Chapter XII
           The Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power
                         of the Commonwealth

  143. THE legislative power is that which has a right to direct how
the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the
community and the members of it. Because those laws which are
constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to continue,
may be made in a little time, therefore there is no need that the
legislative should be always in being, not having always business to
do. And because it may be too great temptation to human frailty, apt
to grasp at power, for the same persons who have the power of making
laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby
they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and
suit the law, both in its making and execution, to their own private
advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the
rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and
government. Therefore in well-ordered commonwealths, where the good of
the whole is so considered as it ought, the legislative power is put
into the hands of divers persons who, duly assembled, have by
themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when
they have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject
to the laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them to
take care that they make them for the public good.
  144. But because the laws that are at once, and in a short time
made, have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual
execution, or an attendance thereunto, therefore it is necessary there
should be a power always in being which should see to the execution of
the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus the
legislative and executive power come often to be separated.
  145. There is another power in every commonwealth which one may call
natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man
naturally had before he entered into society. For though in a
commonwealth the members of it are distinct persons, still, in
reference to one another, and, as such, are governed by the laws of
the society, yet, in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one
body, which is, as every member of it before was, still in the state
of Nature with the rest of mankind, so that the controversies that
happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it
are managed by the public, and an injury done to a member of their
body engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this
consideration the whole community is one body in the state of Nature
in respect of all other states or persons out of its community.
  146. This, therefore, contains the power of war and peace, leagues
and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and
communities without the commonwealth, and may be called federative
if any one pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to
the name.
  147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be
really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution
of the municipal laws of the society within itself upon all that are
parts of it, the other the management of the security and interest
of the public without with all those that it may receive benefit or
damage from, yet they are always almost united. And though this
federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great
moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed
by antecedent, standing, positive laws than the executive, and so must
necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it
is in, to be managed for the public good. For the laws that concern
subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions, may
well enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference to
foreigners depending much upon their actions, and the variation of
designs and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of
those who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the best
of their skill for the advantage of the commonwealth.
  148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of
every community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are
hardly to be separated and placed at the same time in the hands of
distinct persons. For both of them requiring the force of the
society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to place the
force of the commonwealth in distinct and not subordinate hands, or
that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons
that might act separately, whereby the force of the public would be
under different commands, which would be apt some time or other to
cause disorder and ruin.