcendental principle of the
possibility of things in general.
If we thereupon proceed to hypostatise this idea of the sum
of all reality, that is because we substitute dialectically for
the distributive unity of the empirical employment of the
understanding, the collective unity of experience as a whole;
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and then thinking this whole [realm] of appearance as one
single thing that contains all empirical reality in itself; and
then again, in turn, by means of the above-mentioned transcendental
subreption, substituting for it the concept of a thing
which stands at the source of the possibility of all things, and
supplies the real conditions for their complete determination.
CHAPTER III
Section 3
THE ARGUMENTS OF SPECULATIVE REASON IN PROOF
OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING
Notwithstanding this pressing need of reason to presuppose
something that may afford the understanding a sufficient
foundation for the complete determination of its concepts, it
is yet much too easily conscious of the ideal and merely
fictitious character of such a presupposition to allow itself, on
this ground alone, to be persuaded that a mere creature of its
own thought is a real being -- were it not that it is impelled from
another direction to seek a resting-place in the regress from
the conditioned, which is given, to the unconditioned. This
unconditioned is not, indeed, given as being in itself real, nor
as having a reality that follows from its mere concept; it is,
however, what alone can complete the series of conditions
when we proceed to trace these conditions to their grounds.
This is the course which our human reason, by its very nature,
leads all of us, even the least reflective, to adopt, though not
everyone continues to pursue it.
++ This ideal of the ens realissimum, although it is indeed a mere
representation, is first realised, that is, made into an object, then
hypostatised, and finally, by the natural progress of reason towards
the completion of unity, is, as we shall presently show, personified.
For the regulative unity of experience is not based on the appearances
themselves (on sensibility alone), but on the connection of the
manifold through the understanding (in an apperception); and
consequently the unity of the supreme reality and the complete
determinability (possibility) of all things seems to lie in a supreme
understanding, and therefore in an intelligence.
P 495
It begins not with concepts,
but with common experience, and thus bases itself on something
P 496
actually existing. But if this ground does not rest upon
the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary, it yields beneath
our feet. And this latter support is itself in turn without
support, if there be any empty space beyond and under it, and
if it does not itself so fill all things as to leave no room for any
further question -- unless, that is to say, it be infinite in its
reality.
If we admit something as existing, no matter what this
something may be, we must also admit that there is something
which exists necessarily. For the contingent exists only under
the condition of some other contingent existence as its cause,
and from this again we must infer yet another cause, until we
are brought to a cause which is not contingent, and which is
therefore unconditionally necessary. This is the argument upon
which reason bases its advance to the primordial being.
 Now reason looks around for a concept that squares with
so supreme a mode of existence as that of unconditioned necessity
-- not for the purpose of inferring a priori from the concept
the existence of that for which it stands (for if that were
what it claimed to do, it ought to limit its enquiries to mere
concepts, and would not then require a given existence as its
basis), but solely in order to find among its various concepts
that concept which is in no respect incompatible with absolute
necessity. For that there must be something that exists with
absolute necessity, is regarded as having been established by
the first step in the argument. If, then, in removing everything
which is not compatible with this necessity, only one
existence remains, this existence must be the absolutely
necessary being, whether or not its necessity be comprehensible,
that is to say, deducible from its concept alone.
Now that which in its concept contains a therefore for
every wherefore, that which is in no respect defective, that
which is in every way sufficient as a condition, seems to be
precisely the being to which absolute necessity can fittingly
be ascribed. For while it contains the conditions of all that
is possible, it itself does not require and indeed does not
allow of any condition, and therefore satisfies, at least in this
one feature, the concept of unconditioned necessity. In this
respect all other concepts must fall short of it; for since they
are deficient and in need of completion, they cannot have as
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their characteristic this independence of all further conditions.
We are not indeed justified in arguing that what does not contain
the highest and in all respects complete condition is therefore
itself conditioned in its existence. But we are justified in
saying that it does not possess that one feature through which
alone reason is in a position, by means of an a priori concept,
to know, in regard to any being, that it is unconditioned.
The concept of an ens realissimum is therefore, of all concepts
of possible things, that which best squares with the concept
of an unconditionally necessary being; and though it may
not be completely adequate to it, we have no choice in the
matter, but find ourselves constrained to hold to it. For we
cannot afford to dispense with the existence of a necessary
being; and once its existence is granted, we cannot, in the
whole field of possibility, find anything that can make a
better grounded claim [than the ens realissimum] to such
pre-eminence in the mode of its existence.
Such, then, is the natural procedure of human reason. It
begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary
being. This being it apprehends as having an existence that
is unconditioned. It then looks around for the concept of that
which is independent of any condition, and finds it in that
which is itself the sufficient condition of all else, that is, in that
which contains all reality. But that which is all-containing and
without limits is absolute unity, and involves the concept of a
single being that is likewise the supreme being. Accordingly,
we conclude that the supreme being, as primordial ground
of all things, must exist by absolute necessity.
If what we have in view is the coming to a decision -- if, that
is to say, the existence of some sort of necessary being is taken
as granted, and if it be agreed further that we must come to
a decision as to what it is -- then the foregoing way of thinking
must be allowed to have a certain cogency. For in that case
no better choice can be made, or rather we have no choice
at all, but find ourselves compelled to decide in favour of the
absolute unity of complete reality, as the ultimate source of
possibility. If, however, we are not required to come to any
decision, and prefer to leave the issue open until the weight
of the evidence is such as to compel assent; if, in other words,
what we have to do is merely to estimate how much we really
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know in the matter, and how much we merely flatter ourselves
that we know, then the foregoing argument is far from
appearing in so advantageous a light, and special favour is
required to compensate for the defectiveness of its claims.
For if we take the issue as being that which is here stated,
namely first, that from any given existence (it may be, merely
my own existence) we can correctly infer the existence of an
unconditionally necessary being; secondly, that we must regard
a being which contains all reality, and therefore every condition,
as being absolutely unconditioned, and that in this concept
of an ens realissimum we have therefore found the concept
of a thing to which we can also ascribe absolute necessity --
granting all this, it by no means follows that the concept of a
limited being which does not have the highest reality is for
that reason incompatible with absolute reality. For although
I do not find in its concept that unconditioned which is involved
in the concept of the totality of conditions, we are not
justified in concluding that its existence must for this reason
be conditioned; just as I cannot say, in the case of a hypothetical
syllogism, that where a certain condition (in the case
under discussion, the condition of completeness in accordance
with [pure] concepts) does not hold, the conditioned also does
not hold. On the contrary, we are entirely free to hold that
any limited beings whatsoever, notwithstanding their being
limited, may also be unconditionally necessary, although we
cannot infer their necessity from the universal concepts which
we have of them. Thus the argument has failed to give us the
least concept of the properties of a necessary being, and indeed
is utterly ineffective.
But this argument continues to have a certain importance
and to be endowed with an authority of which we cannot,
simply on the ground of this objective insufficiency, at once
proceed to divest it. For granting that there are in the idea of
reason obligations which are completely valid, but which in
their application to ourselves would be lacking in all reality --
that is, obligations to which there would be no motives -- save
on the assumption that there exists a supreme being to give
effect and confirmation to the practical laws, in such a situation
we should be under an obligation to follow those concepts
which, though they may not be objectively sufficient, are yet,
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according to the standard of our reason, preponderant, and in
comparison with which we know of nothing that is better and
more convincing. The duty of deciding would thus, by a practical
addition, incline the balance so delicately preserved by the
indecisiveness of speculation. Reason would indeed stand
condemned in its own judgment -- and there is none more
circumspect -- if, when impelled by such urgent motives, it should
fail, however incomplete its insight, to conform its judgment
to those pleas which are at least of greater weight than any
others known to us.
Though this argument, as resting on the inner insufficiency
of the contingent, is in actual fact transcendental, it is
yet so simple and natural that, immediately it is propounded,
it commends itself to the commonest understanding. We see
things alter, come into being, and pass away; and these, or
at least their state, must therefore have a cause. But the same
question can be raised in regard to every cause that can be
given in experience. Where, therefore, can we more suitably
locate the ultimate causality than where there also exists the
highest causality, that is, in that being which contains
primordially in itself the sufficient ground of every possible
effect, and the concept of which we can also very easily
entertain by means of the one attribute of an all-embracing
perfection. This supreme cause we then proceed to regard as
absolutely necessary, inasmuch as we find it absolutely
necessary that we should ascend to it, and find no ground for
passing beyond it. And thus, in all peoples, there shine amidst
the most benighted polytheism some gleams of monotheism,
to which they have been led, not by reflection and profound
speculation, but simply by the natural bent of the common
understanding, as step by step it has come to apprehend its
own requirements.
There are only three possible ways of proving the existence
of God by means of speculative reason.
All the paths leading to this goal begin either from determinate
experience and the specific constitution of the world of
sense as thereby known, and ascend from it, in accordance
with laws of causality, to the supreme cause outside the
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world; or they start from experience which is purely indeterminate,
that is, from experience of existence in general; or
finally they abstract from all experience, and argue completely
a priori, from mere concepts, to the existence of a supreme
cause. The first proof is the physico-theological, the second the
cosmological, the third the ontological. There are, and there
can be, no others.
I propose to show that reason is as little able to make progress
on the one path, the empirical, as on the other path, the
transcendental, and that it stretches its wings in vain in thus
attempting to soar above the world of sense by the mere power
of speculation. As regards the order in which these arguments
should be dealt with, it will be exactly the reverse of that
which reason takes in the progress of its own development, and
therefore of that which we have ourselves followed in the above
account. For it will be shown that, although experience is what
first gives occasion to this enquiry, it is the transcendental
concept which in all such endeavours marks out the goal that
reason has set itself to attain, and which is indeed its sole
guide in its efforts to achieve that goal. I shall therefore
begin with the examination of the transcendental proof, and
afterwards enquire what effect the addition of the empirical
factor can have in enhancing the force of the argument;
CHAPTER III
Section 4
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN ONTOLOGICAL PROOF
OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
It is evident, from what has been said, that the concept of
an absolutely necessary being is a concept of pure reason, that
is, a mere idea the objective reality of which is very far from
being proved by the fact that reason requires it. For the idea
instructs us only in regard to a certain unattainable completeness,
and so serves rather to limit the understanding than to
extend it to new objects. But we are here faced by what is
indeed strange and perplexing, namely, that while the
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inference from a given existence in general to some absolutely
necessary being seems to be both imperative and legitimate,
all those conditions under which alone the understanding can
form a concept of such a necessity are so many obstacles in
the way of our doing so.
In all ages men have spoken of an absolutely necessary
being, and in so doing have endeavoured, not so much to
understand whether and how a thing of this kind allows even
of being thought, but rather to prove its existence. There is,
of course, no difficulty in giving a verbal definition of the
concept, namely, that it is something the non-existence of which
is impossible. But this yields no insight into the conditions
which make it necessary to regard the non-existence of a
thing as absolutely unthinkable. It is precisely these conditions
that we desire to know, in order that we may determine
whether or not, in resorting to this concept, we are thinking
anything at all. The expedient of removing all those conditions
which the understanding indispensably requires in order
to regard something as necessary, simply through the introduction
of the word unconditioned, is very far from sufficing
to show whether I am still thinking anything in the concept
of the unconditionally necessary, or perhaps rather nothing
at all.
Nay more, this concept, at first ventured upon blindly,
and now become so completely familiar, has been supposed
to have its meaning exhibited in a number of examples; and
on this account all further enquiry into its intelligibility has
seemed to be quite needless. Thus the fact that every geometrical
proposition, as, for instance, that a triangle has three
angles, is absolutely necessary, has been taken as justifying us
in speaking of an object which lies entirely outside the sphere
of our understanding as if we understood perfectly what it is
that we intend to convey by the concept of that object.
All the alleged examples are, without exception, taken
from judgments, not from things and their existence. But the
unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the same as an
absolute necessity of things. The absolute necessity of the
judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the
predicate in the judgment. The above proposition does not
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declare that three angles are absolutely necessary, but that,
under the condition that there is a triangle (that is, that a
triangle is given), three angles will necessarily be found in it. So
great, indeed, is the deluding influence exercised by this logical
necessity that, by the simple device of forming an a priori
concept of a thing in such a manner as to include existence
within the scope of its meaning, we have supposed ourselves
to have justified the conclusion that because existence necessarily
belongs to the object of this concept -- always under the
condition that we posit the thing as given (as existing) -- we are
also of necessity, in accordance with the law of identity,
required to posit the existence of its object, and that this being
is therefore itself absolutely necessary -- and this, to repeat, for
the reason that the existence of this being has already been
thought in a concept which is assumed arbitrarily and on
condition that we posit its object.
If, in an identical proposition, I reject the predicate while
retaining the subject, contradiction results; and I therefore say
that the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if we
reject subject and predicate alike, there is no contradiction;
for nothing is then left that can be contradicted. To posit a
triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory;
but there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle together
with its three angles. The same holds true of the concept of an
absolutely necessary being. If its existence is rejected, we reject
the thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of
contradiction can then arise. There is nothing outside it that
would then be contradicted, since the necessity of the thing
is not supposed to be derived from anything external; nor is
there anything internal that would be contradicted, since in
rejecting the thing itself we have at the same time rejected all
its internal properties. 'God is omnipotent' is a necessary
judgment. The omnipotence cannot be rejected if we posit a
Deity, that is, an infinite being; for the two concepts are
identical. But if we say, 'There is no God', neither the
omnipotence nor any other of its predicates is given; they are one
and all rejected together with the subject, and there is
therefore not the least contradiction in such a judgment.
We have thus seen that if the predicate of a judgment is
rejected together with the subject, no internal contradiction
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can result and that this holds no matter what the predicate
may be. The only way of evading this conclusion is to argue
that there are subjects which cannot be removed, and must
always remain. That, however, would only be another way of
saying that there are absolutely necessary subjects; and that is
the very assumption which I have called in question, and the
possibility of which the above argument professes to establish.
For I cannot form the least concept of a thing which, should
it be rejected with all its predicates, leaves behind a
contradiction; and in the absence of contradiction I have, through
pure a priori concepts alone, no criterion of impossibility.
Notwithstanding all these general considerations, in which
every one must concur, we may be challenged with a case
which is brought forward as proof that in actual fact the
contrary holds, namely, that there is one concept, and indeed
only one, in reference to which the not-being or rejection of its
object is in itself contradictory, namely, the concept of the ens
realissimum. It is declared that it possesses all reality, and
that we are justified in assuming that such a being is possible
(the fact that a concept does not contradict itself by no means
proves the possibility of its object: but the contrary assertion
I am for the moment willing to allow). Now [the argument
proceeds] 'all reality' includes existence; existence is therefore
contained in the concept of a thing that is possible. If, then,
this thing is rejected, the internal possibility of the thing is
rejected -- which is self-contradictory.
My answer is as follows. There is already a contradiction
in introducing the concept of existence -- no matter under what
title it may be disguised -- into the concept of a thing which
we profess to be thinking solely in reference to its possibility.
If that be allowed as legitimate, a seeming victory has been won;
++ A concept is always possible if it is not self-contradictory.
This is the logical criterion of possibility, and by it the object of the
concept is distinguishable from the nihil negativum. But it may
none the less be an empty concept, unless the objective reality of the
synthesis through which the concept is generated has been specifically
proved; and such proof, as we have shown above, rests on principles
of possible experience, and not on the principle of analysis
(the law of contradiction). This is a warning against arguing
directly from the logical possibility of concepts to the real possibility
of things.
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but in actual fact nothing at all is said: the assertion
is a mere tautology. We must ask: Is the proposition that
this or that thing (which, whatever it may be, is allowed
as possible) exists, an analytic or a synthetic proposition? If
it is analytic, the assertion of the existence of the thing adds
nothing to the thought of the thing; but in that case either
the thought, which is in us, is the thing itself, or we have
presupposed an existence as belonging to the realm of the possible,
and have then, on that pretext, inferred its existence from its
internal possibility -- which is nothing but a miserable
tautology. The word 'reality', which in the concept of the thing
sounds other than the word 'existence' in the concept of the
predicate, is of no avail in meeting this objection. For if all
positing (no matter what it may be that is posited) is entitled
reality, the thing with all its predicates is already posited in
the concept of the subject, and is assumed as actual; and in the
predicate this is merely repeated. But if, on the other hand,
we admit, as every reasonable person must, that all existential
propositions are synthetic, how can we profess to maintain
that the predicate of existence cannot be rejected without
contradiction? This is a feature which is found only in analytic
propositions, and is indeed precisely what constitutes their
analytic character.
I should have hoped to put an end to these idle and fruitless
disputations in a direct manner, by an accurate determination
of the concept of existence, had I not found that
the illusion which is caused by the confusion of a logical with
a real predicate (that is, with a predicate which determines a
thing) is almost beyond correction. Anything we please can
be made to serve as a logical predicate; the subject can even be
predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from all content. But a
determining predicate is a predicate which is added to the
concept of the subject and enlarges it. Consequently, it must not
be already contained in the concept.
'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a
concept of something which could be added to the concept of
a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain
determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the
copula of a judgment. The proposition, 'God is omnipotent',
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contains two concepts, each of which has its object -- God and
omnipotence. The small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but
only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If,
now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among
which is omnipotence), and say 'God is', or 'There is a God', we
attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the
subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being
an object that stands in relation to my concept. The content of
both must be one and the same; nothing can have been added
to the concept, which expresses merely what is possible, by
my thinking its object (through the expression 'it is') as given
absolutely. Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than
the merely possible. A hundred real thalers do not contain
the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as the
latter signify the concept, and the former the object and the
positing of the object, should the former contain more than the
latter, my concept would not, in that case, express the whole
object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it.
My financial position is, however, affected very differently by
a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them
(that is, of their possibility). For the object, as it actually exists,
is not analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my
concept (which is a determination of my state) synthetically;
and yet the conceived hundred thalers are not themselves in
the least increased through thus acquiring existence outside
my concept.
By whatever and by however many predicates we may
think a thing -- even if we completely determine it -- we do not
make the least addition to the thing when we further declare
that this thing is. Otherwise, it would not be exactly the same
thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in
the concept; and we could not, therefore, say that the exact
object of my concept exists. If we think in a thing every feature
of reality except one, the missing reality is not added by my
saying that this defective thing exists. On the contrary, it
exists with the same defect with which I have thought it, since
otherwise what exists would be something different from what
I thought. When, therefore, I think a being as the supreme
reality, without any defect, the question still remains whether
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it exists or not. For though, in my concept, nothing may be
lacking of the possible real content of a thing in general, something
is still lacking in its relation to my whole state of thought,
namely, [in so far as I am unable to assert] that knowledge of
this object is also possible a posteriori. And here we find the
source of our present difficulty. Were we dealing with an object
of the senses, we could not confound the existence of the
thing with the mere concept of it. For through the concept the
object is thought only as conforming to the universal
conditions of possible empirical knowledge in general, whereas
through its existence it is thought as belonging to the context
of experience as a whole. In being thus connected with the
content of experience as a whole, the concept of the object is
not, however, in the least enlarged; all that has happened is
that our thought has thereby obtained an additional possible
perception. It is not, therefore, surprising that, if we attempt
to think existence through the pure category alone, we cannot
specify a single mark distinguishing it from mere possibility.
Whatever, therefore, and however much, our concept of an
object may contain, we must go outside it, if we are to ascribe
existence to the object. In the case of objects of the senses, this
takes place through their connection with some one of our
perceptions, in accordance with empirical laws. But in dealing
with objects of pure thought, we have no means whatsoever
of knowing their existence, since it would have to be known
in a completely a priori manner. Our consciousness of all
existence (whether immediately through perception, or
mediately through inferences which connect something with
perception) belongs exclusively to the unity of experience; any
[alleged] existence outside this field, while not indeed such
as we can declare to be absolutely impossible, is of the
nature of an assumption which we can never be in a position
to justify.
The concept of a supreme being is in many respects a very
useful idea; but just because it is a mere idea, it is altogether
incapable, by itself alone, of enlarging our knowledge in
regard to what exists. It is not even competent to enlighten us
as to the possibility of any existence beyond that which is
known in and through experience. The analytic criterion of
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possibility, as consisting in the principle that bare positives
(realities) give rise to no contradiction, cannot be denied to it.
But since the realities are not given to us in their specific
characters; since even if they were, we should still not be in a
position to pass judgment; since the criterion of the possibility of
synthetic knowledge is never to be looked for save in
experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong, the
connection of all real properties in a thing is a synthesis, the
possibility of which we are unable to determine a priori. And
thus the celebrated Leibniz is far from having succeeded in
what he plumed himself on achieving -- the comprehension
a priori of the possibility of this sublime ideal being.
The attempt to establish the existence of a supreme being
by means of the famous ontological argument of Descartes is
therefore merely so much labour and effort lost; we can no
more extend our stock of [theoretical] insight by mere ideas,
than a merchant can better his position by adding a few
noughts to his cash account.
CHAPTER III
Section 5
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A COSMOLOGICAL PROOF OF
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
To attempt to extract from a purely arbitrary idea the
existence of an object corresponding to it is a quite unnatural
procedure and a mere innovation of scholastic subtlety. Such
an attempt would never have been made if there had not been
antecedently, on the part of our reason,the need to assume as
a basis of existence in general something necessary (in which
our regress may terminate); and if, since this necessity must
be unconditioned and certain a priori, reason had not, in
consequence, been forced to seek a concept which would satisfy, if
possible, such a demand, and enable us to know an existence
in a completely a priori manner. Such a concept was supposed
to have been found in the idea of an ens realissimum; and that
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idea was therefore used only for the more definite knowledge
of that necessary being, of the necessary existence of which
we were already convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds.
This natural procedure of reason was, however, concealed
from view, and instead of ending with this concept, the attempt
was made to begin with it, and so to deduce from it that
necessity of existence which it was only fitted to supplement.
Thus arose the unfortunate ontological proof, which yields
satisfaction neither to the natural and healthy understanding
nor to the more academic demands of strict proof.
The cosmological proof, which we are now about to examine,
retains the connection of absolute necessity with the
highest reality, but instead of reasoning, like the former proof,
from the highest reality to necessity of existence, it reasons
from the previously given unconditioned necessity of some
being to the unlimited reality of that being. It thus enters upon
a course of reasoning which, whether rational or only pseudo-
rational, is at any rate natural, and the most convincing not
only for common sense but even for speculative understanding.
It also sketches the first outline of all the proofs in natural
theology, an outline which has always been and always will
be followed, however much embellished and disguised by
superfluous additions. This proof, termed by Leibniz the proof
a contingentia mundi, we shall now proceed to expound and
examine.
It runs thus: If anything exists, an absolutely necessary
being must also exist. Now I, at least, exist. Therefore an
absolutely necessary being exists. The minor premiss contains
an experience, the major premiss the inference from there
being any experience at all to the existence of the necessary.
The proof therefore really begins with experience, and is not
wholly a priori or ontological. For this reason, and because
the object of all possible experience is called the world, it is
entitled the cosmological proof.
++ This inference is too well known to require detailed statement.
It depends on the supposedly transcendental law of natural
causality: that everything contingent has a cause, which, if itself
contingent, must likewise have a cause, till the series of subordinate
causes ends with an absolutely necessary cause, without which it
would have no completeness.
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Since, in dealing with the objects
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of experience, the proof abstracts from all special properties
through which this world may differ from any other possible
world, the title also serves to distinguish it from the physico-
theological proof, which is based upon observations of the
particular properties of the world disclosed to us by our senses.
The proof then proceeds as follows: The necessary being
can be determined in one way only, that is, by one out of each
possible pair of opposed predicates. It must therefore be
completely determined through its own concept. Now there is only
one possible concept which determines a thing completely
a priori, namely, the concept of the ens realissimum. The
concept of the ens realissimum is therefore the only concept
through which a necessary being can be thought. In other
words, a supreme being necessarily exists.
In this cosmological argument there are combined so many
pseudo-rational principles that speculative reason seems in
this case to have brought to bear all the resources of its
dialectical skill to produce the greatest possible transcendental
illusion. The testing of the argument may meantime be
postponed while we detail in order the various devices whereby
an old argument is disguised as a new one, and by which
appeal is made to the agreement of two witnesses, the one with
credentials of pure reason and the other with those of experience.
In reality the only witness is that which speaks in the
name of pure reason; in the endeavour to pass as a second
witness it merely changes its dress and voice. In order to lay
a secure foundation for itself, this proof takes its stand on
experience, and thereby makes profession of being distinct
from the ontological proof, which puts its entire trust in pure
a priori concepts. But the cosmological proof uses this experience
only for a single step in the argument, namely, to conclude
the existence of a necessary being. What properties this
being may have, the empirical premiss cannot tell us. Reason
therefore abandons experience altogether, and endeavours to
discover from mere concepts what properties an absolutely
necessary being must have, that is, which among all possible
things contains in itself the conditions (requisita) essential to
absolute necessity. Now these, it is supposed, are nowhere to
be found save in the concept of an ens realissimum; and the
conclusion is therefore drawn, that the ens realissimum is the
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absolutely necessary being. But it is evident that we are here
presupposing that the concept of the highest reality is completely
adequate to the concept of absolute necessity of existence;
that is, that the latter can be inferred from the former. Now
this is the proposition maintained by the ontological proof; it
is here being assumed in the cosmological proof, and indeed
made the basis of the proof; and yet it is an assumption with
which this latter proof has professed to dispense. For
absolute necessity is an existence determined from mere
concepts. If I say, the concept of the ens realissimum is a
concept, and indeed the only concept, which is appropriate and
adequate to necessary existence, I must also admit that necessary
existence can be inferred from this concept. Thus the so-
called cosmological proof really owes any cogency which it
may have to the ontological proof from mere concepts. The
appeal to experience is quite superfluous; experience may perhaps
lead us to the concept of absolute necessity, but is unable
to demonstrate this necessity as belonging to any determinate
thing. For immediately we endeavour to do so, we must
abandon all experience and search among pure concepts
to discover whether any one of them contains the conditions
of the possibility of an absolutely necessary being. If
in this way we can determine the possibility of a necessary
being, we likewise establish its existence. For what we are
then saying is this: that of all possible beings there is one
which carries with it absolute necessity, that is, that this being
exists with absolute necessity.
Fallacious and misleading arguments are most easily
detected if set out in correct syllogistic form. This we now
proceed to do in the instance under discussion.
If the proposition, that every absolutely necessary being is
likewise the most real of all beings, is correct (and this is the
nervus probandi of the cosmological proof), it must, like all
affirmative judgments, be convertible, at least per accidens.
It therefore follows that some entia realissima are likewise
absolutely necessary beings. But one ens realissimum is in no
respect different from another, and what is true of some under
this concept is true also of all. In this case, therefore, I can
convert the proposition simpliciter, not only per accidens,
and say that every ens realissimum is a necessary being. But
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since this proposition is determined from its a priori concepts
alone, the mere concept of the ens realissimum must carry
with it the absolute necessity of that being; and this is precisely
what the ontological proof has asserted and what the cosmological
proof has refused to admit, although the conclusions
of the latter are indeed covertly based on it.
Thus the second path upon which speculative reason enters
in its attempt to prove the existence of a supreme being is not
only as deceptive as the first, but has this additional defect,
that it is guilty of an ignoratio elenchi. It professes to lead
us by a new path, but after a short circuit brings us back to
the very path which we had deserted at its bidding.
I have stated that in this cosmological argument there lies
hidden a whole nest of dialectical assumptions, which the
transcendental critique can easily detect and destroy. These
deceptive principles I shall merely enumerate, leaving to the
reader, who by this time will be sufficiently expert in these
matters, the task of investigating them further, and of
refuting them.
We find, for instance, (1) the transcendental principle
whereby from the contingent we infer a cause. This principle
is applicable only in the sensible world; outside that world it
has no meaning whatsoever. For the mere intellectual concept
of the contingent cannot give rise to any synthetic proposition,
such as that of causality. The principle of causality has no
meaning and no criterion for its application save only in the
sensible world. But in the cosmological proof it is precisely in
order to enable us to advance beyond the sensible world that
it is employed. (2) The inference to a first cause, from the
impossibility of an infinite series of causes, given one after the
other, in the sensible world. The principles of the employment
of reason do not justify this conclusion even within the world
of experience; still less beyond this world in a realm into
which this series can never be extended. (3) The unjustified
self-satisfaction of reason in respect of the completion of this
series. The removal of all the conditions without which no
concept of necessity is possible is taken by reason to be a
completion of the concept of the series, on the ground that we can
then conceive nothing further. (4) The confusion between the
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logical possibility of a concept of all reality united into one
(without inner contradiction) and the transcendental possibility
of such a reality. In the case of the latter there is
needed a principle to establish the practicability of such a
synthesis, a principle which itself, however, can apply only
to the field of possible experiences -- etc.
The procedure of the cosmological proof is artfully designed
to enable us to escape having to prove the existence of a
necessary being a priori through mere concepts. Such proof would
require to be carried out in the ontological manner, and that
is an enterprise for which we feel ourselves to be altogether
incompetent. Accordingly, we take as the starting-point of our
inference an actual existence (an experience in general), and
advance, in such manner as we can, to some absolutely necessary
condition of this existence. We have then no need to show the
possibility of this condition. For if it has been proved to exist,
the question as to its possibility is entirely superfluous. If now
we want to determine more fully the nature of this necessary
being, we do not endeavour to do so in the manner that would
be really adequate, namely, by discovering from its concept the
necessity of its existence. For could we do that, we should be
in no need of an empirical starting-point. No, all we seek is
the negative condition (conditio sine qua non), without which a
being would not be absolutely necessary. And in all other kinds
of reasoning from a given consequence to its ground this would
be legitimate; but in the present case it unfortunately happens
that the condition which is needed for absolute necessity is only
to be found in one single being. This being must therefore
contain in its concept all that is required for absolute necessity,
and consequently it enables me to infer this absolute necessity
a priori. I must therefore be able also to reverse the inference,
and to say: Anything to which this concept (of supreme reality)
applies is absolutely necessary. If I cannot make this inference
(as I must concede, if I am to avoid admitting the ontological
proof), I have come to grief in the new way that I have been
following, and am back again at my starting-point. The concept
of the supreme being satisfies all questions a priori which
can be raised regarding the inner determinations of a thing,
and is therefore an ideal that is quite unique, in that the
concept, while universal, also at the same time designates an
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individual as being among the things that are possible. But it
does not give satisfaction concerning the question of its own
existence -- though this is the real purpose of our enquiries --
and if anyone admitted the existence of a necessary being but
wanted to know which among all [existing] things is to be
identified with that being, we could not answer: "This, not
that. is the necessary being. "
We may indeed be allowed to postulate the existence of an
all-sufficient being, as the cause of all possible effects, with a
view to lightening the task of reason in its search for the unity
of the grounds of explanation. But in presuming so far as to
say that such a being necessarily exists, we are no longer
giving modest expression to an admissible hypothesis, but
are confidently laying claim to apodeictic certainty. For the
knowledge of what we profess to know as absolutely necessary
must itself carry with it absolute necessity.
The whole problem of the transcendental ideal amounts to
this: either, given absolute necessity, to find a concept which
possesses it, or, given the concept of something, to find that
something to be absolutely necessary. If either task be possible,
so must the other; for reason recognises that only as absolutely
necessary which follows of necessity from its concept. But both
tasks are quite beyond our utmost efforts to satisfy our
understanding in this matter; and equally unavailing are all attempts
to induce it to acquiesce in its incapacity.
Unconditioned necessity, which we so indispensably require
as the last bearer of all things, is for human reason the
veritable abyss. Eternity itself, in all its terrible sublimity, as
depicted by a Haller, is far from making the same overwhelming
impression on the mind; for it only measures the duration
of things, it does not support them. We cannot put aside, and
yet also cannot endure the thought, that a being, which we
represent to ourselves as supreme amongst all possible beings,
should, as it were, say to itself: 'I am from eternity to eternity,
and outside me there is nothing save what is through my will,
but whence then am I? ' All support here fails us; and the
greatest perfection, no less than the least perfection, is
unsubstantial and baseless for the merely speculative reason, which
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makes not the least effort to retain either the one or the other,
and feels indeed no loss in allowing them to vanish entirely.
Many forces in nature, which manifest their existence
through certain effects, remain for us inscrutable; for we cannot
track them sufficiently far by observation. Also, the transcendental
object lying at the basis of appearances (and with it the
reason why our sensibility is subject to certain supreme conditions
rather than to others) is and remains for us inscrutable.
The thing itself is indeed given, but we can have no insight
into its nature. But it is quite otherwise with an ideal of pure
reason; it can never be said to be inscrutable. For since it is
not required to give any credentials of its reality save only
the need on the part of reason to complete all synthetic unity
by means of it; and since, therefore, it is in no wise given as
thinkable object, it cannot be inscrutable in the manner in
which an object is. On the contrary it must, as a mere idea,
find its place and its solution in the nature of reason, and
must therefore allow of investigation. For it is of the very
essence of reason that we should be able to give an account
of all our concepts, opinions, and assertions, either upon
objective or, in the case of mere illusion, upon subjective
grounds.
DISCOVERY AND EXPLANATION
of the Dialectical Illusion in all Transcendental Proofs of the Existence of
a Necessary Being
Both the above proofs were transcendental, that is, were
attempted independently of empirical principles. For although
the cosmological proof presupposes an experience in general,
it is not based on any particular property of this experience
but on pure principles of reason, as applied to an existence
given through empirical consciousness in general. Further, it
soon abandons this guidance and relies on pure concepts alone.
What, then, in these transcendental proofs is the cause of the
dialectical but natural illusion which connects the concepts of
necessity and supreme reality, and which realises and
hypostatises what can be an idea only? Why are we constrained
to assume that some one among existing things is in itself
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necessary, and yet at the same time to shrink back from the
existence of such a being as from an abyss? And how are
we to secure that reason may come to an agreement with
itself in this matter, and that from the wavering condition of
a diffident approval, ever again withdrawn, it may arrive at
settled insight?
There is something very strange in the fact, that once we
assume something to exist we cannot avoid inferring that
something exists necessarily. The cosmological argument rests
on this quite natural (although not therefore certain) inference.
On the other hand, if I take the concept of anything, no
matter what, I find that the existence of this thing can never
be represented by me as absolutely necessary, and that,
whatever it may be that exists, nothing prevents me from thinking
its non-existence. Thus while I may indeed be obliged to
assume something necessary as a condition of the existent in
general, I cannot think any particular thing as in itself
necessary. In other words, I can never complete the regress to the
conditions of existence save by assuming a necessary being
and yet am never in a position to begin with such a being.
If I am constrained to think something necessary as a
condition of existing things, but am unable to think any
particular thing as in itself necessary, it inevitably follows that
necessity and contingency do not concern the things
themselves; otherwise there would be a contradiction. Consequently,
neither of these two principles can be objective. They
may, however, be regarded as subjective principles of reason.
The one calls upon us to seek something necessary as a condition
of all that is given as existent, that is, to stop nowhere
until we have arrived at an explanation which is complete
a priori; the other forbids us ever to hope for this completion,
that is, forbids us to treat anything empirical as unconditioned
and to exempt ourselves thereby from the toil of its
further derivation. Viewed in this manner, the two principles,
as merely heuristic and regulative, and as concerning only the
formal interest of reason, can very well stand side by side. The
one prescribes that we are to philosophise about nature as if
there were a necessary first ground for all that belongs to
existence -- solely, however, for the purpose of bringing
systematic unity into our knowledge, by always pursuing such
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an idea, as an imagined ultimate ground. The other warns us
not to regard any determination whatsoever of existing things
as such an ultimate ground, that is, as absolutely necessary,
but to keep the way always open for further derivation, and
so to treat each and every determination as always conditioned
by something else. But if everything which is perceived
in things must necessarily be treated by us as conditioned,
nothing that allows of being empirically given can be
regarded as absolutely necessary.
Since, therefore, the absolutely necessary is only intended
to serve as a principle for obtaining the greatest possible
unity among appearances, as being their ultimate ground;
and since -- inasmuch as the second rule commands us always
to regard all empirical causes of unity as themselves
derived -- we can never reach this unity within the world, it
follows that we must regard the absolutely necessary as being
outside the world.
While the philosophers of antiquity regard all form in
nature as contingent, they follow the judgment of the common
man in their view of matter as original and necessary. But if,
instead of regarding matter relatively, as substratum of
appearances, they had considered it in itself, and as regards its
existence, the idea of absolute necessity would at once have
disappeared. For there is nothing which absolutely binds
reason to accept such an existence; on the contrary it can
always annihilate it in thought, without contradiction; absolute
necessity is a necessity that is to be found in thought alone.
This belief must therefore have been due to a certain regulative
principle. In fact extension and impenetrability (which
between them make up the concept of matter) constitute the
supreme empirical principle of the unity of appearances;
and this principle, so far as it is empirically unconditioned,
has the character of a regulative principle. Nevertheless,
since every determination of the matter which constitutes what
is real in appearances, including impenetrability, is an effect
(action) which must have its cause and which is therefore
always derivative in character, matter is not compatible with
the idea of a necessary being as a principle of all derived unity.
(For its real properties, being derivative, are one and all only
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conditionally necessary, and so allow of being removed --
wherewith the whole existence of matter would be removed. )
If this were not the case, we should have reached the
ultimate ground of unity by empirical means -- which is forbidden
by the second regulative principle. It therefore follows
that matter, and in general whatever belongs to the world,
is not compatible with the idea of a necessary original being,
even when the latter is regarded simply as a principle of the
greatest empirical unity. That being or principle must be set
outside the world, leaving us free to derive the appearances
of the world and their existence from other appearances, with
unfailing confidence, just as if there were no necessary being,
while yet we are also free to strive unceasingly towards the
completeness of that derivation, just as if such a being were
presupposed as an ultimate ground.
As follows from these considerations, the ideal of the
supreme being is nothing but a regulative principle of reason,
which directs us to look upon all connection in the world as if
it originated from an all-sufficient necessary cause. We can
base upon the ideal the rule of a systematic and, in accordance
with universal laws, necessary unity in the explanation
of that connection; but the ideal is not an assertion of an
existence necessary in itself. At the same time we cannot avoid
the transcendental subreption, by which this formal principle
is represented as constitutive, and by which this unity is
hypostatised. We proceed here just as we do in the case of space.
Space is only a principle of sensibility, but since it is the
primary source and condition of all shapes, which are only so
many limitations of itself, it is taken as something absolutely
necessary, existing in its own right, and as an object given a -
priori in itself. In the same way, since the systematic unity of
nature cannot be prescribed as a principle for the empirical
employment of our reason, except in so far as we presuppose
the idea of an ens realissimum as the supreme cause, it is
quite natural that this latter idea should be represented as an
actual object, which, in its character of supreme condition, is
also necessary -- thus changing a regulative into a constitutive
principle. That such a substitution has been made becomes
evident, when we consider this supreme being, which relatively
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to the world is absolutely (unconditionally) necessary, as a
thing in and by itself. For we are then unable to conceive
what can be meant by its necessity. The concept of necessity
is only to be found in our reason, as a formal condition of
thought; it does not allow of being hypostatised as a material
condition of existence.
CHAPTER III
Section 6
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL PROOF
If, then, neither the concept of things in general nor the
experience of any existence in general can supply what is
required, it remains only to try whether a determinate experience,
the experience of the things of the present world, and the
constitution and order of these, does not provide the basis of a
proof which may help us to attain to an assured conviction of a
supreme being. Such proof we propose to entitle the physico-
theological. Should this attempt also fail, it must follow that
no satisfactory proof of the existence of a being corresponding
to our transcendental idea can be possible by pure speculative
reason.
 In view of what has already been said, it is evident that we
can count upon a quite easy and conclusive answer to this
enquiry. For how can any experience ever be adequate to an
idea? The peculiar nature of the latter consists just in the fact
that no experience can ever be equal to it. The transcendental
idea of a necessary and all-sufficient original being is so
overwhelmingly great, so high above everything empirical,
the latter being always conditioned, that it leaves us at a
loss, partly because we can never find in experience material
sufficient to satisfy such a concept, and partly because it is
always in the sphere of the conditioned that we carry out our
search, seeking there ever vainly for the unconditioned -- no
law of any empirical synthesis giving us an example of any
such unconditioned or providing the least guidance in its
pursuit.
If the supreme being should itself stand in this chain of
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conditions, it would be a member of the series, and like the
lower members which it precedes, would call for further enquiry
as to the still higher ground from which it follows. If, on
the other hand, we propose to separate it from the chain, and
to conceive it as a purely intelligible being, existing apart from
the series of natural causes, by what bridge can reason contrive
to pass over to it? For all laws governing the transition from
effects to causes, all synthesis and extension of our knowledge,
refer to nothing but possible experience, and therefore solely
to objects of the sensible world, and apart from them can have
no meaning whatsoever.
This world presents to us so immeasurable a stage of
variety, order, purposiveness, and beauty, as displayed alike in
its infinite extent and in the unlimited divisibility of its parts,
that even with such knowledge as our weak understanding
can acquire of it, we are brought face to face with so many
marvels immeasurably great, that all speech loses its force, all
numbers their power to measure, our thoughts themselves all
definiteness, and that our judgment of the whole resolves itself
into an amazement which is speechless, and only the more
eloquent on that account. Everywhere we see a chain of effects
and causes, of ends and means, a regularity in origination and
dissolution. Nothing has of itself come into the condition in
which we find it to exist, but always points to something
else as its cause, while this in turn commits us to repetition
of the same enquiry. The whole universe must thus sink into
the abyss of nothingness, unless, over and above this infinite
chain of contingencies, we assume something to support it --
something which is original and independently self-subsistent,
and which as the cause of the origin of the universe secures
also at the same time its continuance. What magnitude are we
to ascribe to this supreme cause -- admitting that it is supreme
in respect of all things in the world? We are not acquainted
with the whole content of the world, still less do we know
how to estimate its magnitude by comparison with all that is
possible. But since we cannot, as regards causality, dispense
with an ultimate and supreme being, what is there to prevent
us ascribing to it a degree of perfection that sets it above
everything else that is possible?  This we can easily do -- though
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only through the slender outline of an abstract concept -- by
representing this being to ourselves as combining in itself all
possible perfection, as in a single substance. This concept is
in conformity with the demand of our reason for parsimony
of principles; it is free from self-contradiction, and is never
decisively contradicted by any experience; and it is likewise
of such a character that it contributes to the extension of
the employment of reason within experience, through the
guidance which it yields in the discovery of order and
purposiveness.
This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect.
It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the
common reason of mankind. It enlivens the study of nature,
just as it itself derives its existence and gains ever new vigour
from that source. It suggests ends and purposes, where our
observation would not have detected them by itself, and extends
our knowledge of nature by means of the guiding-concept of a
special unity, the principle of which is outside nature. This
knowledge again reacts on its cause, namely, upon the idea
which has led to it, and so strengthens the belief in a supreme
Author [of nature] that the belief acquires the force of an
irresistible conviction.
It would therefore not only be uncomforting but utterly
vain to attempt to diminish in any way the authority of this
argument. Reason, constantly upheld by this ever-increasing
evidence, which, though empirical, is yet so powerful, cannot
be so depressed through doubts suggested by subtle and
abstruse speculation, that it is not at once aroused from the
indecision of all melancholy reflection, as from a dream, by
one glance at the wonders of nature and the majesty of the
universe -- ascending from height to height up to the all-
highest, from the conditioned to its conditions, up to the
supreme and unconditioned Author [of all conditioned
being].
But although we have nothing to bring against the rationality
and utility of this procedure, but have rather to commend
and to further it, we still cannot approve the claims, which this
mode of argument would fain advance, to apodeictic certainty
and to an assent founded on no special favour or support from
other quarters. It cannot hurt the good cause, if the dogmatic
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language of the overweening sophist be toned down to the
more moderate and humble requirements of a belief adequate
to quieten our doubts, though not to command unconditional
submission. I therefore maintain that the physico-theological
proof can never by itself establish the existence of a supreme
being, but must always fall back upon the ontological argument
to make good its deficiency. It only serves as an introduction
to the ontological argument; and the latter therefore
contains (in so far as a speculative proof is possible at all) the
one possible ground of proof with which human reason can
never dispense.
The chief points of the physico-theological proof are as
follows: (1) In the world we everywhere find clear signs of an
order in accordance with a determinate purpose, carried out
with great wisdom; and this in a universe which is indescribably
varied in content and unlimited in extent. (2) This purposive
order is quite alien to the things of the world, and only
belongs to them contingently; that is to say, the diverse things
could not of themselves have co-operated, by so great a
combination of diverse means, to the fulfilment of determinate
final purposes, had they not been chosen and designed for
these purposes by an ordering rational principle in conformity
with underlying ideas. (3) There exists, therefore, a sublime
and wise cause (or more than one), which must be the cause
of the world not merely as a blindly working all-powerful
nature, by fecundity, but as intelligence, through freedom.
(4) The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of
the reciprocal relations existing between the parts of the world,
as members of an artfully arranged structure -- inferred with
certainty in so far as our observation suffices for its verification
and beyond these limits with probability, in accordance with
the principles of analogy.
We need not here criticise natural reason too strictly in
regard to its conclusion from the analogy between certain
natural products and what our human art produces when we
do violence to nature, and constrain it to proceed not according
to its own ends but in conformity with ours -- appealing to the
similarity of these particular natural products with houses,
ships, watches. Nor need we here question its conclusion that
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there lies at the basis of nature a causality similar to that
responsible for artificial products, namely, an understanding
and a will; and that the inner possibility of a self-acting
nature (which is what makes all art, and even, it may be,
reason itself, possible) is therefore derived from another,
though superhuman, art -- a mode of reasoning which could
not perhaps withstand a searching transcendental criticism.
But at any rate we must admit that, if we are to specify a
cause at all, we cannot here proceed more securely than by
analogy with those purposive productions of which alone the
cause and mode of action are fully known to us. Reason could
never be justified in abandoning the causality which it knows
for grounds of explanation which are obscure, of which it
does not have any knowledge, and which are incapable of
proof.
On this method of argument, the purposiveness and harmonious
adaptation of so much in nature can suffice to prove
the contingency of the form merely, not of the matter, that is,
not of the substance in the world. To prove the latter we should
have to demonstrate that the things in the world would not
of themselves be capable of such order and harmony, in
accordance with universal laws, if they were not in their
substance the product of supreme wisdom. But to prove this
we should require quite other grounds of proof than those
which are derived from the analogy with human art. The
utmost, therefore, that the argument can prove is an architect
of the world who is always very much hampered by the
adaptability of the material in which he works, not a creator
of the world to whose idea everything is subject. This,
however, is altogether inadequate to the lofty purpose which we
have before our eyes, namely, the proof of an all-sufficient
primordial being. To prove the contingency of matter itself,
we should have to resort to a transcendental argument, and
this is precisely what we have here set out to avoid.
The inference, therefore, is that the order and purposiveness
everywhere observable throughout the world may be
regarded as a completely contingent arrangement, and that
we may argue to the existence of a cause proportioned to it.
But the concept of this cause must enable us to know
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something quite determinate about it, and can therefore be no
other than the concept of a being who possesses all might,
wisdom, etc. , in a word, all the perfection which is proper to
an all-sufficient being. For the predicates -- 'very great',
'astounding', 'immeasurable' in power and excellence -- give no
determinate concept at all, and do not really tell us what the
thing is in itself. They are only relative representations of the
magnitude of the object, which the observer, in contemplating
the world, compares with himself and with his capacity
of comprehension, and which are equally terms of eulogy
whether we be magnifying the object or be depreciating the
observing subject in relation to that object. Where we are
concerned with the magnitude (of the perfection) of a thing,
there is no determinate concept except that which comprehends
all possible perfection; and in that concept only the
allness (omnitudo) of the reality is completely determined.
Now no one, I trust, will be so bold as to profess that he
comprehends the relation of the magnitude of the world as he
has observed it (alike as regards both extent and content) to
omnipotence, of the world order to supreme wisdom, of the
world unity to the absolute unity of its Author, etc. Physico-
theology is therefore unable to give any determinate concept
of the supreme cause of the world, and cannot therefore serve
as the foundation of a theology which is itself in turn to
form the basis of religion.
To advance to absolute totality by the empirical road is
utterly impossible. None the less this is what is attempted in
the physico-theological proof. What, then, are the means
which have been adopted to bridge this wide abyss?
The physico-theological argument can indeed lead us to
the point of admiring the greatness, wisdom, power, etc. , of
the Author of the world, but can take us no further.
Accordingly, we then abandon the argument from empirical grounds
of proof, and fall back upon the contingency which, in the
first steps of the argument, we had inferred from the order and
purposiveness of the world. With this contingency as our sole
premiss, we then advance, by means of transcendental concepts
alone, to the existence of an absolutely necessary being,
and [as a final step] from the concept of the absolute necessity
of the first cause to the completely determinate or determinable
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concept of that necessary being, namely, to the concept of
an all-embracing reality. Thus the physico-theological proof,
failing in its undertaking, has in face of this difficulty suddenly
fallen back upon the cosmological proof; and since the latter
is only a disguised ontological proof, it has really achieved
its purpose by pure reason alone -- although at the start it
disclaimed all kinship with pure reason and professed to
establish its conclusions on convincing evidence derived from
experience.
Those who propound the physico-theological argument
have therefore no ground for being so contemptuous in their
attitude to the transcendental mode of proof, posing as clear-
sighted students of nature, and complacently looking down
upon that proof as the artificial product of obscure speculative
refinements. For were they willing to scrutinise their own
procedure, they would find that, after advancing some considerable
way on the solid ground of nature and experience, and finding
themselves just as far distant as ever from the object which discloses
itself to their reason, they suddenly leave this ground, and
pass over into the realm of mere possibilities, where they hope
upon the wings of ideas to draw near to the object -- the object
that has refused itself to all their empirical enquiries. For after
this tremendous leap, when they have, as they think, found firm
ground, they extend their concept -- the determinate concept,
into the possession of which they have now come, they know not
how -- over the whole sphere of creation. And the ideal, [which
this reasoning thus involves, and] which is entirely a product
of pure reason, they then elucidate by reference to experience,
though inadequately enough, and in a manner far below the
dignity of its object; and throughout they persist in refusing
to admit that they have arrived at this knowledge or
hypothesis by a road quite other than that of experience.
Thus the physico-theological proof of the existence of an
original or supreme being rests upon the cosmological proof,
and the cosmological upon the ontological. And since, besides
these three, there is no other path open to speculative reason,
the ontological proof from pure concepts of reason is the only
possible one, if indeed any proof of a proposition so far exalted
above all empirical employment of the understanding is
possible at all.
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CHAPTER III
Section 7
CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY BASED UPON SPECULATIVE
PRINCIPLES OF REASON
If I understand by theology knowledge of the original
being, it is based either solely upon reason (theologia rationalis)
or upon revelation (revelata). The former thinks its object
either through pure reason, solely by means of transcendental
concepts (ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium), in which
case it is entitled transcendental theology, or through a
concept borrowed from nature (from the nature of our soul) -- a
concept of the original being as a supreme intelligence -- and
it would then have to be called natural theology. Those who
accept only a transcendental theology are called deists; those
who also admit a natural theology are called theists. The
former grant that we can know the existence of an original
being solely through reason, but maintain that our concept
of it is transcendental only, namely, the concept of a being
which possesses all reality, but which we are unable to
determine in any more specific fashion. The latter assert that
reason is capable of determining its object more precisely
through analogy with nature, namely, as a being which,
through understanding and freedom, contains in itself the
ultimate ground of everything else. Thus the deist represents
this being merely as a cause of the world (whether by
the necessity of its nature or through freedom, remains
undecided), the theist as the Author of the world.
Transcendental theology, again, either proposes to deduce
the existence of the original being from an experience in
general (without determining in any more specific fashion the
nature of the world to which the experience belongs), and is
then entitled cosmo-theology; or it believes that it can know the
existence of such a being through mere concepts, without the
help of any experience whatsoever, and is then entitled onto-
theology.
Natural theology infers the properties and the existence of
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an Author of the world from the constitution, the order and
unity, exhibited in the world -- a world in which we have to
recognise two kinds of causality with their rules, namely,
nature and freedom. From this world natural theology ascends
to a supreme intelligence, as the principle either of all natural
or of all moral order and perfection. In the former case it is
entitled physico-theology, in the latter moral theology.
Since we are wont to understand by the concept of God not
merely an eternal nature that works blindly, as the root-source
of all things, but a supreme being who through understanding
and freedom is the Author of all things; and since it is in this
sense only that the concept interests us, we could, strictly
speaking, deny to the deist any belief in God, allowing him
only the assertion of an original being or supreme cause.
However, since no one ought to be accused of denying what he only
does not venture to assert, it is less harsh and more just to
say that the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living God
(summa intelligentia). We shall now proceed to enquire what
are the possible sources of all these endeavours of reason.
For the purposes of this enquiry, theoretical knowledge
may be defined as knowledge of what is, practical knowledge
as the representation of what ought to be. On this definition, the
theoretical employment of reason is that by which I know a -
priori (as necessary) that something is, and the practical that
by which it is known a priori what ought to happen. Now if it
is indubitably certain that something is or that something
ought to happen, but this certainty is at the same time only
conditional, then a certain determinate condition of it can be
absolutely necessary, or can be an optional and contingent
presupposition. In the former case the condition is postulated
(per thesin); in the latter case it is assumed (per hypothesin).
++ Not theological ethics: for this contains moral laws, which presuppose
the existence of a supreme ruler of the world. Moral theology,
on the other hand, is a conviction of the existence of a supreme being
-- a conviction which bases itself on moral laws.
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Now since there are practical laws which are absolutely necessary,
that is, moral laws, it must follow that if these necessarily
presuppose the existence of any being as the condition of
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the possibility of their obligatory power, this existence must
be postulated; and this for the sufficient reason that the
conditioned, from which the inference is drawn to this determinate
condition, is itself known a priori to be absolutely necessary.
At some future time we shall show that the moral laws do
not merely presuppose the existence of a supreme being, but
also, as themselves in a different connection absolutely
necessary, justify us in postulating it, though, indeed, only from
a practical point of view. For the present, however, we are
leaving this mode of argument aside.
Where we are dealing merely with what is (not with what
ought to be), the conditioned, which is given to us in
experience, is always thought as being likewise contingent. That
which conditions it is not, therefore, known as absolutely
necessary, but serves only as something relatively necessary
or rather as needful; in itself and a priori it is an arbitrary
presupposition, assumed by us in our attempt to know the
conditioned by means of reason. If, therefore in the field of
theoretical knowledge, the absolute necessity of a thing were
to be known, this could only be from a priori concepts, and
never by positing it as a cause relative to an existence given
in experience.
Theoretical knowledge is speculative if it concerns an object,
or those concepts of an object, which cannot be reached
in any experience. It is so named to distinguish it from the
knowledge of nature, which concerns only those objects or
predicates of objects which can be given in a possible experience.
The principle by which, from that which happens (the empirically
contingent) [viewed] as [an] effect, we infer a cause,
is a principle of the knowledge of nature, but not of speculative
knowledge. For, if we abstract from what it is as a principle
that contains the condition of all possible experience, and leaving
aside all that is empirical attempt to assert it of the contingent
in general, there remains not the least justification for
any synthetic proposition such as might show us how to pass
from that which is before us to something quite different
(called its cause). In this merely speculative employment any
meaning whose objective reality admits of being made intelligible
in concreto, is taken away not only from the concept of
the contingent but from the concept of a cause.
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If we infer from the existence of things in the world the
existence of their cause, we are employing reason, not in the
knowledge of nature, but in speculation. For the former type
of knowledge treats as empirically contingent, and refers to a
cause, not the things themselves (substances), but only that
which happens, that is, their states. That substance (matter) is
itself contingent in its existence would have to be known in a
purely speculative manner. Again, even if we were speaking
only of the form of the world, the way in which things are
connected and change, and sought to infer from this a cause
entirely distinct from the world, this would again be a judgment
of purely speculative reason, since the object which we
are inferring is not an object of a possible experience. So
employed, the principle of causality, which is only valid within
the field of experience, and outside this field has no application,
nay, is indeed meaningless, would be altogether diverted
from its proper use.
Now I maintain that all attempts to employ reason in theology
in any merely speculative manner are altogether fruitless
and by their very nature null and void, and that the principles
of its employment in the study of nature do not lead to
any theology whatsoever. Consequently, the only theology of
reason which is possible is that which is based upon moral laws
or seeks guidance from them. All synthetic principles of reason
allow only of an immanent employment; and in order to have
knowledge of a supreme being we should have to put them to
a transcendent use, for which our understanding is in no way
fitted. If the empirically valid law of causality is to lead to the
original being, the latter must belong to the chain of objects of
experience, and in that case it would, like all appearances, be
itself again conditioned. But even if the leap beyond the limits
of experience, by means of the dynamical law of the relation of
effects to their causes, be regarded as permissible, what sort of
a concept could we obtain by this procedure? It is far from
providing the concept of a supreme being, since experience never
gives us the greatest of all possible effects, such as would be
required to provide the evidence for a cause of that kind. Should
we seek to make good this lack of determination in our concept,
by means of a mere idea of [a being that possesses] the highest
perfection and original necessity, this may indeed be granted
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as a favour; it cannot be demanded as a right on the strength
of an incontrovertible proof. The physico-theological proof, as
combining speculation and intuition, might therefore perhaps
give additional weight to other proofs (if such there be); but
taken alone, it serves only to prepare the understanding for
theological knowledge, and to give it a natural leaning in this
direction, not to complete the work in and by itself.
All this clearly points to the conclusion that transcendental
questions allow only of transcendental answers, that is, answers
exclusively based on concepts that are a priori, without
the least empirical admixture. But the question under consideration
is obviously synthetic, calling for an extension of our
knowledge beyond all limits of experience, namely, to the
existence of a being that is to correspond to a mere idea
of ours, an idea that cannot be paralleled in any experience.
Now as we have already proved, synthetic a priori knowledge
is possible only in so far as it expresses the formal conditions
of a possible experience; and all principles are therefore only
of immanent validity, that is, they are applicable only to
objects of empirical knowledge, to appearances. Thus all attempts
to construct a theology through purely speculative reason, by
means of a transcendental procedure, are without result.
But even if anyone prefers to call in question all those
proofs which have been given in the Analytic, rather than
allow himself to be robbed of his conviction of the conclusiveness
of the arguments upon which he has so long relied, he
still cannot refuse to meet my demand that he should at least
give a satisfactory account how, and by what kind of inner
illumination, he believes himself capable of soaring so far
above all possible experience, on the wings of mere ideas.
New proofs, or attempts to improve upon the old ones, I
would ask to be spared. There is not indeed, in this field, much
room for choice, since all merely speculative proofs in the
end bring us always back to one and the same proof, namely,
the ontological; and I have therefore no real ground to fear
the fertile ingenuity of the dogmatic champions of supersensible
reason. I shall not, however, decline the challenge
to discover the fallacy in any attempt of this kind, and
so to nullify its claims; and this I can indeed do without
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considering myself a particularly combative person. But by
such means I should never succeed in eradicating the hope
of better fortune in those who have once become accustomed
to dogmatic modes of persuasion; and I therefore confine
myself to the moderate demand, that they give, in terms
which are universal and which are based on the nature of the
human understanding and of all our other sources of knowledge,
a satisfactory answer to this one question: how we can
so much as make a beginning in the proposed task of extending
our knowledge entirely a priori, and of carrying it
into a realm where no experience is possible to us, and in
which there is therefore no means of establishing the objective
reality of any concept that we have ourselves invented.
In whatever manner the understanding may have arrived at
a concept, the existence of its object is never, by any process
of analysis, discoverable within it; for the knowledge of the
existence of the object consists precisely in the fact that the
object is posited in itself, beyond the [mere] thought of it.
Through concepts alone, it is quite impossible to advance to
the discovery of new objects and supernatural beings; and it
is useless to appeal to experience, which in all cases yields only
appearances.
But although reason, in its merely speculative employment,
is very far from being equal to so great an undertaking,
namely, to demonstrate the existence of a supreme being,
it is yet of very great utility in correcting any knowledge of this
being which may be derived from other sources, in making it
consistent with itself and with every point of view from which
intelligible objects may be regarded, and in freeing it from
everything incompatible with the concept of an original
being and from all admixture of empirical limitations.
Transcendental theology is still, therefore, in spite of all
its disabilities, of great importance in its negative employment,
and serves as a permanent censor of our reason, in so
far as the latter deals merely with pure ideas which, as such,
allow of no criterion that is not transcendental. For if, in some
other relation, perhaps on practical grounds, the presupposition
of a supreme and all-sufficient being, as highest intelligence,
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established its validity beyond all question, it would be
of the greatest importance accurately to determine this concept
on its transcendental side, as the concept of a necessary
and supremely real being, to free it from whatever, as
belonging to mere appearance (anthropomorphism in its wider
sense), is out of keeping with the supreme reality, and at
the same time to dispose of all counter-assertions, whether
atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic. Such critical treatment
is, indeed, far from being difficult, inasmuch as the same
grounds which have enabled us to demonstrate the inability of
human reason to maintain the existence of such a being must
also suffice to prove the invalidity of all counter-assertions.
For from what source could we, through a purely speculative
employment of reason, derive the knowledge that there is no
supreme being as ultimate ground of all things, or that it has
none of the attributes which, arguing from their consequences,
we represent to ourselves as analogical with the dynamical
realities of a thinking being, or (as the anthropomorphists
contend) that it must be subject to all the limitations which
sensibility inevitably imposes on those intelligences which are
known to us through experience.
Thus, while for the merely speculative employment of
reason the supreme being remains a mere ideal, it is yet an
ideal without a flaw, a concept which completes and crowns
the whole of human knowledge. Its objective reality cannot
indeed be proved, but also cannot be disproved, by merely
speculative reason. If, then, there should be a moral theology
that can make good this deficiency, transcendental theology,
which before was problematic only, will prove itself
indispensable in determining the concept of this supreme being
and in constantly testing reason, which is so often deceived by
sensibility, and which is frequently out of harmony with its
own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence outside the
world (and not as world-soul), eternity as free from conditions
of time, omnipresence as free from conditions of space,
omnipotence, etc. are purely transcendental predicates, and for
this reason the purified concepts of them, which every theology
finds so indispensable, are only to be obtained from
transcendental theology.

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