Chapter IX
           Of the Ends of Political Society and Government

  123. IF man in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, if
he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the
greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom,
this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any
other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the
state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is
very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for
all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater
part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the
property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This
makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, is
full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that
he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are
already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of
their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general
name- property.
  124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the
preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature
there are many things wanting.
  Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received
and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong,
and the common measure to decide all controversies between them. For
though the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational
creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as
ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a
law binding to them in the application of it to their particular
cases.
  125. Secondly, in the state of Nature there wants a known and
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences
according to the established law. For every one in that state being
both judge and executioner of the law of Nature, men being partial
to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too
far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as
negligence and unconcernedness, make them too remiss in other men's.
  126. Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants power to back
and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution.
They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are
able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times
makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those
who attempt it.
  127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state
of Nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are
quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom
find any number of men live any time together in this state. The
inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to by the irregular
and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the
transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the
established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of
their property. It is this that makes them so willingly give up
every one his single power of punishing to be exercised by such
alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them, and by such rules as
the community, or those authorised by them to that purpose, shall
agree on. And in this we have the original right and rise of both
the legislative and executive power as well as of the governments
and societies themselves.
  128. For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he has of
innocent delights, a man has two powers. The first is to do whatsoever
he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the
permission of the law of Nature; by which law, common to them all,
he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one
society distinct from all other creatures, and were it not for the
corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, there would be no need
of any other, no necessity that men should separate from this great
and natural community, and associate into lesser combinations. The
other power a man has in the state of Nature is the power to punish
the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up when
he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular political
society, and incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest
of mankind.
  129. The first power- viz., of doing whatsoever he thought fit for
the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be
regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the
preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require;
which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by
the law of Nature.
  130. Secondly, the power of punishing he wholly gives up, and
engages his natural force, which he might before employ in the
execution of the law of Nature, by his own single authority, as he
thought fit, to assist the executive power of the society as the law
thereof shall require. For being now in a new state, wherein he is
to enjoy many conveniencies from the labour, assistance, and society
of others in the same community, as well as protection from its
whole strength, he is to part also with as much of his natural
liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety
of the society shall require, which is not only necessary but just,
since the other members of the society do the like.
  131. But though men when they enter into society give up the
equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of Nature
into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the
legislative as the good of the society shall require, yet it being
only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself,
his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be supposed
to change his condition with an intention to be worse), the power of
the society or legislative constituted by them can never be supposed
to extend farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure every
one's property by providing against those three defects above
mentioned that made the state of Nature so unsafe and uneasy. And
so, whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any
commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws,
promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees,
by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies
by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home only
in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign
injuries and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all
this to be directed to no other end but the peace, safety, and
public good of the people.