III. B. Josephus and John b. Levi of Gischala

III. B. 1. Josephus and the Jerusalem Coalition of 66-67 C.E.

Around October of 66 C.E., less than three years after his successful embassy to Rome, Josephus was appointed by the "leading men" of Jerusalem as the emissary in Galilee of the provisional government (V 28-29).[1] Before we apply the model of patron-client relations to Josephus' account of his interaction with John b. Levi of Gischala (hereafter simply "John") it is necessary to locate both Josephus and John within a larger framework of the relevant factions that were part of the coalition government.[2] Only when we see how Josephus and John are located in relationship to the factions of the Jerusalem coalition is it then possible to understand their behaviour towards each other as depicted in V.

The head of the Jerusalem coalition was Ananus b. Ananaus and within this coalition there were two factions that competed for control of Galilee through Josephus and John.[3] Diagram 6 depicts the networks that led from the loose coalition in Jerusalem to Josephus and John in Galilee. Its structure is explained as follows: Eleazar b. Ananias was the leader of the faction that controlled northern Galilee through John. A leading Pharisee, Simon b. Gamaliel (V

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[1]Goodman, *Ruling* 156.

[2]The following overview of the Jerusalem-Galilee network is based upon Martin Goodman's analysis in *Ruling*.

[3]Ananias' alliance contained his own long term supporters, the factions of Eleazar and Jesus, as well as other factions (Goodman, *Ruling* 183). Solomon Zeitlin overlooks the faction of Jesus b. Gamalas and therefore identifies only two factions in the provisional government ("A Survey of Jewish Historiography: Josephus Flavius and John of Gischala," *Solomon Zeitlin's Studies in the Early History of Judaism*, New York: Ktav, 1973, 45). Here we are concerned only with those who had a direct impact on the action portrayed in V between Josephus and John.

190-2) was a close friend of John's and supported Eleazar's faction by sending a deputation from Jerusalem to replace Josephus with John as commander of Galilee. When Josephus was first sent to Galilee to assess the situation on behalf of the coalition, Eleazar's faction sent Joazar and Judas to represent their interests and ensure that John was placed firmly in control of northern Galilee. This Joazar was probably the same Joazar (or Joesdrus) b. Nomicos who later returned to Galilee as a member of the deputation to remove Josephus.[4] John was later to become the leader of Jerusalem for a year when Galilee finally fell to the Romans in 68 C.E.[5]

The power of Eleazar b. Ananias's faction was checked by the faction led by Jesus b. Gamalas, who had been High Priest in 63-64 C.E. Josephus describes Jesus b. Gamalas as a close friend who warned him of the plot to remove him from Galilee (V 204). Both Josephus and John were able to gain and maintain their positions in Galilee as a result of their friendships with members of the Jerusalem aristocracy. The tensions of uneasy cooperation and outright competition between Josephus and John is evident within V and arise out of their membership in competing elite factions that were ambitious for complete control over Galilee.[6] Given this context of the factional network between Jerusalem and Galilee we are now in a position to analyze Josephus' interaction with John from the perspective of patron-client relations.

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[4]Goodman, *Ruling* 184. (V 197 with BJ 2.628).

[5]Goodman, *Ruling* 183.

[6]Goodman, *Ruling* 183.

Diagram 6

The Jerusalem-Galilee Networks



III. B. 2. Josephus and John as Faction Members

John of Gischala is introduced to the reader as a leader (or one of the leading citizens) of the Jewish town of Gischala.[7] John tried to restrain the elation of the citizens over the news of the revolt from Rome and urged them to "maintain their allegiance (πίστις)" to Rome (V 43).[8] His moderate stance did not last, for the surrounding Greek cities sacked the town, forcing him to respond by arming "all his followers", and then attack and defeat their neighbouring enemies (V 44).[9] From the start of V, Josephus' readers are introduced to John as a leader of Gischala in northern Galilee who has an armed following.

Right from the first time Josephus and John met we can see the dynamics of the competing Jerusalem factions affecting the action within V. Shortly after arriving in Galilee, Josephus went with Joazar and Judas to meet John in Gischala. That Josephus would trouble

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[7]There can be no questioning that V and BJ portray John as a member of the ruling class. On this see Goodman, *Ruling* 201-2 and Cohen, *Josephus* 221-7.

[8]Both Josephus and John initially react in the same manner to the peasant revolt, they both try defuse the situation and restore loyalty to Rome. This is an indication of their status as members of the ruling class and a further confirmation of the position of the Jewish elite as collaborators with Rome.

[9]The inter-city and inter-ethnic fighting that Josephus describes throughout the V as erupting during the rebellion reflects known sociological dynamics of an imperial-colonial context. Once the immediate threat of Roman punishment for disorder was removed, long standing rivalries were unleased. On Jewish-pagan relations, see Uriel Rappaport, "Jewish-Pagan Relations and the Revolt against Rome in 66-70 C.E.," *The Jerusalem Cathedra* I, Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1981, 81-95; Douglas R. Edwards, "First Century Urban/Rural Relations in Lower Galilee: Exploring the Archaeological and Literary Evidence," *SBL 1988 Seminar Papers* 169-182; P.A. Brunt, "Josephus on Social Conflict in Roman Judaea," *Klio* 59 (1977) 149-53; and E. Schurer, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ*, G. Vermes et. al., 3 Vols. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1973-87, I, 336-513. In light of the intense, local hostility that the Jews faced it is not improbable that Josephus' fortifying activities were not primarily a defensive measure against the Romans but an interim measure against their Greek neighbours. Rappaport likewise suggests that John fortified Gischala not necessarily from anti-Roman motives but as a defensive measure against non-Jewish neighbours, (see, "John of Gischala in Galilee," *The Jerusalem Catherdra* I, Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1981, 52).

himself to meet with John further indicates that John was a significant local leader. Josephus gives the following account of their first meeting:

> I soon discovered that he (John) was eager for revolution and ambitious of obtaining command. For he requested me to authorize him to lay hands on the imperial corn stored in the villages of Upper Galilee, professing a desire to expend the proceeds on the repair of the walls of his native town. Detecting his ultimate design and present intentions, I declined his request; as the authority entrusted to me by the Jerusalem authorities extended to that district, I intended to reserve the corn either for the Romans or for my own use. Unsuccessful with me he turned to my colleagues (Joazar and Judas), who were blind to coming events and quite open to receive money. These he bribed to vote that all the corn stored in his province should be delivered to him. Unsupported and out-voted by the other two, I held my peace (V 70-73).

This episode must be read within the context of the uneasy alliance between the factions of Jesus and Eleazar. Josephus is never explicit about the existence of these two factions and this is probably due to the fact that he wanted to distance himself from John in the eyes of his Roman readers. This is understandable since John ended up being taken prisoner to Rome by Titus for life imprisonment as leader of the rebel forces at the fall of Jerusalem.

Given the factional context of this episode we are now able to see that its subtext reads as follows: Jesus' faction manoeuvred to have Josephus put in place as commander of Galilee, or at least southern Galilee, (this much we can assume), but as a countermeasure, Eleazar's faction had Joazar and Judas sent with Josephus to ensure that their man in Galilee, John, was able to maintain control of northern (Upper) Galilee. This scenario is confirmed in Joazar and Judas' support of John over the issue of who would control the imperial corn of Upper Galilee.[10] It is obvious that whoever controlled the stores of imperial corn thus gained the ability to build and maintain support within that region. Goodman notes that once Joazar and Judas confirmed

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[10]Goodman associates Joazar and Judas' support of John's control over the imperial corn as "a transfer of power in the north of Galilee to John" (Goodman, *Ruling* 201), but he fails to connect the control of resources to the social structure of patron-client relations as *the* mediator of major resources.

John's position in Upper Galilee, they returned to Jerusalem.[11] Their abrupt departure at this point in the action leads one to wonder if they had not been sent by Eleazar's faction for this very reason - to ensure that John gained control of the imperial stores and thereby maintained his (and therefore, Eleazar's) position in Upper Galilee.[12]

With the resource of the imperial corn behind him and the control of Upper Galilee that it gave, John was now firmly in position to further strengthen himself and his faction by selling off the oil of Gischala to Caesarea Philippi at an enormous profit (V 74-76).[13] Josephus was unwilling to prevent John from gaining yet more power through the sale of Gishcala's oil out of fear of being stoned by the mob if he interfered (V 76). This is the first, albeit by itself weak, indication of John's patronage of the people of Gischala and their support for him over against Josephus. The people of Gischala would have supported John in the sale of oil as they knew the profits would have given their patron yet more resources to distribute among his clients. In light of what follows, these two episodes show two elite rulers manoeuvring for control over key resources of Upper Galilee. Whoever gains control of the resources attains a position to engage the Jews as clients and, indirectly, as supporters of one or the other factions of the Jerusalem coalition. Through the support of Eleazar's faction, as mediated by Joazar and Judas, John

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[11]Goodman, *Ruling* 184.

[12]Cohen, *Josephus* 210, misses John's connection to Eleazar's faction and therefore finds it "strange" that Josephus should refer to Upper Galilee as "his (John's) province" (V 73) but this must have been obvious to Josephus, who would have know full well that Eleazar was intent on maintaining John in Upper Galilee and therefore sent Joazar and Judas with Josephus to represent his faction's interests in Galilee and support John over the issue of the imperial corn. V indicates that Josephus was very astute politically about both Jerusalem and Rome. As a member of the ruling aristocracy he had to be just to survive among his peers.

[13]This is a good example of how social status serves in the redistribution of wealth in an embedded economy. In antiquity social status and the political power that was embedded in status lead to the control and distribution of peasant surplus (Anthony J. Saldarini, *Pharisees, Scribes and Sadducees in Palestinian Society: A Sociological Approach*, Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1988, 23).

acquired control of the resources and Jews of Upper Galilee. After this point, Josephus is never able to exercise any authority in Upper Galilee. As will be seen below, the issue of patronage and resources are inextricable intertwined within V.

III. B. 3. Excursus: Shaye J.D. Cohen on Josephus and John

Shaye J.D. Cohen overstates the case when he says that Josephus and John were on good terms.[14] The best that can be said about their relationship as it is portrayed in V is that is was framed by their respective factions' uneasy alliance under Ananus. Contrary to Cohen, Goodman notes that because Josephus and John were technically allies in the coalition, Josephus therefore,

> accordingly delegated power to Eleazar's supporters in Galilee as appropriate. But he did not trust them, and much of his energy was directed to preventing them from supplanting him from his post ... Josephus' attitude towards John and the rest of Eleazar's faction was ambivalent, since they were technically in coalition with his own political associates.[15]

Cohen consistently misses the systemic level of analysis and typically reduces his explanations to a personalistic level. We see this happen when Cohen explains the tension between Josephus and John as the result of resentment on the part of John and a personality flaw on the part of Josephus:

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[14]Cohen, *Josephus* 222.

[15]Goodman, *Ruling* 183-84. The process of power sharing was probably one of negotiating and manoeuvring rather than "delegating". The is no evidence to suggest that Josephus was in a position to delegate anything in Upper Galilee after John gained control of the imperial corn stores.

> Enduring cooperation between the two leaders was impossible. John resented the intrusion of a rival into his domain and Josephus was too vain to accept anyone as an associate.[16]

John's lack of willingness to cooperate with Josephus is certainly more than a matter of mere resentment - he had to promote the interests of his faction. As to the charge of vanity, this is simply an abusive *ad hominem* parading as an explanation. Neither Josephus nor John were in a position to accept the other as a full "associate" within the context of rival factions in an uneasy alliance. Furthermore, as Cohen's analysis does not adequately take into account Josephus and John's membership in the Jerusalem coalition he is therefore "uncertain" why John needed Josephus' cooperation for the sale of Gischala's oil.[17] Cooperation, even if unwilling, would have been essential in light of the alliance.[18]

III. B. 4. Competition for the Loyalty of the Tiberians

The next time Josephus and John met was in Tiberias were John had travelled to the hot baths on account of his health (V 85). With Josephus meanwhile in the village of Cana (V 86), John took advantage of his absence to try to sway the allegiance of the Tiberians from Josephus to himself:

> On his arrival at Tiberias, John attempted to induce the inhabitants to abandon their loyalty to me and attach themselves to him; and there were many who, ever craving for

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[16]Cohen, *Josephus* 223.

[17]Cohen, *Josephus* 222.

[18]One of the few explicit indications of the cooperation that existed between the two rival leaders is also an indication of their intense rivalry. This is seen when Josephus permits John to travel to the hot baths of Tiberias on the excuse of poor health (V 84-93). On his arrival John immediately attempts to undermine Josephus' leadership of that city (see below).

> revolution, by temperament addicted to change and delighting in sedition, gladly responded to his invitation (V 87).

Josephus was warned of John's intrigue by Silas, whom Josephus had earlier appointed as governor of Tiberias (V 89). On hearing of John's plot, Josephus marched with two hundred men to Tiberias to confront John and try to regain control of the city's inhabitants:

> I urged them not to be so hasty in revolting; such fickleness would be a blot on their character, and they would justly be suspect by a future governor, as likely to prove equally disloyal to him (V 93).

This episode ends with Josephus running for his life from Tiberias when John sent men to kill him. When the clients of Josephus heard of John's attempt on their patron's life, they rallied to Josephus' aid and threatened to sack Tiberias. This in turn caused John to retreat from Tiberias back to Gischala and Josephus and John were once again in a stalemate over the control of Galilee (V 94-103).

In this episode we see one member of an elite faction, John, trying to out-manoeuvre a member of another elite faction, Josephus, for the loyalty of a group of clients - the Tiberians. Since they are explicitly fighting for the *loyalty* of the Tiberians we can reasonably conclude that the issue at stake in the minds of the actors is the matter of who is going to be the patron of this group of clients and mediate the resources of their respective factions to the client-group.[19] This is most clearly seen in Josephus' speech to the Tiberians (above, V 93) where he reminded them that disloyalty to one patron will put them at a disadvantage under their new patron, who will then suspect the quality of their loyalty and be less likely to govern in their interests. This interpretation of the subtext of Josephus' appeal is entirely probable when one remembers that

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[19]Patronage of communities, towns and even cities was common throughout the Roman world. It "was treated as analogous to personal patronage: it was described in similar vocabulary, was equally heritable, and also involved reciprocal services", Garnsey and Woolf, "Patronage of the Rural Poor in the Roman World," 161.

loyalty is one of the few things the peasants had to offer the ruling class. Josephus has rightly identified the very dangerous position that the Tiberians were placing themselves in by withdrawing their loyalty from his client, Silas, the governor of Tiberias. They threatened to seriously devalue their primary resource - loyalty.

III. B. 5. John Gains the Loyalty of Gabara

After relating the episode of John and the Tiberians, Josephus describes two unrelated events and then appears to return to V 84 - the start of the above episode. Just as the episode of John and the Tiberians begins with an account of how Josephus' popularity with his Galilean clients aroused the envy of John (V 84-85), so does this next account begin with a similar cause and effect explanation: John saw the popularity of Josephus among his Galilean clients, perceives this to be a threat - "believing that my success involved his own ruin" (V 122) - and responds by trying to undermine the loyalty of Josephus' clients. That John should see the popularity of Josephus as a threat to his position reflects the dynamics of intense competition between two patrons for the loyalty of a fickle population of clients. This parallel preface probably indicates that Josephus is here returning to the story line of V 84 and now adding some more details: not only did John move against Josephus in Tiberias, but he also tried to attract the loyalty of the inhabitants of Sepphoris and Gabara.

> Hoping to check my good fortune by inspiring hatred in me in those under my command, he tried to induce the inhabitants of Tiberias, Sepphoris, and Gabara - the three chief cities in Galilee - to abandon their loyalty to me and go over to him, asserting that they would find him a better general than I was. Sepphoris, in pursuance of their policy of submission to Rome, lent no ear to either of us and rejected these overtures. Tiberias, while declining the suggestion of revolt, consented to befriend him. Gabara, at the instigation of Simon, a leading citizen and a friend and associate of John, went over to

> his side. The people of Gabara, it is true, did not openly admit their defection; their dread of the Galileans, of whose devotion to me they had frequent experience, was too great a deterrent. But they secretly laid their plots and watched for a favourable opportunity for their execution (V 123-25).

Here again we see that the issues are loyalty and patronage. Who is the best possible patron to be loyal to in the midst of the revolt? John's success in Gabara due to his friendship with the leading citizen, Simon, is yet one more indication of how factional networks grew and were maintained through personal contacts between members of the ruling class. With this context of struggle for loyalty (i.e., that which clients owe to patrons) it is significant that the question is phrased by Josephus as who will be the best στρατηγός. That the issue is a public appointment mediated from Jerusalem is further indication that we are looking at patron-client relations in these texts. David Braund has noted that the public offices of a Roman governor or general in the field "tended to generate patronage".[20] V appears to indicate that the relation between public office and patronage was no less true for Roman Palestine than it was for Italy. The very cities that rejected either John or Josephus are also those cities that looked to Rome and not Jerusalem for resources. We also see in this passage the role that clients play in a situation of competing patrons. The citizens of Gabara were constrained in their support of John by the clients of Josephus - the Galileans. John was correct to fear the growing popularity of Josephus for it minimized his own ability to gain new clients and penetrate Lower Galilee.

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[20]Braund, "Function and Dysfunction," 140.

III. B. 6. Summary

The main indications that John interacted with the citizens of Gischala and Josephus from within the script of patron-client relations are as follows: (1) John was a member of an elite faction and through his faction's support was able to gain control of the imperial corn stores of Upper Galilee, an area which Josephus refers to as "his (John's) province"; (2) John has the support of the citizens of Gischala, who offer him a variety of services, including protection from Josephus and the Galileans and assistance in trying to undermine or even kill Josephus; (3) John clearly attempts to undermine the loyalty of Josephus' clients in strategic areas - Tiberias, Sepphoris and Gabara; and (4) the clients of John and the clients of Josephus engage in conflict with each other as distinct groups loyal to different patrons (V 123-25).

John is clearly a high status elite ruler while his followers are Jewish peasants. The fight over loyalties takes place with close proximity between patrons and clients and there is an implicit flow of generalized reciprocity between John, the controller of imperial stores and the successful trader in oil and the people of Gischala, who give loyalty and support and labour to John in his fight against Josephus.[21] Through the above episodes the picture that emerges is one of patrons who belong to rival factions in an elite alliance who therefore compete at the local level for resources and loyalty - the two key elements required for them to maintain their position

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[21]Sean Freyne, *Galilee* 211, refers to John as "commercially entrepreneurial," but his actions of manoeuvring for control of corn and selling the oil cannot be interpreted with reference to the modern economic concept of commercial entrepreneurialism as if John was a private individual in a capitalist market system. Commercial entrepreneurialism largely arises out of private monetary incentives and rewards and reflects a highly individualistic society. Yet John's actions were probably not motivated primarily out of the desire for private profit but reflected his role, as an elite patron, within a redistributive economy. He actions are best described as an elite patron who reinforced his ability to redistribute material goods to a growing base of local clients (on the lack of an entrepreneurial ethic in antiquity, see T.F. Carney, *The Economy of Antiquity: Controls, Gifts and Trade*, Lawrence, Kansas: Coronado, 1973).

as patrons within an arena of intense local and national conflict. It is indicative of this scenario of competing patrons that the last mention of John in V describes how Josephus, with the aid of his Galilean clients, successfully undermines the loyalty of John's clients and forces him to retreat and remain in his native town, Gischala (V 368-372). The picture of patron-client relations that emerges in V's account of the conflict between patronage networks in Judaea remarkably conforms to Andrew Wallace-Hadrill's description of patronage within the larger setting of Roman society:

> The secret of the game is the manipulation of scarce resources ... The ruling nobility, priests, magistrates, judges, legal counsel, and generals rolled into one, stood astride all the major lines of communication with the centre of state power and the resources it had to distribute ... It was the inaccessibility of the centre except through personal links that generated the power of patronage ... the important feature is that links between communities and the Roman state are mediated through individuals; and in fact the more formal links are supplemented by numerous informal patronal links between members of the local elites and members of the Roman elite.[22]

Josephus began the story of John from the perspective of patron-client relations and ended it within the same cultural script. The following section on the Galileans as clients of Josephus will further highlight aspects of Josephus and John as competing patrons.

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[22]Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage in Roman Society," 73-75.

III. C. Josephus and the Galileans

III. C. 1. Josephus Initiates the Patron-Client Relation

After describing how John outmanoeuvred Josephus in Gischala over the corn and oil, Josephus then immediately relates how he engaged the Galileans as his clients (V 77-84). He does this through two means, first, by paying off the local brigands so they would refrain from attacking "either the Romans or their neighbours" (V 78). These λῃσταί, brigands, were not revolutionaries, as the type of social banditry that Josephus describes is in fact a form of pre-political rebellion common to peasant societies.[1]

There is no basis for Cohen's unsupported assumption that these bandits were "experienced, fulltime fighters who did not have to return to their farms for a livelihood".[2] Social bandits in peasant societies frequently lived within their own villages and were often only part-time bandits:

> Bandits seem to have enjoyed considerable support in their local communities, a fact recognized by the Roman lawyers who realized that such support was essential for the bandits to survive and enjoined local officials to do the best they could to erode popular support for bandits and ensure support for agents of law and order.[3]

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[1]Richard A. Horsley and John S. Hanson, *Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs: Popular Movements at the Time of Jesus*, Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1985, 48-87.

[2]Cohen, *Josephus* 211.

[3]Keith Hopwood, "Bandits, Elites and Rural Order," *Patronage in Ancient Society*, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, 175-76. On social banditry see, Henk Driessen, "The 'Noble Bandit' and the Bandits of the Nobles: Brigandage and Local Community in Nineteenth-Century Andalusia," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 24 (1983); Goodman, *Ruling* 60-64; E.J. Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, Middlesex: Penguin, 1969; Horsley and Hanson, *Bandits*; and Richard W. Slatta, ed., *Bandidos: The Varieties of Latin American Banditry*, New York: Greenwood, 1987.

Whether the bandits that Josephus was faced with were from villages on the periphery of Galilee or from within Galilee would have had little bearing on how Josephus would have engaged them as clients. What is significant is that this episode of V reflects the frequent observation of anthropologists and social scientists; brigands and powerholders, and even local villagers, are often found intimately tied to each other.[4] The situation in antiquity, as reflected in Hopwood's observation (above) remained more or less the same for nineteen hundred years, as is seen in Henk Driessen's portrait of brigandage in nineteenth-century Andalusia, Spain:

> A municipal secretary sold false transfer-guides to cattle-thieves, a municipal night-watchman concealed bandits in his house, judges refused to try brigands arrested by the Civil Guard, victims and eye-witnesses often refused to give notice of crimes.

What is obvious is that Josephus used patronage as a means of moving from the centre and controlling the periphery through a typical two-stage operation that involved creating a patronage network between the local elite rulers and Jerusalem, and then engaging the peasants and bandits alike, granting protection to all groups "in return for the specialisms each was capable of".[5]

The dynamics of social banditry in the Mediterranean indicates that Josephus' solution of engaging the bandits as a way of controlling them and keeping the peace should not be seen as a particularly "brilliant solution".[6] To the contrary, it was a rather common for elite rulers and patrons to engage groups of bandits as their clients and use these bandits to protect their own

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[4]"(l)ocal representatives of state authority and bandits were often hand in glove" (103), Driessen, "The 'Noble Bandit'. B.J. 2.253 speaks of bandits with close links to villages.

[5]Driessen, "The 'Noble Bandit'" 184.

[6]*Pace* Cohen, *Josephus* 211.

territory and harass rival patrons.[7] Once again, Cohen's insufficient understanding of the social scripts of Josephus' world lead him to wrongly explain Josephus' behaviour has the result of a perceived personality flaw - vanity:

> Josephus may have been vain enough to instruct his *lestai* to do nothing without his command, not even to harass the Romans.[8]

While Cohen does note the obvious, "Josephus tried to set himself up as the intermediary between the populace and the brigands and to gain the loyalty of both" yet in the absence of an explicit model of patron-client relations he is consistently unable to extract the significance of what it meant to be an intermediary and to engage a group's loyalty.[9] Within the context of a patron-client relation, Josephus' expectation of a reasonable degree of loyalty and service from his bandit-clients can hardly be the basis for an accusation of vanity, nor can his action of doing so be seen as all that extraordinary.

The second way Josephus engaged the Galileans as clients was by simply engaging their leaders as "friends" and assistants in the administration of Lower Galilee:

> Wishing, moreover, under the guise of friendliness, to retain the Galilean authorities, some seventy in all, as hostages for the loyalty of the district, I made them my friends and companions in travel, took them as assessors to cases which I tried, and obtained their approbation of the sentences which I pronounced; endeavouring not to fail in justice through precipitate action and in these matters to keep clear of all bribery (V 79).[10]

Josephus needed the support of the Galileans of Lower Galilee in order to secure the area against John. This he did, first, by using his position and status to negotiate a dyadic contract between

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[7]Goodman, *Ruling* 224-26.

[8]Cohen, *Josephus* 212.

[9]Cohen, *Josephus* 214.

[10]Among agarian peasants, patrons are particularly valued as mediators of disputes and perservers of local order (Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation?" 23-24).

himself and the bandits on their behalf thus supplying them with a vital, non-market accessible resource - protection. Secondly, Josephus then initiated a patron-client relation with the local leaders of the Jewish peasantry. The euphemism "hostages for the loyalty of the district" indicates that this one level of Josephus' clients (the Galilean leaders) would be a guarantee of the loyalty of his clients' clients, the Galilean peasantry.[11] From this point on in V Josephus' primary descriptive characteristic of the Galileans is that they were his loyal clients.

Cohen claims that the local Galilean leaders "resented the intrusion of outsiders into their domain" but Josephus was not merely an "outsider" but a representative of the Jerusalem coalition.[12] It is probably not assuming too much to suggest that the local aristocracy were well informed of the Jerusalem political scene and were anxious to align themselves with whichever faction they thought was going to gain dominance once things returned to normal. Within V there is no indication of any such resentment on their behalf. Quite to the contrary, V gives one the impression that the local aristocracy were very quick to chose sides and support either John or Josephus. While Cohen is at a loss to discover why the Galilean aristocracy would have supported Josephus, we can be certain that he was perceived not as an intruding rival authority but as a mediator of the potential resources of both the coalition and his own faction.[13] Support

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[11]Cohen is uncertain whose loyalty the Galilean leaders were guaranteeing, "of themselves and the others of their class, or of the Galileans?" (Cohen, *Josephus* 208). Yet the context of V 77-84 is clearly patron-client relations: Josephus describing his clients and how he engaged them (V 77-79); his character as an ideal patron (V 80-83); and his clients' loyalty to him (V 84). Therefore it is certain that the phrase "the loyalty of the district" meant both the loyalty of the local leaders *and* the Galilean peasantry in light of the wider context of V and with regard to the general dynamics of a patron-client network.

[12]Cohen, *Josephus* 206-209.

[13]Sydel Silverman's study of the Colleverdesi reveals a parallel phenomenon that saw the patronage system serving as a means to draw high-status outsiders into local commitments ("Patronage as Myth" 17). The same dynamic appears to have occurred between the Galilean aristocracy and Josephus.

for a well placed member of the Jerusalem aristocracy would have come naturally to the resource-starved, Galilean leaders.

When read from the perspective of local cultural concerns, Josephus' introduction of John, the citizens of Gischala, the brigand-mercenaries, the Galilean aristocracy and the Galileans (V 70-84) exhibits the constant theme of patron-client relations. The plot's cultural dynamics can be represented as follows:

(1) The character (honour) of John (V 70)

(2) Factional contest over resources (control) of Upper Galilee (V 71-76)

(3) The citizens of Gischala introduced as John's loyal clients (V 76)

(4) Brigands controlled and engaged as clients (V 77)

(5) Galilean aristocracy engaged as clients (V 79)

(6) The loyalty of the Galilean peasantry gained (V 79)

(7) Josephus' character (honour) as a patron (V 80-83)

(8) The loyalty and affection of Josephus' clients (V 84)

(9) The beginning of patron competition for clients' loyalty (V 85-87)

I cite this as an example of how a text must be mapped out in terms of its cultural concerns as a preliminary step to understanding its flow of action and central themes.

After describing John's dishonour; "he was eager for revolution and ambitious of obtaining command" (V 70) and how John managed to engage the citizens of Gischala and how they subsequently supported John against Josephus (V 70-76), Josephus then gives a parallel account of how he engaged the Galileans and their leaders (V 77-79). He then describes his own

honour as a patron (V 80-83); he did not violate the honour of his clients through their women,[14] he did not pervert justice through accepting bribes (as John did), he extended mercy to John, his enemy/inferior; and he was honoured by God through the deity's protection. Josephus' description of himself as the ideal honourable patron stands in obvious contrast to the earlier account of John's lack of honour. He concludes this parallel account with a description of the extent of his client's loyalty and affection towards him and how this loyalty threatened John (V 84-86).[15] Undoubtable, this section is addressing cultural concerns of great importance to Josephus' elite readers. Having now examined how Josephus initiated a patron-client relationship between the Galileans and their leaders in Lower Galilee, we will continue to apply our model to the rest of Josephus' account of his relationship with the Galileans in V 87-392.

III. C. 2. Indications of the Galileans as Clients of Josephus

The primary indication that the Galileans behaved towards Josephus as his clients is seen in the way they consistently came to Josephus' aid when he was threatened by an enemy or attacked by a rival patron, John, and/or his clients. We see this in the following instances:

(1) V 97-100: The Galileans offer to sack Tiberias when they prove disloyal to Josephus and some of the Tiberians desert to John.

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[14]On the sexual behaviour of women being the crucial link in the structure of a family's honour see, Wolf "Kinship" 171 and Jane Schneider, "Of Vigilance and Virgins: Honour, Shame and Access to Resources in Mediterranean Societies," *Ethnology* 10 (1971) 3.

[15]It is hopelessly ethnocentric to claim that in V 84 Josephus is boasting of his popularity in his "normal vainglorious manner" (Cohen, *Josephus* 125). Josephus' frequent claims of popularity among the Galileans is a function of his claim to have been an honourable patron. In this context, claims to popularity cannot be interpreted as a function of vanity.

(2) V 102-103: The Galileans offer to kill John and his supporters, the citizens of Gischala, when they discover that John tried to kill Josephus.

(3) V 104-111: A large number of armed Galileans accompany Josephus when he went to Sepphoris to confront Jesus, the brigand chief.

(4) V 124-25: The Galileans prevented the citizens of Gabara from openly defecting to John.

(5) V 368-372: Josephus uses the Galileans to undermine John's own supporters.

(6) V 373-89: The Galileans almost sack Sepphoris and Tiberias when these cities try to invite the Romans into their midst.

All of these episodes reflect a group of clients' support for their patron.

The second indication that Josephus was the patron of the Galileans is seen in their attitude towards Josephus as a supplier of a vital, non market-accessible resource - protection from the brigands. When Josephus decided to quit Galilee in the face of John's intrigues and attempts on his life, the Galileans responded by gathering together before Josephus and then imploring him "not to abandon them to their enemies nor, by my departure, leave their country exposed to the insolence of their foes" (V 210). The very service Josephus renders for the Galileans when he describes how he engaged them as clients, protection from brigands (V 77-78), is in turn the reason later cited for the Galileans' not wanting to see the departure of their patron; "being convinced that while I remained at my post no harm would befall them" (207).

The final indication that Josephus and the Galileans interacted from within the context of a patron-client relationship is seen in the support Josephus received from the Galileans when he was faced with the Jerusalem deputation that John arranged to have sent to Galilee to see to his

removal (V 189-335).[16] It is indicative of the role of client support in a factional struggle between patrons that the deputation was to approach the Galileans in an effort to undermine their loyalty to Josephus (V 198). Since the deputation did not have the full support of the Jerusalem coalition they therefore had to resort to attempting to undermine Josephus' client base. A loss of a large client base would render him inconsequential to the coalition. Josephus indicates that the deputation was completely unable to undermine the loyalty of his supporters (V 230-33; 252-53). Quite the opposite, they wanted to kill John and the Jerusalem deputation for their intrigues (V 305-308; 362).

At the height of the conflict between Josephus and the deputation the Galileans praise Josephus as their benefactor and saviour (V 244; 259). Josephus relates how, in front of the deputation, the Galileans,

> bore testimony to my past conduct and exhorted me upon my course in future; and they all swore that the honour of their womenfolk had been preserved and that they had never received a single injury from me (V 259).

Josephus leaves no doubt in the minds of his readers as to who held the loyalty of the Galileans in Lower Galilee. The conflict between Josephus and the deputation ended with their humiliation at the hands of Josephus and they were sent back to Jerusalem under an armed escort (V 331-32).[17]

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[16]Zeitlin attributes the change in the provisional governments' attitude of Josephus' command to Josephus own actions and not to factional manoeuvring by John. Yet there is no compelling reason to doubt that the deputation was sent as a result of bribery within the coalition ("A Survey of Jewish Historiography," 45).

[17]Cohen attributes the failure of the deputation to their supposed origin in a Pharisaic faction - they failed because the Pharisaic movement was not influential in Galilee "until after the Bar Kokhba revolt" (*Josephus* 226). But Pharisaism was neither the issue with Josephus or with the Galileans. To the contrary, the issues that are clearest in V are the loyalty of the Galileans to Josephus, the Galileans' opposition to the rival patron, John and the honour and good conduct of their own patron Josephus. It is patron-client dynamics, and not the lack of popularity for the Pharisaic movement, that best explains the deputation's failure.

In section II.C.3.a (above), the issue of power and oppression within a patron-client context was raised and the factors that serve to mitigate the exploitation of clients by their patron(s) were outlined. Our analysis would remain incomplete if the legitimacy of the main patron-client relationship was not brought under investigation:

> Patron-client exchange falls somewhere on the continuum between personal bonds joining equals and purely coercive bonds. Determining exactly where between these two poles a paticular patron-client system should be placed, or in which direction it is moving, becomes an important empirical question in any attempt to gauge its legitimacy.[18]

Using Josephus' account of the relationship within V, and recognizing the limitations of analyzing only his side of the story (the only "side" we have), we are now in a position to pass tentative judgement on the quality of the central patron-client relationship of V. The response of the Galileans to Josephus' decision to terminate the relationship and abandon his clients to their enemies (the brigands and the clients of the rival patron, John) was to send "messengers throughout Galilee to announce my intended departure" (V 207). The Galileans, including the "women and children" (210), then gathered together in front of their patron, Josephus and:

> flung themselves on their on their faces and with tears implored me not to abandon them to their enemies nor, by my departure, leave their country exposed to the insolence of their foes (V 210).

The pressure of the crowd and an encouraging dream the night before (V 208) serve to change Josephus' mind and he decides to remain in Galilee. This episode is certainly an example of Josephus giving in to moral pressure from the community that would have him maintain an obviously beneficial (for the Galileans) relationship.

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[18]Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation?" 22. Scott makes the important point that the question "is not whether the exchange is lopsided, but rather *how* lopsided it is (*sic*)" ("Patronage" 25).

But if the Galileans were in such desperate need of Josephus' protection services, what then prevented him from abusing his power over his needy clients? Josephus' power proved to be limited by at least four factors: (1) the high demand for labour that arouse out of his need for a personal army; (2) the inter-patron conflict within Galilee and Jerusalem that turned client-groups into a limited and valuable resource; (3) the high level of client choice that appears to have been active, judging by the repeated attempts of John to gain recruits from among Josephus' own clients, and (4) the ability of the Galileans to repay Josephus, and thus strike an equitable balance of exchange, by providing their patron with physical protection from both John, the Jerusalem deputation and the Romans. The one unknown factor is whether the Galileans had any viable, alternative source of protection from their enemies. As Josephus appears to have had little difficulty in engaging and maintaining the Galileans as clients in a highly competitive environment, we may speculate that he was perceived by the Galileans as their best source of protection and vital resources. These mitigating factors of the relationship between Josephus and the Galileans are summarized in the following diagram.

Diagram 7

Factors that Mitigated the Exploitation of the Galileans

MORAL PRESSURE	Josephus was dissuaded from prematurely ending his relationship with the Galileans
HIGH DEMAND FOR LABOUR	Josephus was in great need of a large client base to serve as a personal army
INTER-PATRON CONFLICT	Josephus' need for a loyal client base was heightened by intense factional conflict
CLIENT CHOICE	The Galileans appear to have had the option of turning to John or the Jerusalem deputation
ABILITY TO REPAY	The Galileans repaid Josephus' protection by protecting Josephus from his enemies
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF RESOURCES	Neither Josephus nor the Galileans appear to have had a viable alternative support group

III. C. 3. Summary

The conflict between the coalition factions of Eleazar and Jesus over the control of Lower Galilee was fought over the control of the Galileans as a client base and was largely waged through the local patrons of John and Josephus.[19] The very fact that there was a factional conflict over the control of Galilee is a indication of the probability of inter-patron conflict between Josephus and John over clients in that area. Success in political life required the use of a network of obligations and such networks run throughout Josephus' account of the political struggles of Judaea. Sean Freyne's comment that,

[19]Inter-patron conflict and the role of client choice increased as the social systems of Roman Palestine decayed in the course of the revolt. In a similar fashion, these two factors came to dominate patron-client relations throughout the late empire (see, Garnsey and Woolf, "Patronage of the Rural Poor in the Roman World").

> There is little doubt that in establishing himself with the Galileans over against native 'big men', such as John of Gischala or Justus of Tiberias, Josephus exploited to the full his Jerusalem and priestly connections.[20]

overlooks the factional and patronage networks that operated between Josephus, John, Jerusalem and Galilee. John was not merely a politically isolated, local "big man" in contrast to a well connected Josephus.[21]

We have seen that Josephus acted as a patron of the brigand/mercenaries, the Galilean aristocracy, and οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι themselves. Within V the only lapse in the loyalty of the Galileans was when a rumour had been spread "throughout Galilee" that Josephus was going to "betray the country to the Romans" (V 132).[22] Yet this is a highly understandable reaction on the part of the Galileans and does not detract from the overall weight of the argument. Josephus refuted the rumour and remained the patron of the Galileans (V 143-44).[23]

In Galilee, Josephus was involved in an inter-patron and inter-factional struggle over client loyalty that remained at a general stalemate until the arrival of the Romans and the capture of

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[20]Sean Freyne, *Galilee, Jesus and the Gospels: Literary Approaches and Historical Investigations*, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988, 150-51.

[21]Freyne makes a similar error when he writes that the Galilean peasants "remained innately suspicious of the locals made good (locals like Jesus of Nazareth or John of Gischala)", *Galilee* 267. To the contrary, our analysis shows no such suspicion of John on the bases of his local origin. The suspicion that does exist arises out of either his stance as a revolutionary or from his position as a rival patron to Josephus. John and his interaction with the Galileans cannot be analyzed simply through intuitive concepts of a "big man" or a "local-made-good" without misinterpreting both John and the Galileans.

[22]There is a mention of a Galilean named Jesus who was staying in Jerusalem with six hundred armed men (V 200) but there is no connection between Jesus and the group Josephus refers to as "the Galileans" other than geographical.

[23]This analysis confirms Freyne's observation that within V the term "οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι" has a distinctive meaning as indicating the loyal supporters of Josephus, (Sean Freyne, "The Galileans in the Light of Josephus' *Vita*," *New Testament Studies* 26 [1980] 397-413).

Josephus.[24] Between Jerusalem and Galilee, between faction leader, Jesus b. Gamalas and the Galileans, there existed a network of elite friendships and dependant relationships of social unequals which served to mediate vital resources in both directions. Wallace-Hadrill notes that the key justification for describing the type of network that we see in V as a whole in terms of a patronage network is:

> that it involves exchanges between those closer to the centre of power and those more distant from it, and has the effect of mediating state resources through personal relationships.[25]

That the Jerusalem coalition and Josephus were able to put themselves in a position of leadership over Galilee is seen by Freyne as merely an extension of the council's religious authority to "other spheres of life".[26] But their control over Galilee was less likely a function of religious authority than a function of centre-to-periphery networks that certainly predated the revolt. When the revolt occurred, Galilee simply continued to look to Jerusalem for patronage-based flow of resources and Jerusalem simply stepped into the areas of control that Rome left empty, particularly those surrounding the collection of peasant surplus. Freyne artificially divorces "religious authority" from power over other areas of the social structure of the Galilean

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[24]Cohen once again reduces his analysis of V to a personalistic level when he states that, "Personal rivalry between the two leaders is a sufficient explanation for this ploy (of sending for the Jerusalem deputation) and recourse to political differences is not necessary" (*Josephus* 224). Contrary to Cohen, we have shown that John acted against Josephus because he was a member of a rival faction. Cohen tends to see Josephus and John as largely independent of the Jerusalem coalition, but this was most certainly not the case.

[25]Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage in Roman Society," 77. He also notes that the existence of such a network is hard to document "without numerous collections of letters" (77), but V with BJ stands out as a unique document in antiquity that describes with unusual detail the networks of relationships and the resources involved between the centre and the periphery of society. It is striking that, as far as I have been able to ascertain, there exists no study of patronage within Josephus' work besides my own. In this regard, V has thus far been overlooked.

[26]Sean Freyne, "Galilee-Jerusalem Relations According to Josephus' *Life*," *New Testament Studies* 33 (1987) 602.

peasantry and concludes that Josephus was able to control the Galileans because they "remained attached to that city (Jerusalem) as the symbolic centre of their beliefs".[27] Yet what if Jerusalem was not merely a "symbolic" but a *material* centre that made the marginal survival of the Galilean peasantry possible in an otherwise hostile and uncertain existence?

[27]Freyne, "Galilee-Jerusalem" 607.

III. D. Josephus as the Client of the Emperors (V 414-430)

The final section of V is a long litany of the favours that the emperors Vespasian, Titus and Domitian bestowed upon Josephus:[1]

(1) Vespasian arranged for a virgin-wife for him (414).

(2) Titus protected him from both the Jews and the Roman soldiers on the field of battle (416-17).

(3) Titus offered Josephus booty from the "wreck of my country" (417).

(4) Titus gave Josephus a gift of some sacred books (418).

(5) Josephus was granted the freedom of some of his countrymen, his brother and fifty friends, and was permitted to liberate all of his friends and relatives from the Temple by Titus (419).

(6) Josephus was granted the release of three of his acquaintances who were being crucified by Titus (420).

(7) Titus gave Josephus a better grant of land in a plain near Jerusalem (422).

(8) Vespasian gave Josephus lodging in his old house and granted him both Roman citizenship and a pension (V 423).

(9) Vespasian punished Josephus' accusers and gave Josephus a large tract of land in Judaea (424-25).

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[1]Tacitus also claims to have enjoyed the benefactions of Vespasian, Titus and Domitian: "My official career owed its beginning to Vespasian, its progress to Titus and its further advancement to Domitian" (*Histories* 1.1.5). For a survey of the role of imperial patronage from the beginning of Roman literary activity in the mid third century B.C.E. down to the Flavians, see Gordon Williams, "Phases in Political Patronage of Literature in Rome," *Literary and Artistic Patronage in Ancient Rome*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982, 3-27.

(10) Domitian also continued to protected Josephus from his accusers and exempted his property in Judaea from taxation.

(11) Even Domitia, Domitian's wife, "never ceased conferring favours upon me (429).

While this litany of favours certainly does stretch Josephus' credibility, it is significant that a false claim to Roman citizenship carried with it a severe punishment, so we must consider just how far Josephus would have exaggerated the patronage of the emperors, at least on this count, in the face of potential punishment for such exaggeration.[2] Josephus' claims to imperial benefactions must be measured against the general pattern of imperial patronage of literary figures. His claims reflect Fergus Millar's point that "literary and scholastic pursuits provided by far the best and most direct means of access to imperial favours".[3] If our sources (and they are numerous) are to be believed, the type of imperial patronage that Josephus makes claim to could potentially include simply enormous benefits; piles of money, ranks, property, immunities (from taxation and persecution/prosecution), citizenship, and "protection and succour in innumerable situations in ordinary life".[4] Josephus appears to have experienced the full range of benefits, extraordinary and mundane.

Josephus' list of imperial benefactions do not appear to be randomly chosen. Quite to the contrary, his emphasis on the salvation of kin, land ownership, and imperial favour conforms to Millar's conclusion that "the pattern of *beneficia* which the emperors distributed accurately reflects the values of the society over which they ruled".[5] Furthermore, that as a writer Josephus

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[2]In 62 C.E. Cicero defended a Greek poet from a charge of having made a false claim to Roman citizenship (*Arch*. 5).

[3]Fergus Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World*, London: Duckworth, 1977, 493.

[4]Millar, *Emperor* 506.

[5]Millar, *Emperor* 493.

should claim to find a place within Roman society is not beyond credibility. Peter White's observation about the social opportunities for poets in Roman society is very likely true for historiographers as well: "men with literary abilities found openings in Roman society that other men did not, both in private and in public life".[6]

At the close of V Josephus appears to name yet one more patron, Epaphroditus, for whom he appears to have written AJ and V:

> Having now, most excellent Epaphroditus, rendered you a complete account of our antiquities, I shall here for the present conclude my narrative (V 430).

Richard Laqueur sees in this attribution a switch from Flavian patronage to the patronage of Epaphroditus as a result of a loss of favour with Domitian (*Der jüedische Historiker Flavius Josephus*, Stuttgart, 1920). But from the perspective of patron-client dynamics, I am inclined to think that as we can only guess who Epaphroditus may have been, we are thus left with insignificant data to apply any model. There is no justification for referring to Epaphroditus as the sole or primary patron of Josephus' works when Josephus himself describes the emperors as his patrons, by virtue of their *beneficia*. Laqueur appears to make a rather common mistake of assuming that a writer (or anyone) could have only one patron at a time. It is entirely possible that Epaphroditus was a client of one or more of the emperors and Josephus was a client of both. At any rate, given the known complexity and patterns of literary patronage and the paucity of data, it is certainly misguided to read a switch in the patronage of Josephus from the emperors to Epaphroditus and treat such a supposed switch as a warrant for other conclusions.

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[6]Peter White, "Positions for Poets in Early Imperial Rome," *Literary and Artistic Patronage in Ancient Rome*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982, 64.