Chapter II
                        Of the State of Nature

  4. To understand political power aright, and derive it from its
original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and
that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and
dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the
bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon
the will of any other man.
  A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction
is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing
more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank,
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use
of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another,
without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of
them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one
above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment,
an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
  5. This equality of men by Nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon
as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the
foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men on which he
builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the
great maxims of justice and charity. His words are:
  "The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is
no less their duty to love others than themselves, for seeing those
things which are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I cannot
but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any
man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part
of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the
like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men weak, being of one
and the same nature: to have anything offered them repugnant to this
desire must needs, in all respects, grieve them as much as me; so that
if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others
should show greater measure of love to me than they have by me
showed unto them; my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in
Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of
bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of
equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what
several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of
life no man is ignorant." (Eccl. Pol. i.)*

  * Richard Hooker, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity.

  6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of
licence; though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to
dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to
destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but
where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The
state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges
every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will
but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought
to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions; for men
being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker;
all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by His
order and about His business; they are His property, whose workmanship
they are made to last during His, not one another's pleasure. And,
being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of
Nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us
that may authorise us to destroy one another, as if we were made for
one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours.
Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his
station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation
comes not in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the
rest of mankind, and not unless it be to do justice on an offender,
take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the
life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.
  7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others'
rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be
observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the
execution of the law of Nature is in that state put into every man's
hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of
that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation. For the law
of Nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world,
be in vain if there were nobody that in the state of Nature had a
power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and
restrain offenders; and if any one in the state of Nature may punish
another for any evil he has done, every one may do so. For in that
state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority
or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of
that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
  8. And thus, in the state of Nature, one man comes by a power over
another, but yet no absolute or arbitrary power to use a criminal,
when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats or
boundless extravagancy of his own will, but only to retribute to him
so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to
his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and
restraint. For these two are the only reasons why one man may lawfully
do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing
the law of Nature, the offender declares himself to live by another
rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure
God has set to the actions of men for their mutual security, and so he
becomes dangerous to mankind; the tie which is to secure them from
injury and violence being slighted and broken by him, which being a
trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it,
provided for by the law of Nature, every man upon this score, by the
right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where
it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such
evil on any one who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent
the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and, by his example, others
from doing the like mischief. And in this case, and upon this
ground, every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be
executioner of the law of Nature.
  9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some
men; but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me by what
right any prince or state can put to death or punish an alien for
any crime he commits in their country? It is certain their laws, by
virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the
legislature, reach not a stranger. They speak not to him, nor, if they
did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority by
which they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth hath no
power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in
England, France, or Holland are, to an Indian, but like the rest of
the world- men without authority. And therefore, if by the law of
Nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he
soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of
any community can punish an alien of another country, since, in
reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man
naturally may have over another.
  10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the laws, and
varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes
degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human
nature and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done,
and some person or other, some other man, receives damage by his
transgression; in which case, he who hath received any damage has
(besides the right of punishment common to him, with other men) a
particular right to seek reparation from him that hath done it. And
any other person who finds it just may also join with him that is
injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may
make satisfaction for the harm he hath suffered.
  11. From these two distinct rights (the one of punishing the
crime, for restraint and preventing the like offence, which right of
punishing is in everybody, the other of taking reparation, which
belongs only to the injured party) comes it to pass that the
magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the common right of punishing
put into his hands, can often, where the public good demands not the
execution of the law, remit the punishment of criminal offences by his
own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any
private man for the damage he has received. That he who hath
suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he
alone can remit. The damnified person has this power of
appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender by right
of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime
to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of
preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in
order to that end. And thus it is that every man in the state of
Nature has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing
the like injury (which no reparation can compensate) by the example of
the punishment that attends it from everybody, and also to secure
men from the attempts of a criminal who, having renounced reason,
the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the
unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war
against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a
tiger, one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no
society nor security. And upon this is grounded that great law of
nature, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be
shed." And Cain was so fully convinced that every one had a right to
destroy such a criminal, that, after the murder of his brother, he
cries out, "Every one that findeth me shall slay me," so plain was
it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
  12. By the same reason may a man in the state of Nature punish the
lesser breaches of that law, it will, perhaps, be demanded, with
death? I answer: Each transgression may be punished to that degree,
and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain
to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from
doing the like. Every offence that can be committed in the state of
Nature may, in the state of Nature, be also punished equally, and as
far forth, as it may, in a commonwealth. For though it would be beside
my present purpose to enter here into the particulars of the law of
Nature, or its measures of punishment, yet it is certain there is such
a law, and that too as intelligible and plain to a rational creature
and a studier of that law as the positive laws of commonwealths,
nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier to be understood
than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary
and hidden interests put into words; for truly so are a great part
of the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right as
they are founded on the law of Nature, by which they are to be
regulated and interpreted.
  13. To this strange doctrine- viz., That in the state of Nature
every one has the executive power of the law of Nature- I doubt not
but it will be objected that it is unreasonable for men to be judges
in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves
and their friends; and, on the other side, ill-nature, passion, and
revenge will carry them too far in punishing others, and hence nothing
but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath
certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence
of men. I easily grant that civil government is the proper remedy
for the inconveniences of the state of Nature, which must certainly be
great where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to
be imagined that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury
will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it. But I shall
desire those who make this objection to remember that absolute
monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those
evils which necessarily follow from men being judges in their own
cases, and the state of Nature is therefore not to be endured, I
desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it
is than the state of Nature, where one man commanding a multitude
has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his
subjects whatever he pleases without the least question or control
of those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth,
whether led by reason, mistake, or passion, must be submitted to?
which men in the state of Nature are not bound to do one to another.
And if he that judges, judges amiss in his own or any other case, he
is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.
  14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever
were, there any men in such a state of Nature? To which it may suffice
as an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of
"independent" governments all through the world are in a state of
Nature, it is plain the world never was, nor never will be, without
numbers of men in that state. I have named all governors of
"independent" communities, whether they are, or are not, in league
with others; for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state
of Nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually
to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other promises
and compacts men may make one with another, and yet still be in the
state of Nature. The promises and bargains for truck, etc., between
the two men in Soldania, in or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the
woods of America, are binding to them, though they are perfectly in
a state of Nature in reference to one another for truth, and keeping
of faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of society.
  15. To those that say there were never any men in the state of
Nature, I will not oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker (Eccl.
Pol. i. 10), where he says, "the laws which have been hitherto
mentioned"- i.e., the laws of Nature- "do bind men absolutely, even as
they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never
any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do or not to do; but
for as much as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves
with competent store of things needful for such a life as our Nature
doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man, therefore to supply
those defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single
and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion
and fellowship with others; this was the cause of men uniting
themselves as first in politic societies." But I, moreover, affirm
that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so till, by their
own consents, they make themselves members of some politic society,
and I doubt not, in the sequel of this discourse, to make it very
clear.