Chapter XV
             Of Paternal, Political and Despotical Power,
                         Considered Together

  169. THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately before,
yet the great mistakes of late about government having, as I
suppose, arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with
another, it may not perhaps be amiss to consider them here together.
  170. First, then, paternal or parental power is nothing but that
which parents have over their children to govern them, for the
children's good, till they come to the use of reason, or a state of
knowledge, wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that
rule, whether it be the law of Nature or the municipal law of their
country, they are to govern themselves by- capable, I say, to know it,
as well as several others, who live as free men under that law. The
affection and tenderness God hath planted in the breasts of parents
towards their children makes it evident that this is not intended to
be a severe arbitrary government, but only for the help,
instruction, and preservation of their offspring. But happen as it
will, there is, as I have proved, no reason why it should be thought
to extend to life and death, at any time, over their children, more
than over anybody else, or keep the child in subjection to the will of
his parents when grown to a man and the perfect use of reason, any
farther than as having received life and education from his parents
obliges him to respect, honour, gratitude, assistance, and support,
all his life, to both father and mother. And thus, it is true, the
paternal is a natural government, but not at all extending itself to
the ends and jurisdictions of that which is political. The power of
the father doth not reach at all to the property of the child, which
is only in his own disposing.
  171. Secondly, political power is that power which every man
having in the state of Nature has given up into the hands of the
society, and therein to the governors whom the society hath set over
itself, with this express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed
for their good and the preservation of their property. Now this power,
which every man has in the state of Nature, and which he parts with to
the society in all such cases where the society can secure him, is
to use such means for the preserving of his own property as he
thinks good and Nature allows him; and to punish the breach of the law
of Nature in others so as (according to the best of his reason) may
most conduce to the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind;
so that the end and measure of this power, when in every man's
hands, in the state of Nature, being the preservation of all of his
society- that is, all mankind in general- it can have no other end
or measure, when in the hands of the magistrate, but to preserve the
members of that society in their lives, liberties, and possessions,
and so cannot be an absolute, arbitrary power over their lives and
fortunes, which are as much as possible to be preserved; but a power
to make laws, and annex such penalties to them as may tend to the
preservation of the whole, by cutting off those parts, and those only,
which are so corrupt that they threaten the sound and healthy, without
which no severity is lawful. And this power has its original only from
compact and agreement and the mutual consent of those who make up
the community.
  172. Thirdly, despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one
man has over another, to take away his life whenever he pleases; and
this is a power which neither Nature gives, for it has made no such
distinction between one man and another, nor compact can convey. For
man, not having such an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give
another man such a power over it, but it is the effect only of
forfeiture which the aggressor makes of his own life when he puts
himself into the state of war with another. For having quitted reason,
which God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the
peaceable ways which that teaches, and made use of force to compass
his unjust ends upon another where he has no right, he renders himself
liable to be destroyed by his adversary whenever he can, as any
other noxious and brutish creature that is destructive to his being.
And thus captives, taken in a just and lawful war, and such only,
are subject to a despotical power, which, as it arises not from
compact, so neither is it capable of any, but is the state of war
continued. For what compact can be made with a man that is not
master of his own life? What condition can he perform? And if he be
once allowed to be master of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary
power of his master ceases. He that is master of himself and his own
life has a right, too, to the means of preserving it; so that as
soon as compact enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits his
absolute power and puts an end to the state of war who enters into
conditions with his captive.
  173. Nature gives the first of these- viz., paternal power to
parents for the benefit of their children during their minority, to
supply their want of ability and understanding how to manage their
property. (By property I must be understood here, as in other
places, to mean that property which men have in their persons as
well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the second- viz.,
political power to governors, for the benefit of their subjects, to
secure them in the possession and use of their properties. And
forfeiture gives the third- despotical power to lords for their own
benefit over those who are stripped of all property.
  174. He that shall consider the distinct rise and extent, and the
different ends of these several powers, will plainly see that paternal
power comes as far short of that of the magistrate as despotical
exceeds it; and that absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from
being one kind of civil society that it is as inconsistent with it
as slavery is with property. Paternal power is only where minority
makes the child incapable to manage his property; political where
men have property in their own disposal; and despotical over such as
have no property at all.